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ABSTRACT

Quemoy is a small island with an area of fifty-eight square miles at the mouth of
Xiamen Bay on the southeast coast of China. As a Cold-War front of Taiwan shelled by
the Chinese artillery for twenty years, Quemoy is becoming a heritage tourism
destination attracting mainland Chinese to sightsee in its military structures. In this study,
I examine landscape change in the post-conflict society through the interplay of three
social dynamics—reconciliation, demilitarization, and touristification—exploring the
cultural mechanism of landscape change and its meaning. Through a review of Quemoy’s
history, I identify Quemoy’s geographical characteristics—marginality, cultural hybridity,
and islandness—formed and articulated in a repetitive process that I term as the reversal
of geographical coordinate system. The reversal coincides with a change of social
concerns in the marginal society, whose negotiations with terrestrial and maritime powers
direct its engaging front toward the land or the sea, and stimulates distinct human
inscriptions in the landscape. Militarization of Quemoy as Chinese Nationalists’
Cold-War front initiated the last reversal, which turned its front toward the mainland
China in 1949 and brought forth a military landscape characterized by its rigidity,
hierarchy, and pragmatism. Simultaneously, the militarization incurred biopolitical
production through militia duty, everyday regulation, combat economy, and battlefield
knowledge. As the 1949-reversal is now dissolving under current demilitarization, from
reinvention and destruction of military structures I reveal irony in the landscape as a way
of cultural demilitarization subverting the significance of the past anticommunist
conflicts. Furthermore, by reconstruction of historical landscapes and reinterpretation of
symbolic landscapes, Quemoyans (re)localize landscape and jointly engage in a process
xi

of homeland construction. The juxtaposition of historical simulacra and reinvented
military relics produces heterotopias of a museum island for heritage tourism.
Consequently, the production of irony and heterotopias together serves as the cultural
mechanism of the current identity reformulation from a battlefield to a heritage tourism
destination. Uncovering the mechanism, I then demonstrate that ambiguity and
multiculturality emerging from this irony’s multivocality and heterotopia’s multilocality
is a cultural strategy of the border island society to negotiate with the post-conflict
situation.

xii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: POST-CONFLICT PLACES
AS BATTLEFIELD PARKS
In the last few years of my Master’s study in landscape architecture, I often hovered
with a sketch book and a camera in my hands around the Port Hudson State Historic
Site—a Civil War battlefield thirty minutes away from the LSU campus—conducting
fieldwork for my thesis research to find out what the place means to Southerners today.
An answer to my question did not hide for long, and revealed itself expressively in the
annual reenactment in the late spring. With southern Louisiana geared up for the summer
heat, I watched hundreds of soldiers in heavy wool uniforms, blue or gray, fighting in the
field. Musket shots and canon thunders resonated in the open meadow as smoke drifted
against the banner proclaiming “Lest We Forget!” In such a Southern assemblage, to
carry out the reenactment somebody had to “put on the blue (to enact the Union soldiers),
and a certain number of people never want to do that” (Chen 2005, 141). Little boys in
gray emulated the older enactors, waving their wooden toy swords and guns, excitingly
running behind the line of the Confederate cannons. Following their movements and
joyful voices, I found the answer to my research question in a scene they made (Chen
2005, 142):
[Seeing the Stars and Bars falling back, the band of boys in grey ran] yelling at the
General in the front, “General! General! We’re losing!”
[Hearing them, the reenactor turned toward them with a smile and answered,] “we’re
gonna lose, [but] we’ll still kick their butts!” . . . [In contrast to the scene on the
Confederate side,] the only thing behind the Union army is an [oxcart collecting the
bodies of slain Yankee soldiers] . . . .
At that moment, witnessing the scene, I felt deeply part of the South, the Deep South.
Being in the place, participants not only celebrated the significant siege but also polished
their Southern identity that in the everyday life could only be expressed in full on such an
occasion. In the reenactment, the place let the constructed identity to be: The historic site,
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as the Southerners’ creation, was the place for them to be at home, acting out their distinct
identity. The experience of studying a historic battlefield inspired me to look into the
expressive cultural practice central to local identity in post-conflict places, and also
encouraged me to investigate cases involved with even more intricate social relations and
entangled interplay of cultural dynamics. From a research interest in understanding the
current meaning of post-bellum battlefields, I turned from the Civil War battlefield in the
American South to the other side of the Earth across the Pacific Ocean to the Asian Cold
War front, Quemoy.
This study seeks to explore three major problems: (1) how the place identity
reformulation in the former Cold War battlefield changes its landscapes; (2) the cultural
mechanism of the landscape change, orchestrated by an interplay of social
dynamics—touristification, demilitarization, and reconciliation; and (3) the meaning of
the cultural mechanism, which reveals the post-conflict community’s joint expression in
the identity reformulation. In the following chapters, I describe how people in Quemoy
collectively shaped their landscape to facilitate their activities to articulate themselves in
the post Cold-War era. Their cultural inscriptions on the landscape reciprocally encourage
spatial praxes constituting the reformulated place identities. The mutual reinforcement
between human activities and the designed environment resonantly amplifies the current
identity of Quemoy as an island of heritage tourism. Through an investigation on place
formation on Quemoy, its geographic biography discloses why the coastal island has
consistently been a contested place. The historical review contextualizes the islanders’
cultural praxes in response to the contestation, and reveals the meaning of the praxes.
Unlike their counterparts in the American South, who through commemorative activities
bring the past conflict near, people in Quemoy alienate themselves from their collective
2

past. Through the ongoing process of identity reformulation, the anticommunist past
rapidly fades in order to pursue reconciliation. The alienation suggests a continuum of the
local negotiations in the inherent territorial contestation stemming from the geographical
marginality of Quemoy—a border island in between the land and the sea. In this round of
negotiations, boosters in Quemoy create irony and cultural hybridity in the landscape to
transfer the place image from a Cold War front to a heterogeneous heritage island. The
negotiation strategy disengages Quemoy from the awkward position in the geopolitical
either/or dichotomy, and fosters an ambiguous identity that juxtaposes and blurs all
geographical representations of Quemoy.
1.1 The Land and Water of Quemoy
Quemoy (aka Kinmen, Jinmen and Chinmen 金門) is a coastal island of the Fukien
(aka Fujiang 福建) Province in the southeast China (Figure 1.1). In the legendary
Chinese geographical text, Collection of the Mountains and Seas 山海經, the ancient
Chinese in their cultural hearth, the flood plain of the Yellow River, reported that “the
Min [Fukien] is in the middle of the sea 閩在海中” (Yang 1998, 1). Their
misunderstanding discloses the remoteness of Fukien for the ancient Chinese and
seafaring as the prevalent and particular activity of the peoples there. The geographical
and cultural distance of Fukien from the dominant Chinese culture has had a constant
effect on Quemoy—situating it as a remote island of a remote region, an outlier of an
outlier. Guarding the entrance of Xiamen Bay 廈門灣, Quemoy island controls the
southern Fukien region through the Jiulong River 九龍江 flowing through the region
and then into the bay (Figure 1.2). With an area of 51.83 square miles, Quemoy is in the
shape of a dumbbell with its widest part aligned east to west stretching 12.43 miles (20
km) and its narrowest part aligned south to north in the middle of the island stretching
3

not in scale

Figure 1.1. Quemoy in East Asia. [GIS map remade by
the author]

not in scale

Figure 1.2. Quemoy in the Taiwan Strait. The green area
is the basin of the Jiulong River flowing into the orange
area—the Xiamen (aka Amoy) Bay. [GIS map remade by
the author]
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1.86 miles (3 km). The satellite island of Quemoy, Lieyu 烈嶼, is 6,000 feet away on its
west, and Amoy 廈門, the second large island in the bay (after Quemoy) is nine miles to
west of Lieyu (Figure 1.3). Due to the location at the mouth of the Jiulong River, Amoy
has been the major entrepôt of the region for centuries, while guarding the accumulated
fortune in the region, Quemoy at the entrance of the bay gained greater and greater
military significance over the years.
The spine of Quemoy, the Taiwu Moutain 太武山 with a peak rising 840 feet (256 m)
above the sea level, runs from the narrowest part of the island toward the northeast
(Figure 1.4). The range has only scarce vegetation cover and most of its bedrock (mainly
granite-gneiss) is exposed against the strong wind. The hillsides are generally steep,
barren, and uninhabitable slopes and are flanked on both sides by the coastal plains.
Extending from the range’s crest line to the northeast, a few low hills occupy the island’s
northeastern territory. The southwest portion of Quemoy is also a hilly area rising up
from the sea, and the walled city built to oversee the maritime traffic is also located in
this area. Except for these rugged sections, the rest of the island has gentle topography
covered with a bucolic landscape decorated with hamlets and towns. A few hiccups in the
landscape produce loose wrinkles like drapes on the silk cloth. Two major creeks in the
island flow through the landscape—the Wujiang Creek 浯江溪 in the west, and the
Jinsha Creek 金沙溪 in the northeast. They are both short (less than five miles) and
cannot hold much fresh rain water. Consequently, their upstream sectors often dry out,
until the wet season, when the monsoon rain starts to pour down in the summer. Due to
the prevalent dry conditions, artificial ponds and dammed reservoirs of various sizes are
common landscape features. However, even with water conservation facilities, the
insufficient water supply still makes farming unfruitful toil, and wet-field cultivation is
5

not in scale

Figure 1.3. Quemoy in Xiamen Bay. [GIS map remade by
the author]
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Figure 1.4. Topography Map of Quemoy. [Map remade by
the author]
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hardly practical on most arable lands in the island. Toward their mouths, both the creeks
flow into estuaries with mudflats, and along Wujiang Creek there are also mangrove
forests. The distribution of muddy beaches is generally on the west and north coasts of
the island facing the mainland, while the east and south coasts consist of mainly sandy
and rocky beaches. In the past, the locals turned the intertidal mudflats into oyster farms
and salterns, while they fished and foraged along the sandy and rocky beaches. Inland,
the two historic urban centers were both river towns, on the riverfront highlands where
the water in the creeks flowed year round and enabled access to vessels from the sea.
They were both points of attachment to the mainland society and the local centers of
commercial activities. Not until the Chinese Civil War severed Quemoy from the
mainland was a new town built at the foot of the Taiwu Mountain for the protection it
provided from shelling.
As a Cold War front of Free China in Taiwan, Quemoy has been under Taiwanese
control since 1949, when the Chinese Nationalist troops successfully repelled a Chinese
Communist landing operation. With the triumph, the island thus became the forefront of
“Free China.” Following their defeat, the Chinese Communist army ferociously
bombarded the island three times in the 1950s, and the last one eccentrically turned into a
symbolic artillery battle that lasted for twenty years from 1958 to1978. During the period,
the Chinese Communist artillery shelled Quemoy on odd number dates, and on the even
number dates the Chinese Nationalist artillery struck back. The stalemate lasted for
forty-three years, and put Quemoy under strict military control by the Chinese Nationalist
army until 1992. That year, Quemoy renounced its role as a military base, and
reconstituted itself as a tourist island, with the omnipresent military landscapes on the
island as its selling points.
7

The change of identity released a great impact on the post-military society. As
demilitarization withdrew troops, the masses in Quemoy who relied on military
expenditures as their major income source immediately faced difficulty continuing their
livelihoods. To cope with the stagnant situation, the county government promoted tourism
as the new economic base. By negotiating with the military for land acquisition and
autonomy, the local elites developed an island devoted to battlefield tourism, allowing
outsiders to enter and to tour the island freely, even those originally military-dedicated
facilities. In the recent years, after democratization restored the local autonomy,
renovation of historic landscapes mushroomed. In addition, as a way to enrich and to
diversify resources of heritage tourism, the locals took the opportunity to renovate and to
reinterpret their past. By embodying their reinterpretations in the material settings, they
then reshaped the military landscape to fit the image of their homeland. As a result, the
renovated landscape articulated the local understanding of Quemoy and its past, from
which the place identity and the meaning of homeland reconstruction shone through.
After two decades of tourism development, the islanders have assimilated to the
social changes spurred by the demilitarization starting in 1992. Although effective
solutions for a lingering economic depression have yet to be found, tourism has become
one of the major economic activities in the island. Furthermore, even though the
impression of Quemoy as a Cold War front persists and encourages battlefield tourism,
the identity as an island of heritage tourism also becomes representative enough to
compete with the former place identity (cf. Ou 2005; Chang 2011). Meanwhile, the
reconstruction and reinterpretation of landscapes, which demonstrate the social
adaptation to the post-military society, are very much alive. In spite of the ongoing status
of becoming, the endeavors to reformulate identity on Quemoy have manifested
8

themselves intelligibly in the landscape. My goal in this study is to reveal the cultural
proclamations through an investigation of human interactions with the landscape, which
have been made for the end of identity reconstruction for the former military island.
1.2 Accounts on Former Battlefields in Cultural Geography
This inquiry generally involves in two subjects related to contested places: reuse of
battlefields and place making. One naturally follows the other after the social structure
undergoes significant change following conflicts. Methods chosen to reuse places
associated with conflicts traditionally depend on how the dominant group retrospectively
defines the historic, and antagonistic events. According to Foote (2003), total obliteration
is one option to manage landscapes of violence and tragedy, aside from sanctification,
rectification, and designation. However, the destructive method leaves few physical
traces for later investigation, and the meaning behind the actions for cultural cleansing is
rather frenetically straightforward and dry. In comparison, other methods are more
informative especially in the respect of the intricacy of social tapestry, and thence is able
to unfold before scrutinizing eyes by analyses of the reuse patterns of landscape (e.g.
DeLyser 1999; Gable and Handler 2003). Even with a tempo-spatial continuum from the
past under preservation, the reused historic sites nevertheless do not always articulate the
whole Truth of the symbolized historical events (see Hurt 2010; Karacas 2010). More
frequent than not, as Lowenthal pointed out (1975, 27),
[t]he tangible past is altered mainly to make history conform with memory. Memory
not only conserves the past but adjusts recall to current needs. Instead of
remembering exactly what was, we make the past intelligible in the light of present
circumstances.
Sequentially, some aspects of the conflict are preserved, commemorated, and showcased,
while others are put behind, forgotten, and concealed from the public attentions. On that
very account, Anderson comments that “[a]ll profound changes in consciousness, by their
9

very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific
historical circumstances, spring narratives” (1991, 204). Forgetting is therefore as
important as remembering for historic narratives. Just as the shabby slave quarters are not
much a strong suit, among other exquisite exhibitions of the antebellum elites’ life, in a
Southern plantation tour, Hoelscher (2003) finds that the annual celebrations of the
antebellum heritage in the Natchez Pilgrimage is another way to reassure the racial
supremacy of the dominant group. In Sparke’s case study (1998) when Native American
nations claim their land rights in court against the Canadian government, the long
forgotten heritage of the subaltern group reemerges in the general publics’ attention.
Kapralski (2001), on the other hand, exemplifies the dominant group’s art of forgetting by
its deliberate “manipulations of landscape” in several Jewish-Polish settlements in the
southeastern Poland after WWII, and laments for the oblivion leading Poland to its loss of
“a great deal of its own identity” (56). On the subject of battlefield, Gough (2007)
outspokenly pointed out that the “contrived” historic narratives pertaining to his studied
battlefield (the Beaumont Hamel Memorial in Newfoundland) “prioritized certain
memories over others” (693) to “lend authority to a particular reading of the space” (698).
Hurt (2010) articulates that a dominant pro-military narrative that has long “silenced
Cheyenne histories” (383) in an 1868-American-Cheyenne conflict site (the Washita
Battlefield National Historic Site) currently undergoes a reinterpreting process “to better
present a balanced historic narrative” (388). As these cases have shown, underneath the
most glorified aspect of the past oftentimes the darkest shadow conceals the rest of the
very same past. It is such concealment of the dominant culture that lead Richardson to
assert, “every culture is a conspiracy, and its principle conspiracy is to deny conspiracy”
(2003, 329).
10

For this reason, a place, or how the tract of land is construed, in cultural
geographers’ understanding is not merely products of social construction (Johnston 1991;
Relph 1985), or a depository of social relations (Duncan and Duncan 1988), but moreover
are themselves “social processes” (Gold and Gold 2003; Hanna 1996; Schwenkel 2006;
Till 1999). The view seeing places as social processes lays emphases on practice,
simultaneity, and immediacy of the present world that both the authorities and minorities,
the core and periphery are jointly engaging in. The conceptual transition of place from
products to processes signifies a change in perceiving places from a fixed, passive, and
objective “end product” to a fluid, dynamic, and non-representational dialogue, which
continuously yields meanings to contest for the place. As shown in the case studies of
monuments in Rome (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998), Berlin (Till 1999), Tokyo (Karacas
2010), and Montreal (Osbrone 1998), their meaning changes over time, and their very
existence restlessly stimulates contests over their meanings. Edensor (1997) unraveled in
his study of the Wallace Monument that the contests, as he termed as “the politics of
memory,” are not only negotiations between the present and the past juxtaposing in
places associated with conflicts, but also an ongoing dialogue among coeval social groups
adhering to different understanding of these places.
In addition to its continuous effects on specific locales, the legacy of conflicts also
ignites a comprehensive reshaping process of landscape during the transitional period,
especially the time immediately after conflicts. The reprocessing of symbolic landscape
often happens hand in hand with the post-conflict reconstruction, which embeds and then
showcases narratives of the incumbent dominant groups (see Foote, Tóth, and Árvay
2000; Stangl 2003; Till 2001, 2003, 2005). In some extreme cases (e.g. Falah 1996;
Kapralski 2001), the group arbitrarily obliterates the cultural landscape of Others. In any
11

event, the reshaping consequently produces a set of images which constitutes a
hegemonic representation of the post-conflict place that its dominant group creates to
impose on its residents and outsiders altogether.
Against the imposition, contests over the meaning of place begin, and the politics of
representation follows. The new representation tends to exclude incongruent
interpretations of the contested places by re-emphasizing, appropriating, or obliterating
former cultural inscriptions on the landscape. By maintaining an exclusivity, the
reprocessed cultural landscape can therefore convey narratives of the dominant group to
the public. In the sense, boosterism and place branding in the post-conflict place in the
post-conflict time, to various degrees, manifest such intentions to produce exclusivity
(see Hannam 2006; Palmer 2007; Vitic and Ringer 2007). Since the land is meant to be
construed differently after reconstruction, the reshaping process is a process of place
formation. Moreover, even when the competing representations do not necessarily
exclude one another (see Boholm 1997; DeLyser 2003; Hanna 1996), over long
juxtaposition they can still blur “to become mutually constitutive as a new” (DeLyser
2003, 886). Thus the blurring and contesting both contribute to the evolution of place,
and as a matter of course a battlefield is meant to be something else after the battles.
By examining the social conditions of the post-conflict Quemoy, this study
demonstrates an evolutionary process that begins when boosters reshape the landscape,
providing new interpretations of the past, and consequently reusing the military
stronghold as an island of heritage tourism. The transformation of place image and
representation through the branding activities occasions most phenomena discussed
previously: To reconcile with China, the locals obliterate anti-communist signs and
military structures in the island. By doing so, they intend to pacify the historical
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confrontation while at the same time sanitizing traces of the anticommunist struggle. In
addition, to develop heritage tourism the local government reconstructs historic
landscapes of the antebellum period, and appropriates military relics as tourist attractions.
The “touristification” articulates the peacemaking in progress, and suggests, and
reinforces, the strong social ties between Quemoy and the mainland. Conclusively, the
reshaped landscape and the tourist activities in Quemoy constitute a place image that is
supposed to supplant the former representation of Quemoy, the Cold War front. As
previous studies have indicated, the known effects of touristification in the post-conflict
places may facilitate an identity shift: Working on the landscape touristification can
decentralize the former meanings attached to a place (Hannam 2006); can propagate
designated narratives of the dominant groups (Cooper 2006; Holguín 2005); can
re-fabricate collective group identity (see Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998; Muzaini and
Yeoh 2005; Till 2005); and can unshackle the place from the hegemonic social
constructions (Adams 1997; Evans 2002). With these changes taking place hand in hand
with touristification, politics of memory and representation sequentially emerge.
According to Johnson’s categories (1995), heritage studies are broadly based on two
conceptual frameworks that first “examines the view that the heritage industry is mainly a
mechanism for re-inscribing nationalist narratives in the popular imagination,” and the
other “examines the link between heritage and the cultural changes associated with
postmodernism” (552). The battlefield studies included in Johnson’s first conception
commonly discuss the sanctification of their studied sites, and offer interpretations to
shed light on the phenomena. Through these studies, cultural geographers associate the
former battlefields with heroism, nationalism, and patriotism that grant them a
quasi-religious quality and therefore incite pilgrimage to pay homage to the dead and
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their causes (see Gatewood and Cameron 2004; Lloyd 1998; McLean, Garden, and
Urquhart 2007; Stephens 2007). As a result, “identity” in these studies largely refers to
group identity instead of place identity, while the latter is what this study of Quemoy
mainly focuses on.
Besides, with respect to meaning, although post-conflict societies in these studies
bestow these sites with different (re)interpretations along time, their historic significance,
despite a contentious one, remains in the social spotlight at all times. The continuous
contest facilitates the persistence of their commemorated causes. In other words, these
studies focus on the continuum of historic significance of former battlefields rather than
the vicissitudes in their semiotic values, which however is the main concern of this study
of Quemoy. To reveal the vicissitudes, studies of the latter sort investigate cases of
“obliteration” and “rectification,” according Foote’s categories of management methods
of tragic landscapes (2003). Atkinson and Cosgrove (1998) examine a monument in
Rome that “has been derided throughout its history” and known “to the Romans who pass
by every day as ‘The Wedding Cake’ or ‘The False Teeth’” (28). Hoelscher discusses the
Nazi regime’s flak towers in Vienna as “monuments that, however much we'd like to
forget, simply won't go away” (2008). The military landscape—which the Chinese
nationalist impose upon the islanders in Quemoy to coerce them into carrying on the task
defending the whole nationalist regime—is not locals’ preferred representation of their
homeland. Although out of self-mockery they call their island a “big military camp 大軍
營” (Chang 2008, 67; Yang 1996, 97), a great portion of the local efforts in the
post-conflict reconstruction are dedicated to undoing the forty-three-year militarization of
“their” landscape. The causes commemorated in anticommunist and patriotic memorials
are now inflated social currencies that have only little value among the Quemoy people.
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Furthermore, heritage studies with emphases on place identity often concentrate on
images, representations, and authenticity of the heritage sites (e.g. Adams 1997; DeLyser
1999; Hanna and Del Casino 2003; Hannaford 2001; Gable and Handler 2003). These
place-centered studies fall into Johnson’s second category, in which one examines “the
cultural changes associated with postmodernism.” Tourism usually demands
(re)production of place and its images, which eventually constitute representation of
place. For the characteristic imagery consumption of tourism, the heritage studies in this
category often share a common notion that “tourism is ‘prefiguratively’ postmodern”
(Johnson 1996, 552-3). The constructivist view of imagineering enables these studies to
investigate the socially constructed dimension of space and its relevant issues—the
(re)production of space, the blurring of the reality and representations, the politics of
representation (e.g. Knox 2006; Stainer 2006; Till 2005). The pursuit of a new place
identity in the post-conflict Quemoy through imagineering intersects issues that the
postmodern heritage studies have been investigating. As these studies illustrate, the
currently perceived representation of place and dominant place identity are partially
social constructions that articulate the dialectical relationship of our “social worlds real
and imagined” (Stainer 2006, 104).
The post-conflict imagineering in Quemoy—relying heavily on the local studies
conducted by local K-12 teachers in the past two decades—concretizes the landscape in
memory as well as the local aspirations for their homeland. To satisfy the local yearning
for the antebellum landscapes, the post-conflict reconstruction is a culturally orchestrated
experiment to revert the militarized reality to the nostalgic images in memory. The
exchange of representations of Quemoy—from an anticommunist stronghold in the
nationalist and geopolitical view to an insular destination of heritage tourism in the
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constructivist and decentralized perspective—reveals the local negotiations with (1) their
physical environment, (2) their collective local past, and (3) all the involved interest
groups within and outside the island. Veterans, unionists, separatists, and local boosters
are all concerned how the past of Chinese Civil War is re-narrated and re-inscribed on the
landscape in the current process of identity reformulation. After the meta-narrative of
civil religion has collapsed, the locals are struggling to free themselves from the carapace
of military culture that they have lived in and under for more than four decades. Toward
the end, they take advantage of touristification to justify their end of sanitation of the
military landscape. The tourist development thus serves as an effective tool to propagate
the new representation of Quemoy as a heritage site through boosterism.
Although studies of the battlefield tourism share common research interests with
other heritage studies, they are prone to and distinguished for their focus on the issues of
contested places. As a legacy of war, sites of battlefield tourism often arouse polarized
opinions on the conflictual past; therefore meanings attached to these sites are not only
contested but also confronted. To characterize battlefield tourism—the activity to act out
different opinions, scholars at times call it “dark tourism” (Lennon and Foley 2000) or
“thanatourism” (Seaton 1999). Both the terms suggest a fact that tragedy, violence, and
death in situ constitute the significance of place. As pilgrimages to the former battlefields
gradually popularize battlefield tourism, the rite of civil religion sequentially brings about
the landscape change/production of the former battlefields (see Gold and Gold 2003;
Gough 2007; Knox 2006).
Since the dominant group often attains power to embody their interpretation in the
landscape, the touristified battlefields, due to the embedded hegemonic narratives, tend to
arouse controversies, and turn into contested places. They beckon disputes over their
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meanings held dearly by different social groups, especially the two rival groups
previously fighting and involved in the battle (see Hannam 2006; Smith 2007; Frost 2007;
Panakera 2007). Due to the symbolic value of former battlefields, changes in the material
settings are thus able to articulate the power struggle of the post-conflict communities. As
shown in some precedent studies (e.g. Falah 1996; Foote, Tóth, and Árvay 2000; Karacas
2010; Moeller 2005), the dominant group likely undertakes a syncretic approach to
reshape the landscape, with a hegemonic discourse overwhelming dissonant sounds made
by other dissident groups. With the syncretic observations, these studies suggest an
antagonistic incompatibility between the former landscape/power and the post-conflict
power structure. However, such is not the case in Quemoy, where the coexistence of
military and tourist landscape enunciates their compatibility after re-interpretation.
Touristification of military sites is a tricky business that necessitates both
authenticity and demilitarization. The latter however undercuts the former and vise versa.
As a result, military sites of battlefield tourism are always a product of compromises
between the two: They are partially militarized and partially touristified; both real and
imagined. The ambiguity obfuscates the past conflicts, and delivers the compatibility.
More importantly, the demilitarization in Quemoy stems from the pursuit of
decentralization, democratization, and localization. In the circumstances, although the
historical narrative about the past conflict changes after the demilitarization, the changes
attribute to observations made from different angles by different social classes, yet, on the
same side in the war, instead of totally opposite observations made by the rivals. The
common ground between the two narratives provides a base for understanding. When the
elite class in Quemoy drastically interpreted features of military landscape form war
apparatus to peace tokens, the reinterpretation did not stimulate acute controversies. The
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ambiguity of space and the reinterpretations with compatibility brought by tourist
development enable and display the cultural hybridity after demilitarization.
Following localization and touristification in Quemoy, the local study gradually
becomes a popular subject matter for researchers. However, as the stage of knowledge
production remains preliminary, most of the studies in the last two decades devoted to
data collection in the extra-textual field of reference, and built an academic basis for
advanced exploration later. Under this circumstance, the theoretical and inter-textual
studies of cultural geography are scarce. In the present literature, a few studies relevant to
mine generally center on two issues: production of space and methods of representation.
Scholars studying the first issue share a common interest in revealing the mechanism of
landscape production. Chi (2004) identifies a dialectic interaction in the production of
space during militarization. The dialectics between the everyday space and the militarized
space beget a contested “thirdspace” that “embraces conflicts, confusion, and
ambiguities” (Chi 2004, 523). By her study, Chi highlights the impracticality of total
hegemony, nationalism in this case, over space construction of Quemoy. Other studies
with the same focus investigate the landscape change after demilitarization in 1992.
Considering Quemoy as a “border-island,” the geopolitical study claims that “politics,
nationalism and military are the three major and influential forces involve [sic] in the
landscape transformation process and mechanism” (Chien 2004, 449). On the other hand,
the study of urban planning credits the change “from a war-zone to a cultural tourism
destination” to the local cultural industry, whose success hinges upon the legacy of
militarization—the efficient local institutions and mobilization through the old civil
defense mechanism (Yang and Hsing 2001). Last, Chang and Ryan (2006) in their study
of battlefield tourism propose that heritage tourism renders Quemoy “a place in transition
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from a site of war to a place of normalization” (151), and consider reconciliation as the
solo force promoting the landscape change in Quemoy.
Secondarily, studies concerning methods of representation often conclude with
suggestions for tourist development or historic preservation in Quemoy. In her
exploration of means to interpret former battlefield relics and monuments, Lin (2004)
introduces the concept of “counter-monument,” which de-sanctifies the commemorated
significance by viewers’ participation in completing the monument. Based on a review of
memorialization methods and case studies of war commemorative monuments, she
suggests the preservation of the social memory in Quemoy by a decentralized approach.
With a discussion on the construction and the management of tourist images, Hou (1999)
departs from the methods of recurrence, simulation, and disguise to represent the war
history in Quemoy, “but rather, it should be transformed into tangible contents in artistic
forms to reveal the universal meaning” (39). In addition to the introduction of artistic
forms of representation, he recommends that the current tourist development should
create spaces which invite experiential engagement in the historic battlefield, in addition
to the traditional sightseeing activity. With these suggestions concretized in the landscape,
Zhang (2007) analyzes representation of the war memorials and the touristified military
structures; thereby concluding that the increasing awareness of the new place identity—a
destination of battlefield tourism—among the local population is central to the success of
tourism development. In general, all these studies emphasize the advantages of the
experiential, partaking and bottom-up approaches of representation, revealing an
underlying discourse of local empowerment and localization in the post-conflict Quemoy.
Through the literature review, I discover a few missing points in the current
literature of former battlefields and battlefield tourism. First, research on the subjects tend
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to ignore what essentialists call geographical personality (Dunbar 1974; Norton 2000)
and constructivists call conventional place image, “built up over many years of
accumulated visual and textual representations” (Hannaford 2001). Noting that “former
battlefields are often unprepossessing places” (Gold and Gold 2003, 108), research on the
subject recognize only the significance of these places after the violent conflicts. Gold
and Gold explain that the neglect is mainly due to the homogeneous material settings of
former battlefields (2003, 108):
fields of combat tend to lack imposing topography. Flat ground allows infantry
commanders to deploy their forces in optimal formation and artillery commanders to
establish uninterrupted lines of fire, at best looking for slight undulations or ridges to
give themselves points of tactical advantage. Whatever their appearance during the
heat of battle, most battlefields scarcely merit a second glance for their inherent
landscape qualities once the debris of war has been cleared away.
Since these studies intentionally or institutionally disregard the antebellum past of these
places, they then fail to contextualize the conflicts and the venues. On one hand, for
studies centering on nationalist narratives embedded in former battlefields, the
de-contextualization can be excusable because meanings of these nationalist monuments
nearly remains on the same page. However, insofar as the meanings of former battlefields
are the focus of investigation, the neglect of context is to map the cultural geography
without cardinal points. As this study sees the whole Quemoy island as a battlefield,
overlooking its rich history while investigating meanings that locals attach to its
landscapes could lead to fallacies and misinterpretations.
On the other hand, for postmodernist studies focusing on politics of memory and
representation, their ahistorical view of social constructionism sees the observed
phenomena in former battlefields as the outcome of the interplay among present social
dynamics rather than a legacy of war. With their focus on the present, the past is
construed as a social construct of the current milieu. In the sense, the politics of former
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battlefields are overwhelmingly negotiations among social groups in the present. The
de-emphasis of the past and its influence on the present thus contextualizes and locks the
current landscape in today’s social fabrics. By viewing the past as a manipulatable and
manipulated creation for contemporary groups to pursue their social interests, the
postmodernist conception realizes place as tools for certain purposes. The view does not
account for how a place comes into being nor can it reveal site specificities contributing
to place formation. To explore meaning of place without considering the dialectical,
improvisatory relationship between praxes and conventions in every appropriation,
negotiation, and resistance is to reduce the intricacy of cultural evolution to an image
equivalent to any other in the postmodern time. The reduction of “Quemoy” to
representations (a Cold-war battlefield or a tourist destination) may likely simplify the
current negotiations of identity reformulation. The necessity to take negotiations in the
past (i.e. the evolutionary trajectory of place formation) into account and to include the
past into the current negotiations for place reformation is key to revealing the meaning of
Quemoy and its changing landscapes today. For this reason, I endeavor to include a
thorough review of the island’s past in this study to identify its distinct characteristics of
cultural geography built in the long-term human-environment co-evolution, and to ground
this research on place identity on a solid basis of the local understanding.
Secondarily, another characteristic of former battlefields that the prior studies do not
sufficiently address is how drastically the meaning of place and sequentially its
landscapes can change after conflicts. The polarized change in their symbolic meanings
from place of war to peace or from place of one group’s justice to their opponent’s
induces a contradiction. With a great semantic contrast, such a shift in meaning of place
introduces irony in landscape. Touristification of the former battlefield further reifies the
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irony through reinvention of military relics in identity reformulation that turns the island
orientation upside down and inside out. In addition, through a review of the local history,
I discover that the ironic shift of place identity from one affiliation to its opposite has
repeatedly occurred due to the cultural and geographical marginality of Quemoy. The
resurfacing contradictions manifest geographical characteristics of this island on the
border, and articulate the irony of human futility in the belligerent struggles for identity
construction. The Sisyphean work in constructing a hegemonic identity for the border
island through territorialization counter-intentionally brought a vague identity that reveals
the locals’ negotiations with marginality and the conventional cognition of Quemoy. The
landscapes in the border island are therefore ripe for irony.
As “the cultural signature of the entire [sic] postmodern condition” (Fernandez and
Huber 2001, vii), irony “most often is used to express skepticism toward authority,” and
“describe[s] a questioning attitude and critical stance” (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 1).
The cutting edge of irony makes it “an undercutting instrument” to demystify
authoritative meta-narratives (Fernandez and Huber 2001, 3). As Foucault proclaimed,
“power projects an image that is all pervasive, unavoidable and inscribed in the very heart
of all ventures of knowledge” (Torres 1997, 30). To shatter the power-constituted image,
ironies in the postmodern time obtain a greater significance (Knauft 1996, 95):
These ironies are not just discursive, epistemological, or limited to world of trope;
they have enormous impact on peoples’ lives. The play of signs is a powerful
strategy of domination and disempowerment . . . .
In terms of landscape, the constituent image of power/knowledge emerges from the
“inherently descriptive text [of geographers’ writings] in the communication of social
pretensions by privileged persons and groups” (Smith 1997, 78). The discrepancies
remain between the pretentious myth and the reality “give rise to ironies” (Smith 2002,

22

324). As Orientalism exemplifies the postmodern irony, the geographical ironies, or
precisely ironies in geographical writings, often involve refutation to the imaginative
geography, such as the myths of American exceptionalism, American geographical
uniformity (Smith 2002) and the Finnish northern imagination (Ridanpää 2007). With the
emphases on the “awareness of irony [that] can lead to a salutary dissolution of pretense”
(Smith 2002, 325), the current literature of geographical irony weighs in the discursive
aspect of landscape texts, but is lack of a practice theory to investigate how social groups
reshape their landscape to ignite ironic flair through pastiche and juxtaposition. The
landscape change in Quemoy pertinently demonstrates the practice aspect of ironic
landscape. As militarization of Quemoy manifests the nationalist pretensions, which
cordoned off Quemoy from its nearby areas and produced a rigid, utilitarian, and
hierarchical military landscape, touristification subverts the authoritative myth through
irony. Irony in the post-conflict reconstruction, which transforms the former military base
to a battlefield tourism destination, greatly changes the residents’ everyday life. As such
often in the practice aspect of ironic landscape can the unique postmodern condition
“have enormous impact on people’s lives” (Knauft 1996, 95).
Furthermore, ironies, as a Woolgar discerned, “are useful for maintaining the
ambivalence of things that can never be known for sure” (Torres 199, 20). In the place
identity reformulation, their polysemy simultaneously makes Quemoy a heterotopia
which “is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that
are in themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). Inspired by the concept, Duncan
construes a heterotopia as “sites of difference,” each of which “with its own discourses
linked to similar sites” in their discursive fields (1994, 407). Due to juxtaposition of the
new and old identities of Quemoy in developing a cultural landscape pastiche for heritage
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tourism, the identity reformulation consequently increases place ambiguity. The
counterintentionality and contradictoriness maximizes the post-conflict irony in
landscape. It is through the fluidity and eclecticism of heterotopias that the postmodern
ironies serve as “a powerful strategy” to emancipate Quemoy from further
territorialization.
1.3 A Magpie Roaming in the Park
Throughout my entire enterprise of this research, I heavily rely on the
phenomenological research method acquired from my interdisciplinary training in both
landscape architecture and cultural geography. Phenomenology, as defined, “suggests that
we work to accomplish our efforts through that intensive mixture of experiencing and
speaking” that results in “understanding” (Richardson 2006, 2). Students in landscape
architecture for design purposes learn from site inventory and analysis to identify distinct
qualities and themes of sites. This acquired knowledge sharpens in conceiving
site-specific designs to transform their intentions to paper, by which landscape architects
perfect their reading in creating new landscapes. Their line of work compels them to
locate the sense of place in a design site and to analyze spatial composition of a design.
The reading in locating, the deconstructing in analyzing, and the reconstituting in
designing disclose landscape architects’ vision of human inscriptions on Earth as
landscape paintings, consisting of iconographies, plant materials, design elements, and
other manipulable components for aesthetic, ecological re-arrangement. Differing from
the vision, cultural geographers however read landscape as texts. In this view, landscape
communicates. As Richardson elucidates, “places we call ordinary communicate the
taken-for-granted understandings of the present” (1994, 159). For cultural geographers,
landscape conveys meaning by offering understandings for interpretations. The approach
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to understand landscapes’ meaning resembles the one of language learning that requires
total engagement in an estranged reality to acquire understandings through experience.
By the understanding, landscape readers can read texts in a meaningful way and interpret
their meanings. Through this effort of “reading a world that speaks,” Richardson
comments, “reading engages us [creatures of symbolic communication]; through reading
we enter the world of the text. The endeavor is . . . more given to addressing the how than
the why, more given to pondering words than assigning cause . . .” (1994, 163).
Phenomenology is thus a method to let the world reveals itself through our engagement in
it.
Since my first trip to Quemoy in January 2004 for this study, nearly ten years have
passed. During the decade, I visited Quemoy four times for ten to fourteen days. In
addition, I stayed in the island for sixteen months to do my fieldwork before writing this
dissertation. In the first few visits, I started out as a participant in tourist pilgrimages, and
gradually set my own courses of survey. To witness the landscapes described in texts
through my own eyes, I undertook a basic survey over the whole island, proceeding
quarter by quarter over the course of one to two days on my rental scooter. I tried to grind
over every possible path in the island, and along the way photographed distinct local
features, such as the military landscape in Quemoy. In the process of indiscriminate
collecting, I felt myself like a magpie roaming in the park, intrusively breaking into its
tranquility and compulsively hoarding its distinctive features. The detachment from
touristic landscapes enabled me to see the landscape change in a broader view and to
re-contextualize tourist development back to the ongoing social dynamics in Quemoy.
With a big picture, the meaning of landscape change gradually emerged. In these trips, I
also interviewed municipal officials, national park rangers, military officers, local
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historians, and professors in Quemoy.1 Through these talks, I learned from their point of
view the meaning of landscape change, and was able to identify the social concerns and
controversial issues in the post-conflict society. My experience from the preliminary
work channeled my research toward articulating phenomena of cultural change.
In addition to the surveys and interviews, local festivals and events were also
informative due to their evocation of situational performance which acts out the local
interpretations of the landscape and the collective past. One of the occasions was the
Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art in 2005, an installation art event taking place in
abandoned military facilities. The event included eighteen works created by foreign
artists and nineteen local children’s works. By reinventing military relics to be sites of
artworks, the event aroused an intense discourse on representation of Quemoy between
the nationalist perspective and the one under reformulation. My experience in the
rehabilitated space, observations on viewers’ behavior and talks with interpreters, enabled
me to approach the local understanding of the landscape change in demilitarization. By
analyzing the rehabilitative methods applied to the military space, I also discovered the
different interpretations of bunkers between the local and foreign perspectives. In the last
trip to Quemoy in 2008, I participated in a workshop held by Kinmen County
Government and Taiwan Historica on the subject of the local culture and tourism. The
two government organs deliberately designed a five-day program consisting of lectures
and fieldtrips from mornings to evenings in order to deliver participants the
representative images of Quemoy. In the workshop, participants from Taiwan, like groups
of tourists, acted together; transferred as a group from site to site by bus on fieldtrips.
1

Throughout my field studies, I had conducted nearly twenty in-depth interviews and approximate sixty
informal ones. In in-depth interviews, I visited my interviewees, mainly public servants knowing my
identity and purpose, and took notes during the interviews with their consent. Others happened in regular
conversations.
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Even though half of the participants were Quemoy locals, the Taiwanese participants, due
to the controlled environment and tight schedule, experienced only limited aspects of the
everyday life in Quemoy. My participation in the workshop allowed me to observe how
the local elites portrayed their homeland to Others, and how biased the travel experience
of mass tourism can be, due to the cultural immersion in the selected, exquisite images.
By the personal experience in these events, I then could make close examinations into the
imagineering of the demilitarized Quemoy.
Through the understanding obtained from my preliminary study, I submitted my
research proposal to my dissertation committee in December 2008, and with their
approval I initiated my sixteen-month fieldwork in Quemoy. Before residing in Quemoy,
I spent two months in the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Scinica as a visiting student
reviewing the latest literature of Quemoy and exchanging ideas with colleagues in Taiwan.
After that, I again stepped on Quemoy soil in March 2009.
During the sixteen-month stay, I gathered information mainly through three channels:
the local newspaper, my local networks, and my day job. The Quemoy Daily originally
was a military newspaper that after demilitarization became an organ of the county
government. In this daily newspaper, there were local news, editorials, literature
supplements, columns, reader’s opinions and advertisements. Its materials did not differ
much from regular newspapers. However, due to the fact that the government owned this
medium, a great portion of the local news was actually press releases prepared by various
government agencies. As such, the Quemoy Daily continuously served as an important
mouthpiece for the authorities. Knowing this, although it provided a convenient access to
keep track of the social phenomena in Quemoy, I remained cautious about its reports
especially those concerning the local public policies. Nonetheless, the Quemoy Daily was
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a major source of citations in this study. Due to the shadows of totalitarian control by the
military in the past forty-three years, the restrained masses had grown keenly sensitive to
audio recorders and cameras.2 Learning from experience, I often kept my interviews
informal to encourage interviewees to speak freely. Besides, I must confess that I did not
always keep field notes in most of the lengthy conversations happening at random, nor
did I keep a regular diary to have my interviewee’s words in transcripts. Consequently,
the open-ended interviews and my informal data collection rendered the local newspaper
a necessary adjunct to my ethnography. For the newspaper articles provided credentials
that my findings in casual conversations lacked for, more often than not, the Quemoy
Daily substantiated my knowledge of the local opinions on public affairs enlightened by
my other sources of information.
The three major informants in my local networks were Josephine (a barista and the
owner of a cafe stand), Dan (an innkeeper of a budget hotel), and Bill (my landlord).3
Josephine’s stand was an information exchange center where her customers brought her
the latest news of the community through their chats. She sometimes would share the
information with me in our conversations, providing leads to the everyday culture from
sundry matters of social life to taboos.4 Dan’s budget hotel reinvented from an old
mansion was the rendezvous of Taiwanese contract workers, travelling merchants, and
returned visiting emigrants. His tenants due to the requirements of their business would
2

For example, one old fisherman in Guningtou village was nervous, and continuously asked me the
purpose of my recording and photographing, when we were on our way to his oyster farm. In spite of my
explanation and reassurance, he still avoided his face from the camera. When the interview approached
questions about the wartime past, the subject made his hair stand up on end. He turned even cautious, and
defensively asked what I was asking those questions for.
3
All the three informants’ names are pseudonyms to protect their confidentiality.
4
She once commented on my decision to live in a traditional house in the Guningtou village by myself as a
“very bold deed,” for the village and its vicinities were not clean (tainted by unrestful spirits). The area was
a gory slaughter ground covered in bloodshed in the Battle of Guningtou and sequential artillery wars.
Ghosts and spirits dying in agony were said still lingering on the ground. I later on also received the same
comments on my “boldness” from other local acquaintances.
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usually have to stay in Quemoy longer than regular tourists and business travelers. Dan
on occasion would sit down with some of them after work in the walled front yard, the
porch, or the lobby, drinking together and shooting the breeze. In such gatherings, their
boasting would retell their impressions of the demilitarized Quemoy and its past. From
Dan and his tenants, I then acquired the vision of Quemoy in the minority’s
perspective—a vulgar view that texts produced by the elites and the educated class did
not often share with their audience. Bill was a carpenter and a wood carving sculptor who
mastered the traditional craft of creating religious artifacts. He just renovated his
inherited house in the Guningtou village with the funding from the Kinmen National Park
when I was looking for a traditional folk house for rent. After becoming a tenant of his
countryside property, I regularly visited his home in the town center, and in our chats
picked up piecemeal information of the local knowledge here and there. In addition, his
recollections about the antebellum past and his experience in the Battle of Guningtou in
his young days explained the local desire of reconciliation with the mainland society. His
investment in the real estate in the Amoy city and business association with a mainland
manufacture of wooden artifacts manifested the aspiration. His participation in the annual
pilgrimage to his clan’s ancestor halls on the mainland also demonstrated a social
reconciliation. However, his only sister, three children, and grandchildren living in
Taiwan simultaneously fastened his life tightly with the island with the other side of the
strait. Through him, I learned about the new relation established on the old connection,
and witnessed such by my tagging-along in one annual pilgrimage of his clan to their
common ancestor halls and graves in the mainland. From my informants, I then could
hear the voice that announced without the privilege of education and mastery of words;
however they spoke the everyday life of the people in the community.
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In addition to the fieldwork, I also taught in the Department of Tourism Management
in National Quemoy University, and worked as an administrative assistant in its graduate
program. In the two semesters, the department assigned me a few space-related courses,
including “Reuse of Abandoned Spaces,” “Public Space and Art,” and “Introduction to
Urban Planning.” In exploring these subjects with my classes, the teaching assignments
reciprocally enhanced my understanding of Quemoy: When the class was concluding the
urban planning of Baroque cities characterized by its straight avenues and land marks at
traffic nodes, we also discussed the military hegemony in the traffic network of Quemoy
constituted by straight concrete roads and bunkers at the center of traffic circles. In the
course, “Reuse of Abandoned Space,” the class focused on the reuse of “ruins,” which
were commonplaces in Quemoy due to the damaged property, wartime personnel
evacuation, and demilitarization in recent years. In an architecture student’s oral report,
he demonstrated a reuse case of a beachfront fort turned into a successful bird
observation station. The gun embrasures of the fort provided ideal settings for
bird-watching, due to their discreet design to protect soldiers from enemy gunfire. Based
on the structural characteristics, the transfer of military facilities through reinvention and
reinterpretation into peacetime articulated the meaning of landscape touristification. The
exchange of information with students in the classes granted me access to their life
experience on the subjects concerning my research, and turned the class into a real-time
venue of hermeneutics between the extra- and inter-textual fields of reference.
The main responsibilities of my administrative assistant job were two: to conduct a
survey of tourism resources in Quemoy and to write grant proposals for the department
every once in a while. The survey of tourism resources prompted me to investigate the
tourist spots in Quemoy in order to discover their distinct characteristics that produced
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the tourist attractions of the island. Furthermore, in order to win the grant committee over,
the proposals also adopted a strategy to stress the local specificity. As such, the process of
conducting the survey and writing grant proposals led me to a journey of demystification
to unravel the genius loci of Quemoy. In quite the same way, my involvement in other
professional activities—such as site inventory for landscape design projects, review of
public projects commissioned by the county government, and research on the local
traditional industries—also benefited this study. With all the engagement in the local
community, my life experience in the field allowed me to identify the landscape change
after demilitarization. In addition, based on the immersion in the chorological culture, I
then could reveal the meaning of landscape change according to the local semiotic
system.
The accomplishment of my fieldwork and literature review constitutes the following
passages of this study. Chapter 2 provides a geographical biography of Quemoy as an
overview of the local past from prehistoric sea-nomad cultures to the modern antebellum
period. In a fashion similar to sequent occupance, the chapter introduces the past
according to a series of representative place identities in each of its development stages.
By examining the co-evolution of the environmental and social system, the overview
provides a context for the formation of local culture, from which the meaning of cultural
landscapes derives. Also the examination uncovered a repeating theme of landscape
change throughout local history. Identification of the theme that I term “reversals of the
geographical coordinate system” ties the militarization and demilitarization of landscape
in the geographical personality of Quemoy.5 The contextualization then re-presents the
5

Similar orientation changes also occur in the Baltic countries both in the history of (Tuchtenhagen 2003)
and in the post-communist present (Istrate 2012; Nekrašas 2003; Pavilionis 2003) especially in terms of
transportation and economy (Himanen 2000).
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landscape change in a perspective of historical geography, and permits a new reading of
the change that emits irony. Chapter 3 explores the change in a holistic view by
considering Quemoy as a whole to examine the shifts of the insular coordinate system.
From its repeated reversals, an irony of Sisyphean futility emerges between
reterritorialization and deterritorialization. Chapter 4 further looks into the irony in
landscape by investigating individual cases of military structures, which underwent
different management practices and reinvention treatments after demilitarization. The
investigation concludes that the irony in landscape is the embodiment of cultural
demilitarization that subverts the anticommunist ideologies, and dispatches the conflicts
to the past. Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss the landscape touristification in Quemoy to
supplant the military landscape. Through reinvention of military structure,
reinterpretation of war memorials, and reconstruction of historic landscape, the
post-conflict Quemoy presents a cultural variation. Juxtaposition of these variant cultural
features in the landscape collapses the nationalist meta-narrative, and the cultural
hybridity encourages the formation of places with ambiguity in Foucault’s heterotopias.
Chapter 6 provides an overall conclusion of the study, disclosing the irony in landscape
and formation of heterotopias as the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy.
By the resulted ambiguity and multiculturality, the identity reformulation in Quemoy
therefore articulates the local aspiration to free themselves from the Sisyphean struggle of
the either/or dichotomy of the border island.
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CHAPTER 2 WHEEL OF HISTORY: FROM NOWHERE TO HOMELAND
Chien Mu 錢穆, a modern Chinese historian had once criticized a popular metaphor
that indicated history is a play and geography is the stage of history. He considered the
analogy fallacious because actors could repeatedly reenact the same play on numerous
stages. However, only specific milieu could induce the idiographic history to occur. As a
result, “Confucius cannot be born in India; Buddha cannot be born in Jerusalem; and
Jesus cannot be born in China. This [evolution trajectory of a place] comes with double
conditions of geography and history” (Chien 2005, 56). Chien emphasizes the uniqueness
of a place and its history, and denies their duplicability by refuting the metaphor which
however suggests a critical mechanism of place formation. By discovering a repetitive
historical theme of Quemoy, I argue that the repetitive social performance is key to its
place formation. Just as the Sisyphean toil makes the condemned king, the reiterative
theme constitutes the border island. Its marginal environment stimulates the specific
social-spatial practice which reciprocally articulates geographical characteristics of the
place. Chien considers that geography condition the development of a place, of which
accumulation becomes the local history. If so, a study on the local history should be able
to reveal the underlying geographical characteristics of a place. Vidal de la Blanche
termed these idiographical characteristics as “geographical personality.” According to
expositions by cultural geographers, the “personality” is “something that grows through
time,” deriving from the local way of life, which signifies inhabitants’ adaption to “the
physical characteristics of the land” (Dunbar 1974, 28; Norton 2000, 91). In this chapter,
I explore the geographical personality that promotes historical events through a reading
of the Quemoy history, discovering how the reiterative historical theme contributes to the
formation of the border island and its culture.
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Quemoy as an island on the Chinese coast controls the regional entrance of Southern
Fukien 閩南 region. Its geographical characteristics are distinct, so are the inhabitants’
adaptations to them. Through its development, Quemoy has been a virgin land for
Chinese pioneers, a grazing pasture and saltworks for early settlers, a military base and an
international gateway for Imperial China, and a homeland for the overseas Chinese. As an
island, its small size and its proximity to the mainland make Quemoy inseparable from
the Chinese culture. Nevertheless, as a regional entrance, Quemoy is also susceptible to
foreign influence. Located on the periphery of the mainland, Quemoy is far away from
the Chinese political center and cultural hearth in Northern China. With mountains
surrounding the Fukien region in southeast China and limiting its accessibility, China
took thousands of years of political expansion and cultural assimilation to reach Quemoy
(1556 BCE-ca. 980 CE). It took Chinese settlers four-hundred years to adapt fully to the
insular environment after they landed there (ca. 980-1386).6 During the adjustment
period, Imperial China established two state-owned enterprises on the island—first, horse
pastures and later saltworks. Concomitant with development of overseas trading in the
Southern Fukien, pirate activities gradually arose, and over time became a thorny issue
for the Chinese imperial authorities. Due to the strategic location of Quemoy, empire
constructed the island to be a regional outpost. As “Quemoy” in Chinese literally means
“the golden gate,” Quemoy had long been an impregnable fortress of empire at the
gateway in its seafront frontier.
As early as the seventh century, foreign merchants from as far away as Arabia and
Persia had already arrived and settled in Quanzhou 泉州—the capital city of the
6

The official Quemoy history, Gazetteer of Kinmen (2010), dates the establishment of the first Han
settlement in 282 or 317, which the current historians consider problematic (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003;
Yang 2004). By a historical review, I propose 980 as the earliest date possible for a continuous Han
settlement in Quemoy. Please see 2.3 for details.
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Southern Fukien (Shi and Xu 2007). The development of international trade attracted
armed mercantile fleets, as well as pirates. In the eleventh century, the first documented
pirate activity occurred in Quanzhou, and in 1218 in Quemoy. Thenceforth, the maritime
powers and the Chinese Empire continuously skirmished in the vicinity of Quemoy. The
constant conflicts prompted the empire to reinforce its military deployment in its insular
frontier, and with reinforcement, the scale of conflict ascended. In the confrontation, the
characteristics of a military base emerged in the landscape in Quemoy, and every
imperial victory further thoroughly impressed the fledging identity on Quemoy. The
reiterative constructions of military defenses developed the landscape characteristics of
this imperial frontier. I use the action—hammering nails along the edge—as the metaphor
for the formative process: The nails, symbolizing the peripheral city and its coastal
defenses, would stay on the brink (of the imperial bloc figuratively) after the hammering,
but over time, due to impact and wear, they would be the first to fall apart from the edge.
The falling beckons another hammering, which eventuates in another falling. In a
diachronic view, the construction of Quemoy as an imperial frontier proves to be a
Sisyphean task. However, it is through the repetitive efforts of building that the insular
society left its cultural impress on the landscape. As such, the futile “hammering”
produces the homeland image of Quemoy.
2.1 Theories of Landscape Evolution
In 1893, the American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, presented his Frontier
Thesis, asserting that the repeated experience in the advancing western frontiers shaped
the American culture, and distinguished it from its European antecedents (1920, 1):
American social development has been continually beginning over again on the
frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion
westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of
primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character.
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Later, the theory received broad critique for its presumptions pertaining to which Norton
(2000) summarized a few: The thesis described the cultural formation happening in
isolation without interaction with the eastern seaboard area, and presumed that European
settlers had generally experienced a primitive livelihood of subsistence production, which
was not the typical case of economic activities in the frontiers. And most importantly,
Turnerians considered American culture to be founded on the frontier when in fact the
direction of cultural diffusion goes the other way around from the eastern seaboard.
Nevertheless, aside from its widely debated conclusion, the merit of this thesis rested in
its view of the formative process, of which Turner’s emphasis on the continuous
repetition of this formative process was obvious. Accompanying the advancing frontier
line, the early American settlers relived the frontier experience through reclaiming the
“free land” again and again (Nostrand and Estaville 2001). The social development that
“has been continually beginning over again” resulted in “this perennial rebirth” of life
experience. Both the repetition and the recurrence articulated the Sisyphean character of
the process that Turnerians considered to accomplish the characteristics of American
culture.
2.1.1

Related Concepts in the Sauerian Tradition

Whereas historians are interested in the immaterial aspect of cultural evolution,
geographers focus on the cultural landscape. Following the Vidalian and Sauerian
traditions, such a focus is often bound to a geographical delineation with shared cultural
traits, namely pays or a cultural region. To constitute a cultural region, diffusion is
considered as the major formative mechanism. The place of origin for diffusion is
commonly known as a cultural hearth, a core area, or later a homeland, as it is variously
called. Accounting for the genesis of a cultural region, Zelinsky considers the indicator of
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the establishment as the first effective settlement. He defines such a settlement as the first
one with specific characteristics “able to effect a viable, self-perpetuating society” in “an
empty territory” or when “an earlier population is dislodged by invaders” (1973, 13). As
so defined, the first effective settlement is taken as the starting point of cultural diffusion,
from which diffusion of cultural traits gradually forms the sequent cultural region. The
clearly theorized start then gives geographers full access to explore the evolutionary
patterns of cultural regions from their genesis to the following succession of human
occupation. To narrate the evolution of a cultural region, some studies adopt a framework
describing the regional development stage by stage in terms of the land-use patterns
following the timeline. The framework first conceived by Derwent Whittlesey (Norton
2000) is known as Sequent Occupance, according to which each stage of regional
development is identifiable by a prominent way of life that characterizes the
human-environment relationships in a specific historical period. Due to the nature of such
studies focusing on a cultural region, the identified stages, except the initial one, could be
often idiographical and place-specific. Nevertheless, the general trajectory of human
society from agriculture to industrialization, and in some case to urbanization also shows
in these regions, but they do not always follow in linear sequence.
2.1.2

Meinig’s Model of Cultural Evolution in the American Wests

Cultural areas are each particular, and it is difficult to induce a general pattern of
evolution. However, Meinig’s study on the American Wests makes a stride toward a more
generalized set of evolutionary stages. This inter-regional study incorporates an economic
dimension into the cultural evolution of the regions in the West, and identifies four
evolutionary phases of the regions: transplant, regional culture, impact of national
culture, and dissolution of historic regional culture (1972, 163; Figure 2.1). The
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selected transplant from one or more source
regions; never a complete cross-section of the
older society; experimental adaption of imported
cultural traits to new environment.

STAGE

regional culture; new amalgam of people, forming
cohesive society, adjusting to insularity and new
environment; high potential for cultural lag and
divergence.

strong impact of national culture; nationwide
communications, marketing networks, and
control of facilities diffuse national culture
through central place network. Only
subcultures with tenacious social patterns
(religion, language, race) can persist as
distinct.

dissolution of historic regional culture; all areas
directly exposed national culture; emergence of
ethic mosaic and new innovative centers; new
consciousness of local environmental and cultural
values.

Figure 2.1.
Meinig’s model of cultural evolution in the American
Wests [Source: Foote et al. 1994]
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transplant stage denotes for the initiation of immigration when bands of pioneers
swarmed into the West. In the second stage, regional culture, settlers successfully
adapted to the environment, and established six insular nuclei. These nuclei coming with
“high potential for cultural lag and divergence” are actually cores of the six regions of
Meinig’s American Wests. The development of these cores constitutes the cultural
plurality in the regional culture stage. In the third stage, the regional cultures decline due
to the impacts of national culture through the “central place network.” The national
impact eventually brings “the end of insularity and local cultural identity and the onset
of . . . national cultural uniformity” (Norton 2000, 119). In the fourth stage, the cultural
integration results in the dissolution of historic regional culture; however simultaneously
encourages the “emergence of ethnic mosaic and new innovative centers” (Meinig 1972,
163). Overall, Meinig’s study focuses on the evolution of regional cultures rather than the
landscape evolution in a cultural area. In other words, the study emphasizes on the
geographical changes instead of changing geography.
Parting from the idiographical narrative of cultural geography, Meinig’s study
provides the theoretical latitude to yield nomothetic value through his model. The initial
stage requires immigration. The immigrants develop specific ways of life through the
process of environmental adaptation in the second stage. Although variant land use
pattern and industries may come into being through time, they are theoretically still
human adaptations to the environmental and cultural change. Successful adaptations
would enable the settlement to endure outside challenges, which in Meinig’s study are the
impacts of national culture. These challenges may lead the cultures into demise, or may
well reinforce them due to the defense against variant threats. The persistence of a
cultural landscape thus relies on the constant reinforcement and the successful adaptation;
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whereby the formative process of this stage somehow resembles in the repetitive cycle of
the Frontier Thesis. In Meinig’s model, the regional culture eventually diminishes in the
last stage due to the impact of national popular culture, and the decline subsequently
beckons the dissolution of the cultural regions. Nonetheless, such dissolution refers to the
collapse of the core-domain-sphere structure of a culture region but to the demise of
regional cultures. Even though cultural regions collapse, regional cultures remain at the
core areas, and some even would reversely diffuse outward through the national network
of popular culture. Such diffusion forms a cultural mosaic nationwide, and may well
further popularize regional cultures to constitute a “patchwork quilt” (Clark and Tsai
2002, 423) of the regional and national culture.
2.1.3

The Homeland Concept

After the cultural regions dissolve and their domains and spheres demise, a cultural
region core by itself has little meaning. Also, without research focus on diffusion, a
cultural hearth is less significant. When the two concepts decline, the homeland thesis
fills in their place in the geographical discourse of place evolution. While the local
cultures become parts of a national culture, each of them is still distinguishable. They
point back to their origins, and sustain these places as sanctuaries for people practicing
the culture. Based on the geographical association, Nostrand conceives the homeland
thesis to interpret the evolution of cultural geography in particular places, and seeks to
re-visit the humanistic dimension in cultural geography—viewing place as a locale where
a group of people imbue their affections. The overtones are manifest in Nostrand’s
definition of homeland (1992, 214):
The people must have lived in a place long enough to have adjusted to its natural
environment and to have left their impress in the form of a cultural landscape. And
from their interactions with the natural and cultural totality of the place they must
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have developed an identity with the land—emotional feelings of attachment, desire
to possess, even compulsion to defend.
Similar to the Vidalian concept of geographical personality, the homeland thesis also
requires human interaction with a place through time. The environmental adjustments, in
a form of palimpsest leaving marks on the ground as the people’s landscape impress, also
correspond to the concept of sequent occupance but without a deterministic sequence.
The thesis innovatively treats daily landscapes as the embodied local culture, and
considers that the collective identity of the residents greatly hinges on them. As such, in
additional to the functionality of daily use, these landscapes consist of symbolic meaning
of the place and of the group of people. In this case of the homeland when a cultural
landscape is under threat, so is the collective self of the people, to defend the landscape is
then a matter of course. Nostrand and Estaville propose five homeland ingredients
(people, place, bonding with place, control of place, and time) and consider bonding with
place as the key to spur the defense mechanism against outside challenges (2001, xix):
The tie [bonding with place] happens when a people adjust to the natural
environment, stamp the environment with their cultural impress, and from both the
natural environment and the cultural landscape create a deep sense of place.
According to the definition, cultural impress refers to human creation capable of
triggering the intangible sense of place among the cultural group and stimulating a sense
of bonding. Beyond the connection, Nostrand and Estaville move further and affirm a
reciprocal relationship between culture landscape and a cultural group (2001, xx):
Bonding with place thus means that a people shape the area with their culture, and
the area in turns shapes them: Feeling of attachment and belonging develop. If
threatened, desire to possess becomes compulsion to defend.
The idealistic view of homeland, its emphasis on senses, feelings and attachments, allows
the thesis to move beyond essential regions and tangible traits, and resorts to a form of
topophilia (Tuan 1974, 4). Consequently, the homeland concept comprises an idealistic
connotation, inasmuch as the constitution of a homeland depends upon the psychological
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factors. The defensive compulsion arises when the cultural group encounters outside
challenges. To defend is to retain the control of place. Successful defense not only
survives the culture but also revives cultural identity, and furthermore makes the culture
persist through time by the reinforced self-consciousness (Jordan-Bychkov 2001). As in
fact bonding with place is often latent and impalpable until the defensive measures—as
the intensive cultural expressive practice—are taken against outside challenges, I propose
that only in the struggles can a homeland, constituted by the five homeland ingredients,
realistically emerge: A people defend their cultural landscape to maintain its control over
time. The defensive action sustains a homeland from assimilation; substantiates bonding
with place from intangible sense of place, feelings and attachments; and retains control of
place in the process of negotiation. In this regard, repetitive defense is key to homeland
constitution, and ultimately, it is such constant negotiations with Others that persist a
homeland. As Turner (1920) proposed that the repetitive adaptation to the remote
frontiers is key to culture formation of the Euro-American immigrant society, the
repetitive outside challenges are also critical to homeland formation. In a marginal island
like Quemoy its place formation heavily relies on the situational repetition through
collective performance of environmental adaptation and defense against assimilation.
This chapter presents Quemoy as a homeland to substantiate my proposal of
homeland formation through the constant negotiation. The conflicts between the maritime
powers and the Chinese Empire in Southern Fukien articulate the contest between the
nation and the region. As the regional conflicts recur over time, the external challenges
and the negotiations with the empire repeatedly appear in the regional coastal frontier,
and further strengthen the identity of Quemoy as a border island. Negotiation, aroused by
the imperial construction of Quemoy into an exclusive military bastion, repeats similar
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life experience among different generations. The cycles of negotiations unfold how the
defensive mechanism turns Quemoy from a coastal island into a homeland. The dispute
originates from the different views of Quemoy, of which empire saw a vulnerable point of
military defense, but people in the region used it as a major gateway to overseas foreign
lands. Although the two conflicting parties read the place identity of Quemoy differently,
both of the identities stem from the same geographical settings and the historical context.
As the geographical personality has greatly influences on the development of Quemoy’s
place identities, a discussion on the homeland formation of Quemoy necessitates a review
of its geographical biogeography in terms of landscape evolution.
2.1.4

The Four Evolutionary Stages of the Landscape in Quemoy

Based on former theories of cultural regions’ evolution and homeland formation, I
propose four stages of homeland evolution in Quemoy. As recognized by cultural and
historical geographers, the first two stages are the initial peopling stage and the second
environmental adaptation stage. At the end of environmental adjustment stage, the
immigrant society has largely left the subsistence production behind through successful
environmental adaptations. With the establishment of a functioning settlement, the
society proceeds and eventually faces challenges from outside. To cope with these
exterior challenges of territorialization, which bring the society into the social struggles
with others, the people create their cultural symbols in the landscapes, or attach meanings
to the ordinary landscapes. The third stage therefore, as identified in the homeland thesis,
is the landscape impress stage. Successful defense against outside challenges not only
sustains the culture but also reinforces and may diffuse it outward. With the repetitive
success, the residents transform the place into their homeland. Its establishment in
Quemoy brings forward the last cultural diffusion stage, and the major struggle of the
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society turns into the cultural one. The diffusion of homeland culture does not proceed as
a one-way exportation but a bidirectional cultural exchange between Quemoy and the
migrant societies. Meanwhile, modernization facilitates the spread of national culture to
individuals at home, and also impinges on the local culture. The outcome of the exchange
shows in the landscape in a cultural mosaic as Meinig noticed in the last stage of his
regional evolution model. The cultural hybridity then represents the latest stage of
homeland evolution.
The fact that the culture in an immigrants’ homeland, like Quemoy, is heterogeneous
rather than homogeneous is surprisingly refreshing whereas the concept of a cultural
hearth being the origin of cultural diffusion and the scheme of cultural core being the
typical representation of a cultural group both suggest their cultural purity and intensity.
Accounting for another conceptional characteristic, it is noticeable that the homeland
evolution does not proceed in a linear progress with one stage following another as
sequent occupance suggests, but in a complex manner with one or more happening at the
same time. Immigration should serve as a pertinent example: Immigrants continuously
enter Quemoy from the mainland after the initial peopling stage. The latter immigrant
groups could come with their own cultural baggage and different ways of life, which
trigger additional environmental adaptations, and sequentially create new cultural
landscapes. This is to say the homeland evolution is a continuous dynamic process with
different major struggles in each stage. The merit of clarifying evolutionary stages rests in
the identification of major struggles but not of each stage per se. Although immigrants
might face, for instance, the cultural and economic struggles at the same time, for early
immigrants the economic ones are the major concern for their society. Such is the case of
the Quemoy migrants in their colonies, while the pidgin culture they import to Quemoy
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plays a part in the cultural struggle at home. Based on the fact that different milieus could
lay weights on respective struggles, cultural evolution eventually hinges upon the
co-evolution of environment and social system that constitute the milieus.
2.2 Prehistoric Cultures: Oyster Eaters on the Waterfront
The earliest Human traces in Quemoy date eight thousand years ago. According to
the latest archaeological survey, there are four major Neolithic sites in Quemoy (Chen,
Liu, and Lang 2001; Figure 2.2). Among them, Fukuotun 復國墩 and Jingueishan sites
belong to Fu-kuo-tun culture (6000-3800 BCE), and Pubian 浦邊 and Houfenggang 后
豐港 sites belong to the Pubian type (2000-1500 BCE) of Tanshishan 曇石山 culture
which originated in the Min River 閩江 estuary in northeastern Fukien. Archeologists
have found sizable prehistoric oyster shell middens in these sites (Chen 1997; Chen W.
1999; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005; Figure 2.3). Inferring from these remains that the people
practiced a “maritime hunter-gatherer culture” without agricultural activities (Chen 1997,
1998; Chen W. 1999; Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005). Chen (1998; 1999) considered the group
of prehistoric people in Quemoy among the “sea nomads” on the southeast coast of China.
Kuo and Liu (2006) defines the time of Fukuotun culture as the early phase of prehistoric
Quemoy, and the time of the Pubian type as the latter phase of prehistoric Quemoy. The
human activities between the early and the latter phases (3800-2000 BCE) and between
the end of the latter phase and the beginning of the historical era (1500 BCE-319 CE)
remain unknown. None of the artifacts from the four prehistoric sites could provide
information about the two gaps.
2.2.1

The Prehistoric Sea Nomads in Quemoy

Shell middens sites of the sea nomads are distributed over southeast Chinese
seaboards and islands. Their widespread geographical distribution marks the territory of
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Jingueishan
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Jingsha River

Houjiang Bay
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Quemoy
Leiyu
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Fuigure 2.2. The Distribution of Neolithic sites in Quemoy. The four sites are all
located in the favorable habitats of sea nomads, including estuaries, sandy beaches,
and mangrove-covered coastal mud flats. The two sites belonging to Fukuotun culture
are found on waterfront hills along the estuary and the cove. The other two of Pubian
period are located on the flats behind the seafront sand dunes adjacent to muddy
beaches. Although there are also sea nomad sites in Leiyu, this study limits its scope in
Quemoy only. [Map remade from: Chen et al. 2001]
Figure 2.3.
The Jinguishan
Shell Midden Site. The shell
middens mainly consist of
oyster shells. Archeologists
also find stone tools, pottery
shreds, and small animals’
bones. They consider these
sites belong to a “maritime
hunter-gatherer culture”
without agricultural activities
(Chen 1997; Kuo, Liu, and Dai
2005). [Source: Chen 2006]
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the sea nomads and also proves their seafaring skill. Their far-flung distribution suggests
that sea nomads did not belong to a single archaeological culture but different cultural
groups practicing similar life styles. Chen identifies four characteristics of the
shell-midden sites in the Southeast China, which could also be used as criteria to identify
sites belonging to the sea nomads (1999, 52):
1. Most sites are located on the terraces alongside estuaries, or on the slopes of small
crescent islands.
2. Most sites are small and have only thin cultural strata, suggesting short duration
[occupation] and possible seasonality of settlement.
3. Livelihood depends mainly on fishing and gathering shellfish, with hunting of
small animals.
4. No shell midden sites in Fujian or Guangdong show any signs of agriculture.
Chen found shell midden sites in Quemoy that fit all the criteria, and identified all of
them belonging to the sea nomads. In addition, the shell-midden deposits of Jingueishan
金龜山 site suggest a migratory life: “The site has only one cultural layer. This stratum
spans 4,000 years in one meter from its lower level to its upper level, indicating the
short-term settlement pattern of the sea nomads” (Chen C. 1999, 6). The deposits reveal
an amphibious life style that sea nomads were not always on the sea, but would at least
periodically stay on land when they made shell middens. Even though their livelihood
mainly relied on the sea resources, they “cannot be completely divorced from terrestrial
resources, and . . . cannot completely separate themselves from the inhabitants on
land . . .” (Chen 2002, 52). In other words, they would maintain a “mutually beneficial
symbiosis” with semi-nomadic and land-dwelling people (Chen C. 1999; Sopher 1977).
These traits suggest two life patterns of the sea nomads. First, the sea nomads could
customarily migrate on familiar routes in a diachronic timeframe since the shell midden
deposits of the Jingueishan site disclose an intermittent usage of the place for 4,000 years.
They might visit Quemoy periodically. Second, since all prehistoric sites in Quemoy
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belong to sea nomads, there must have been some land-dwelling peoples living along the
migratory route who exchanged necessities with the sea nomads (Yang 1990). Through
contact with these land-dwelling peoples, the sea nomads, by their widespread
geographical distribution, simultaneously played a role of cultural transmitters on the
southeast coast of China (Chen C. 1999; 2002). Chen considered that the migration of
these cultural transmitters might explain the complicated cultural patterns of the Neolithic
sites in this area (2002, 53):
In-depth investigation of the pottery, stone tools, jades and other artefacts of these
Neolithic cultures show [that] there is both unity among diversity and diversity
among unity. All apparently have close relationships but do not belong to a single
cultural phenomenon.
Chen attributes the cultural mixture to the outcome of the sea nomads’ cultural
transmission: “Their free transmissions interrupted the hypothetical rules of cultural
boundaries . . . and made it hard for them [archaeologists] to agree upon the sequence of
these southern coastal Neolithic culture of China” (2002, 53). The marine peoples thus
contribute to an important linkage between the archaeological cultures in the region.
2.2.2

The Sea Nomands’ Hybrid Culture in Quemoy

Kuo and Liu (2006) speculate that the sea-level change might be responsible for the
end of Fukuotun culture and the first gap. According to the geological research, sea level
rose ten meters every thousand years until 6,000 years ago during the time of Fukutun
culture. In the succeeding period (4000-2500 BCE), the maximum sea level reached
about 2.4 meters higher than today (Rolett, Jiao, and Lin 2002). After a short recession,
another marine transgression during 2000-1500 BCE caused the sea level to rise 2.3
meters higher than at present (Kuo and Liu 2006). The sea-level change, in terms of
cycles of marine transgressions and regressions, might erode the early Neolithic relics on
the lowlands and caused the first gap, which was why both the sites of Fukutun culture
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were on hills. Otherwise, the gap could simply mean that the people of Fukutun culture
left Quemoy. In that case, marine transgressions, which reduced their habitat or changed
the environment into an unfavorable setting, would encourage their migration. Despite all
the uncertainty, what could be sure was that the marine transgression coincided with the
end of the archaeologically documented culture in Quemoy and the outset of Tapenkeng
大坌坑 culture in Taiwan about 6,000 years ago.
Although the sea level changes might cause the end of Quemoy’s early prehistoric
phase, nonetheless the following marine transgression (2000-1500 BCE) could be the
incentive for a new wave of immigrants to Quemoy. As identified by Kuo and Liu (2006),
the archaeological culture of Pu-bian type is closely related to the culture of
Chuangpianshan 庄邊山 upper strata phase—a successive type of Tanshishan
culture—on the estuary of the Min River in the northern Fukien. Notwithstanding, the
artifacts assemblage also shows characteristics of the archaeological culture of Paojinwan
寶鏡灣 site on the estuary of the Pearl River 珠江 in Canton (a.k.a. Guangdong 廣東;
Figure 2.4) Kuo and Liu provides an explanation for the phenomenon of cultural
hybridity, which Chen, as mentioned before, considers as the contribution of sea nomads,
(Kuo and Liu 2006, 193):
The relics of Pu-bian type in Quemoy should attribute to the small-scale
immigration of the prehistoric people of the Chuang-pian-shan upper strata phase.
The reason urging these people to immigrate possibly has to do with the sea
transgression concomitant with a reduction of their habitats. . . . By the time, a few
prehistoric people from the estuary of the Pearl River might also immigrate to
Quemoy. They live with the people of the Chuang-pian-shan upper strata phase from
the estuary of the Min River, and the two peoples together develop the distinct
culture of Pu-bian type in Quemoy.
The Pubian type archaeological evidence in Quemoy suggests a cultural mixture by two
bands of sea nomads. Their migration validates the early traffic alongside the southeast
coast of China which, as Bellwood (1995) claims, have already existed since 6,000 years
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QUEMOY

Pao-jing-wan

Figure 2.4.
The Early Neolithic Cultures on the Southeast Coast of China and in
Taiwan. The arrows indicate the cultural transmission among the four cultural
spheres in the region—Dawan culture in Canton, Fukuotun culture in Fukein,
Hemudu culture in Zhejiang, and Tapenkeng culture in Taiwan. Although the artifact
assemblages in some sites of Tapenkeng culture show characters of Hemudu culture
and Dawan culture, Fukuotun culture has the direct influence on the motif of the
early Neolithic culture in Taiwan. The intricate exchange network in the strait also
suggests a frequent marine traffic at this time in the southeast coast of China. [Map
remade from: Kuo et al. 2005]
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Table 2.1. The Chronologies of Neolithic Cultures in the Early Prehistoric Quemoy
[Source: Kuo, Liu, and Dai 2005]
Time

6000 BCE 5500 BCE 5000 BCE 4500 BCE 4000 BCE 3500 BCE 3000 BCE 2500 BCE 2000 BCE

Cultures or Types

Tapenkeng
Fukuotun
Dawan
Hemudu

Table 2.2. The Chronologies of Neolithic Cultures in the Latter Prehistoric Quemoy
[Source: Kuo and Liu 2006]
Time

3500 BCE 3000 BCE 2500 BCE 2000 BCE 1500 BCE 1000 BCE

Cultures or Types

Pubian
Tanshishan
Chungpianshan
Paojinwan
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ago “amongst the hundreds of small islands which flank the coasts of Zhejiang [浙江]
and Fujian Provinces . . . if the Austronesians ever required a maritime ‘nursery’, it might
have been here” (104). Rolett, Guo, and Jiao (2007) reports that the volcanic adzes found
in the Neolithic sites in Taiwan are actually made in and transported from Pescadores
archipelago in the Taiwan Strait (Figure 2.3). By the exchange networks, he then affirms
that the “systematic open-sea voyaging” between Pescadores archipelago and Taiwan
“began at least 4000 years ago” (Rolett, Guo, and Jiao 2007, 275). Lapteff (2006)
considers that the archaeological cultures in Fukien has direct influences on Jōmon
culture in Japan since its early period (4500-3000 BCE, or ca. 5300-3600 BCE) through
“direct cross-cultural contact or migrations” (Lapteff 2006, 258). And “the migration [is]
limited to some convenient sea bridges, like Fujian-Taiwan” (Lapteff 2006, 262). As early
as the time indicated by Bellwood and Lapteff, the only archaeological culture in Fukien
was the Fukuotun culture, and sea nomads were the cultural transmitters. They perfected
their seafaring skill by voyaging along the southeast coast of China for thousands of years,
and then traversed the 140-km Taiwan Strait at the latest 6,000 years ago. As late as 4,000
years ago, the cross-strait voyages had become regular and systematic and supplied the
volcanic stone adzes to Taiwan. The relatively frequent marine traffic across the strait and
along the southeast coast of China thus rendered Quemoy, sitting at the traffic intersection,
one of the major entrepots of the continental archeological cultures, and consequently a
place with cultural mixture.
As it might be evident, prehistoric Quemoy achieved such cultural hybridity due to
its geographic location. The mouth of Jiulong River and Xiamen Bay providing favorable
habitats for sea nomads with estuaries, sandy beaches, and mangrove-covered coastal
mud flats on numerous islands (Sopher 1977), has attract the people of Fukuotun to settle
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in Quemoy. Its close distance to Taiwan with Pescadores archipelago as the midway point
constitutes a convenient sea bridge for migration. The median position on the coastal line
of southeast China between Zhejiang and Canton makes Quemoy an essential point on
the migration route ascending or descending along the coast. All these geographical
characteristics suggest Quemoy was the sea nomads’ traffic node in the southest coast of
China, and consequently brought cultural hybridity to the island.
2.3 Origin Myth: The Northern Elite?
Although the prehistoric archaeological cultures in Quemoy hold noticeable
significance in anthropology (see Appendix A), the current inhabitants in Quemoy
seemingly have difficulty relating themselves to these findings. Since the discovery of
these prehistoric sites in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the local government
and commoners together have made only limited efforts to preserve these prehistoric sites.
The Fukuotun site, for example, is desolate.7 Residents in Quemoy commonly identify
themselves with the Han Chinese, and do not conceive themselves as genealogically
related to these indigenous populations. However, the understanding is a socially
constructed misconception because the indigenous peoples in Fukien have endeavored to
conceal their indigenous origin for nearly 2,000 years (Chen 2006). The objective of the
social practice was for the indigenous people to attain social and cultural equality in the
Chinese society. There is a continuum of the indigenous settlement in the coastal Fukien
since the prehistoric era till the turn of the last century, and the indigenous people belong
to the cultural ethnicity of the sea nomads. Due to the inclination to eradicate relations to
7

When I carried out my fieldwork in the summer of 2010, villagers told me that the site was located
behind the ancestor hall of Guan 關 clan. However, the path to the site was covered by thick grasses and
the site was therefore inaccessible. Notwithstanding, during the winter when the grasses wither, or in the
mid-spring after the locals enter the area for a pilgrimage to their ancestors’ graves on the annual tomb
scrub day, the site would be in the villagers’ view.
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the indigenous people, only a few in Fukien today would identify themselves with
indigenous populations. Although the ancestor worship weighs heavily in their religious
life, commoners in Quemoy treat the prehistoric sites as the landscape of Others.
2.3.1

The Problem of the Genesis of Quemoy

Likewise, the local members of the educated class share a similar neglect. In the
latest official history of Quemoy, the sixteen-volume Gazetteer of Quemoy (2010)
devotes only three pages to prehistory, while it repeatedly states that Han Chinese
emigrants from northern China established the first settlement in Quemoy in 282 or 317.
The assertion arbitrarily overlooks the fact that long before such migration became
possible, indigenous populations prospered in this region. Although the historians may
merely parrot clichés in the previous gazetteers, the assertion reveals the traditional
Han-centric perspective of the Chinese intellectuals. Nonetheless, it is intriguing that
when archeological discoveries abundantly document indigenous settlements in
prehistoric Quemoy, the well-informed committee tenaciously maintains a problematic
statement offered by early historiographers nearly two-hundred years ago.8 The
presumption of Quemoy’s genesis and the neglect of prehistoric Quemoy are two sides of
the same coin. They cannot simply attribute to the limit of the craft of historiography. The
central problem of the proposition of Quemoy’s genesis hinges on the cultural inclination
toward ethnicities that Quemoy people identify with.

8

Certainly, one may argue that the great division between history and archaeology can prompt the
abbreviation of the discussion on prehistoric Quemoy in the gazetteer: historians can only speak on textual
records but not on artifact assemblages. However, the argument is not necessary true as many monographs
of regional history, including some of Quemoy, start with pertinent discussions on the regional prehistoric
sites and the archaeological findings (e.g. Lee 2005; Shi and Xu 2007; Tang 1995; Xie, Yang, and Wang
2003; Zhu 1985). And even if the argument prevails, it still does not explain why the far-fetched genesis of
Quemoy by Han Chinese is dogmatically maintained. The presumption of Quemoy’s genesis and the
neglect of prehistoric Quemoy are two sides of the same coin. They cannot simply attribute to the limit of
the craft of historiography.
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2.3.2

Two Historical Discourses of Quemoy’s Origin

The presumption originally derives from two historic records—one regarding the
establishment of Jinan County 晉安郡 in 282 and the other about the Wuhu Chaos 五胡
亂華 during the years 304-316. Under current historians’ scrutiny, neither incident in the
records can substantiate the presumption of Quemoy’s genesis. In 282, the Chinese
administration of Jin Dynasty 晉代 established Jinan County which covered half of the
current Fukien Province, mainly the seaboard and the southwest hilly areas. The
establishment indicated a growth of Han population in the county and the political
expansion of Han Chinese to southern Fukien. However, in terms of regional
development, the establishment of this county remained nominally at the level that
marked a large tract of land on the map for administrative purposes, but did not signify a
full exercise of dominion or wide spread occupancy of Han Chinese in the region. In fact,
Han Chinese at this time only controlled a small part of this territory, and the vast land of
Fukien largely remained in the hand of indigenous peoples. Using the county
establishment to date the genesis of Quemoy was therefore problematic (Xie, Yang, and
Wang 2003, 12):
In fact, before Tang Dynasty [618-907] only the Min River Delta, the northern
Fukien corridor [the Min River Valley], and the Jin River Delta 晉江 had been
preliminarily developed [by Han Chinese]. Areas that the power of Han Chinese
could reach . . . were only limited to the capital cities of prefectures, the county seats,
the town centers, as well as the corridors along the major traffic lines. Territory out
of these areas was almost undeveloped or only with very limited development.
Remote islands like Quemoy and Leiyu were either treated as barbarian land or even
unknown to the administration at the time. As a result, the issue regarding which
prefecture or county that Quemoy islands belonged to by this time was actually
irrelevant.
In other words, although Quemoy was in Jinan County, historians did not interpret the
county establishment as an indication that Han Chinese had already settled in, or even
known about, this remote island.
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The other record in the gazetteer incongruously indicated that the first Han
settlement in Quemoy occurred in 317. In the third volume of Gazetteer of Quemoy
(2010), the section “Genesis of Quemoy People” provided a complete version of the
record (Huang et al. 2010, 39):
When Wuhu Chaos happened in the Jin Dynasty, Central Plain [in the mid and lower
Yellow River basin] was under turbulence. The righteous people following the
imperial court of Jin emigrated southward. Six clans—Su, Chen, Wu, Tsai, Lu, and
Yan—fled to and resettled in Wuzhou [the toponym of Quemoy before 1386]. This
was the beginning of settlement in Quemoy. 晉，五胡亂華，中原紛擾，義民隨晉
室南渡，逃居浯洲者六姓，曰蘇、陳、吳、蔡、呂、顏，金門之有居民，實自
此始。
Wuhu Chaos was a nomadic invasion during the years 304-316. Northern nomads crossed
the Great Wall, and established their regimes in northern China. Following the invasion,
Tan (2000) estimated that approximate 900,000 people, equivalent to one eighth of the
population in the northern China, moved southward during 304-317. After Han Chinese
established a new regime, Eastern Jin 東晉, in southern China, immigrants from the
northern China constituted one sixth of its population. These immigrants mainly, if not all,
resettled in the immigrant prefectures in the Yangtze Basin and the Huai River 淮河
Basin. Also, the northern border of Eastern Jin was generally demarcated in the two
regions. Fukien was located far beyond the northern border, being surrounded by
mountains with only a few land routes to communicate with neighboring lands. In
addition, indigenous peoples, occupying the Fukien territory, often conflicted with Han
pioneers over the control of Fukien at this time (Chen 2006). The geographical condition
and the social milieu rendered Fukien a foreign land with dangerous environment and
unfriendly population. As a result, Fukien at the time was an unlikely destination for the
northern refugees. In fact, the Eastern Jin regime had not established any immigrant
prefectures and counties in Fukien. By their geographical distribution, Xie, Yang, and
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Wang (2003) took the exclusion of Fukien as a proof that Fukien did not accommodate, at
least, a great amount of refugees after Wuhu Chaos. Without the migration waves taking
place, the contemporary historians were unable to establish the relationship between
Wuhu Chaos and the regional development of Fukien, which in its due course would lead
to the establishment of permanent Han settlement in Qemoy. Xie, Yang and Wang futher
clarified that the presumed relationship actually originated from a theory of the genesis of
Fukien—Eight Clans into Min 八姓入閩—from the book History of Nine Kingdoms 九
國志 (2003, 12):
In the second year of Youngjia period [308], the Central Plain was under turbulence.
Eight clans of the gentry class—Lin, Huang, Chen, Zhen, Zhan, Qiu, He, Hu—were
the first [Han] group entering Min [the ancient name of Fukien before 733]. 永嘉二
年，中州板蕩，衣冠始入閩者八族，林、黃、陳、鄭、詹、丘、何、胡是也。
However, Xie, Yang, and Wang (2003) considered that even the theory was fictional, but
just so well-known that the latter-day historiographers took the theory for granted. The
late discovery of tombs from the Jin Dynasty produced a rebuttal to the prevailing theory.
According to the dates on these tombs, Han Chinese had already immigrated to Fukien in
a constant and small-scale fashion. The immigration continued throughout the East Jin
Dynasty (317-410), and directly contributed to the growth of Han population in Fukien
(Chen 2006). These Han immigrants mainly resettled in the areas with preliminary
development, i.e. the Min River Basin and the Jin River Delta, where the tombs had been
found. The tomb owners ranged over all social tiers, and were not limited to the gentry
class, and their family did not necessarily belong to the eight clans mentioned in the
theory (Tang 1995; Chen 2006).
Although the theory of immigration was not literally correct, small-scale
immigration did coincide with the gradual population growth of Han Chinese in Fukien
since the turn of the fourth century. It was also at this time that Han settlers initiatively
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entered the southern Fukien, in which their settlements mainly concentrated in the Jin
River Delta. Due to the initial phase of development, the allegation, suggesting that a
considerable amount of war refugees from the northern China had resettled in a remote
and not particularly resourceful island like Quemoy, was hardly convincible. Besides, if
Han Chinese first entered Fukien in 308 due to Wuhu chaos, the previous record,
indicating the year of 282 as the establishment date of the first Han settlement in Quemoy,
would simply be wrong. The establishment of the first Han settlement in Quemoy could
not precede the one of Fukien. And if the theory of Fukien genesis was correct, the
discrepancy in the immigrated clans, in terms of the eight clans to Fukien versus the six
clans to Quemoy, would provoke even more suspicions over the second record of
Quemoy genesis.
2.3.3

The Alleged Evidences of Quemoy Genesis

Some of the local historians in Quemoy noticed that the two textual records were at
odds with each other, and the discrepancy between them and the theory of Fukien genesis
generated even more uncertainties. To consolidate their view, they supplied another lead
to complement the two records. In 1955 when the Nationalist troops under bombardment
constructed defenses in Quemoy, they excavated a brick from the Xiancuo 賢厝 village
(Kuo 2006a). It was described as a rhomb-shape solid with geometrical inscriptions on
the narrow sides. One serviceman made a few rubbings of the geometric inscriptions, and
sent them in a letter to his father, a museum curator in Taiwan. The curator wrote a
review on the brick and dated it between 197-618. The review was then broadly cited in
the official history of Quemoy but in a manipulated way that the purposely omitted an
incongruent opinion in the quotation (e.g. Huang et al. 2010, 39; Kuo 2006a, 13; Kuo
2006b, 63; Kuo 2007, 353). The review indicated that after the serviceman and his crew
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found the first brick, they sequentially discovered similar bricks in the foundations of the
folk houses and the surrounding stone hedges. Villagers told the serviceman that these
bricks were brought back from the mainland China. Although the curator did not agree
with the opinion, he included the local beliefs in his review (Zhuang 1958, 356):
There might be ancient relics underground. The inhabitants’ opinion that these
bricks were from the mainland was unnecessarily credible. When a scientific
excavation could be carried out, I could assure that the findings, if any, must be
significant to the Southeast culture. 想地下或有古人遺跡，居民所告甎係移自大
陸未必可信也。何時可從事學術發掘，倘有所獲，定與東南文化大有關係，可
斷言也。[emphasis added; indicating the omitted sentence]
When the editors of Quemoy gazetteers extracted this passage, they intentionally omitted
the sentence indicating the inhabitants’ opinion, and thus concealed one possible origin of
the brick. The manipulation to supply a historic evidence for the Quemoy genesis further
problematized the historic discourse. Since the villagers understood that these bricks were
foreign objects, the manipulation was then projected for Others outside the social circle
of Quemoy. Besides, not only the first brick but also those in the nearby village were
missing from Quemoy today. Huang (pers. comm.) speculates that all of them must have
been shipped to the curator in Taiwan so that he could examine them closely to make the
identification. However, the curator stated in his review that his appraisal was merely
based on the rubbings. As a result, this discovery of material evidence concerning the
Quemoy genesis is unverifiable.
The problems regarding the three “evidences” of Quemoy genesis can go on and on,
if one scrutinizes them even further. However, the bottom line is that no sound evidence
sustains the thesis, but also none absolutely denies it. Some historians, Xie, Yang, and
Wang (2003), for example, consider that it is rather impossible that Han refugees would
travel this far to an island like Quemoy, when they actually can find favorable habitats in
the Yangtze River Basin that is much closer to their original settlements. The
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establishment of immigrant prefectures and counties in the Yangtze River Basin
substantiates this view. Nevertheless, historians also cannot rule out the possibility that
sporadic Han immigrants ended up in Quemoy without historical records. The
inconclusiveness reveals a void that needs to be filled with new historic and
archaeological discovery, without which all claims about Quemoy’s genesis suffer.
Consequently, the prehistoric Quemoy may extend, from 1500 BCE, further into a latter
period, since the historical time of Quemoy have not begun from 282 or 317.
2.3.4

The Non-Han Populations in Fukien

In recently years, some local historians when discussing the development of
Quemoy have mentioned the non-Han ethnicities in Fukien (e.g. Huang et al. 2010; Lee
2005; Luo 2010). The ethnicity that they often mention is Yue 越, which is a term that
the ancient Han Chinese commonly used to refer to all the indigenous populations living
in the current day southern China. The term has a variation as Hundred Yue 百越
(Meacham 1996). These peoples, as Meacham maintains, inhabited southern China
between 1000 BCE-1000 CE.9 In history, the interaction of these indigenous peoples
with Han Chinese was limited to their borderland, largely in the Yangtze River Basin.
Before the third century BCE, the Han Chinese only acquired general knowledge about
places beyond their borders. Without reliable historical records, attempts to define the
geographical distribution of each ethnicity of Hundred Yue were often unproductive. As
the southern Fukien was located in the hinterland of Hundred Yue, the geographical
distance occasioned the epistemological unfamiliarity. A better understanding of the
ethnography therein would accompany the Chinese political and military expansion into

9

Chinese historians usually report a much earlier appearance in the early Shang Dynasty 商代 ca. 1500
BCE (Shi and Xu 2007).
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the region. Before the expansion, the early Chinese records provided only dubious
descriptions about the culture of these peoples who shared “common traits such as
tattooing, short cropped hair, fighting abilities, adaptation to water environment”
(Meacham 1996, 94).
The Hundred Yues in Chinese History
As late as the eighth century BCE (the beginning of Spring and Autumn 春秋
Period), Han Chinese had recognized the indigenous people in Fukien as Seven Min 七
閩. The name might stand for the seven tribes paying tribute to kings of the Zhou
Dynasty 周代. In the early fifth century BCE, a group of Hundred Yue in the Yangtze
Delta established the state of Yue, which by that time had grown formidable enough,
letting the coeval Chinese warlords to concede its ruler the title of protector-general 霸
(Brindley 2003, 10). The concession thereby ensured the Yue people a role in Chinese
history. As late as the third century BCE, Min people in Fukien established their first
state—Min Yue 閩越. The powerful state had served as an allied force to Chinese
warlords during the revolution war against the Qin 秦 empire (Chen 2006). After their
involvement in the Chinese political games, trace of Min people (Min Yue) then
consistently appeared in Chinese history. The term “Min Yue” thenceforth stood for the
group of Hundred Yue in Fukien. The term “Hundred Yue” first appeared in Chinese
history and became a general term to name all Southerners on the Chinese mainland.
Even with a general understanding of these peoples, the ancient Chinese knowledge of
them was far too general to meet the current-day standards of ethnography. The
recognition of their ethnicities was mainly a byproduct of the political and military
pursuit for Han Chinese at this time, but nowhere near a systematic understanding of their
culture (Meacham 1996).
61

The Archeological Cultures of Min Yue in Fukien
Indigenous peoples lived in Fukien long before the Chinese were aware of their
presence. Of the Yue “mega-culture,” Min people share common cultural traits with other
groups of Hundred Yue, such as “the production of stamped geometric pottery,
shouldered stone axe, and stepped adzes” (Meacham 1996, 6). Nevertheless, through
analyses of the pottery typologies, decoration patterns, types of pottery stamps, late
archaeological studies find this “Geometric Stamped Pottery Culture” in Fukien endemic
and distinct (Kuo 2007; Kuo and Liu 2006; Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002). Tanshishan
culture is the representative of this “Geometric Stamped Pottery Culture” in Fukien,
which culminates in the Chuangpienshan upper strata phase (2200-1500 BCE), and
diffuses to Quemoy forming the Pubien phase (2000-1500 BCE) as its variation. Wu
(2002), by examining the cultivation tools of Tanshishan culture, concludes that the
subsistence pattern of Min people is different from the one of Lungshanoid in the Yangtze
Delta, who are famous for their sophisticated wet-rice cultivation, a legacy of Hemudu
culture (6000-4000 BCE). Instead, the Min way of life, as shown by shell middens, relies
on gathering marine resources and hunting small game, along with primitive horticultural
activities (Wu 1997; 2002; Zhong 2005). According to Chen’s (1999) definition, the
location of settlements and the subsistence pattern both characterize the Min culture as
one of sea nomads. It belongs to Meacham’s category of “Yue Coastal Neolithic”—a term
he invented “to highlight these archaeological cultures from those of the Lungshanoid”
(1996, 96). The foraging livelihood was the cultural hallmark of sea nomads in the
southeast coast of China, and remains to be the most prominent cultural trait of the Min
people until 1200 BCE, when the sea nomad culture marched into the Bronze Age.
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Chinese archaeologists (Wu 1997; Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002) generally agree that
the metalwork is a foreign technology, which along with other cultural traits, such as
burial customs of mound tombs, defused to Fukien primarily from the Yangtze River
Delta. The cultural diffusion consequently brought a series of dramatic changes and even
“Chinese characters” to the Min (Wu 2002). These changes signify the inception of a
hybrid culture and the formation of Min Yue ethnicity before the third century BCE. The
cultural interaction eventually diminishes the endemic quality of the Min culture (Kuo
2007). The exchange of cultural traits with the Lungshanoid cultures turns into a cultural
assimilation or even, as some proposed, Sinicization (Wu 2002; Wu and Cao 2002).
However, the “Sinicization” has not thoroughly completed even now, especially when a
boat-dwelling people in the southeast coast of China today are considered as the
descendants of the Neolithic sea nomads (Chen 2002; Sopher 1977).
Tan People: The Early Settlers in Quemoy?
Chinese historians consider Tan 蜑 as the descendants of Min Yue (Chen 2006; Fu
2007a; Li 2009; Ouyang 1998; Xu 1997). Informed by the genealogical discussion, two
views between historians and archaeologists correspond with each other. Both agree that
Min people are the ancestors of the Tan, who maintained the sea nomads’ culture. In
history, the Tan originally consisted of the remnants of Min Yue after the annexation of
their state by Han Chinese in 110 BCE. They spread all over the southeast coast of China,
but mostly were active in the river estuaries and islands in their vicinities. Most of the
Tan people spent all their lives aboard boats, while a few had straw huts atop platforms
on the river banks. Their livelihood mainly relied on collecting marine resources, and, as
Sopher points out, their way of life is distinguishable from the one of Han Chinese (1977,
379-80):
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Tan are an aboriginally primitive folk, later much acculturated but still subject to
segregation and antipathy on account of their “un-Chinese” origin and “un-Chinese”
way of life. One may infer most plausibly that their skill in swimming and diving
and their boat-dwelling habit[s] were derived from nomadic strand and riverside
collecting and fishing, which, in addition to collecting in the forest margins and
mat-working, were their principal economic activities.
Chinese, including assimilated peoples with indigenous origins, historically viewed Tan
as uncivilized human animals of a pariah class. The view prevailed especially after the
tenth century when population pressure in Fukien emerged. Thereafter, Chinese society
customarily imposed unjust measures upon them: Land dwellers prohibited Tan people
from owning land and deprived them of their rights to change class. The oppression, in
the worst case, could lead to lynching till death, when occasionally land dwellers found
Tan in their land. Due to their identical physiology, the land-dwelling people demanded
Tan distinguishably mark themselves by following specific dress codes and using
distinctive hair styles. The social injustice prevented their cultural fusion with Han
Chinese, and consequently preserved their vernacular culture. Accordingly, the
distinctness of their culture was partially an outcome of the thousand-year segregation
from Chinese civil community.
Due to the apartheid, the quarantined “marooned” communities of the Tan people
became asylums for other fugitives banished from the Han Chinese society. Rebels
suppressed by imperial forces, a Chinese emperor and his followers exiled by foreign
conquerors, and defeated warlords and their troops during the revolutions all had been
named as the ancestors of Tan in the history (Chen 1946). Due to their nomadic nature,
the Tan society usually lacked organization (Ouyang 1998). However, with inclusion of
these military-trained personnel, Tan, benefiting from their familiarity with water
activities through everyday life, had grown into formidable maritime powers in specific
historic moments since the fourth century, and participated in significant and massive
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military operations of anti-governmental activities (Zheng 1999). Historians had reported
their alliance with various Chinese forces in naval battles, and their engagement in the
pirate activities and the oversea trading activities during peacetime. These records not
only accentuated their power outside Chinese control, but also underscored their
continuous influence on the coastal Fukien.
Based on the studies of the sea nomads, there is clearly a spatial and temporal
continuity to the existence of sea nomads in the coastal region of Fukien since prehistoric
times (Table 2.3). These sea nomads, concomitant with the Chinese expansion, have been
known by variant names—Seven Min, Min Yue, and Tan. Their archaeological cultural
transplantation from the Min River Delta to Quemoy effects their sophisticated seafaring
skill. With this cultural trait and nomadic lifestyle, their territory includes most of the
coastal region of Fukien since prehistoric time. In the coastal region, the mouths of the
Min River and the Jiulong River are the two favorable habitats for sea nomads (Sopher
1977).10 Quemoy is located at the gateway of Xiamen Bay, one that the Jiulong River
flows into, and was settled by the sea nomads in prehistoric time. Although no
archaeological and historical evidence demonstrates that any sea nomads were active in
Quemoy after the disappearance of Pubien phase, they are the most legitimate candidate
for the early settlers in Quemoy before the Han Chinese claimed the island.
According to a Chinese monograph of historical geography—Taiping Huanyu Ji 太
平寰宇記—written in the 980s (Wang 2007), when Quemoy was in the area of Zhuhai
neighborhood 煮海里 in Tongan county 同安縣 (Yang B. 2010), the inhabitants in
Quemoy at the time still lived as sea nomads:
10

Lin (2007) a Quemoy local in his late 40’s in 2010 reported that in his father’s childhood (the antebellum
days) Tan people still anchored their boats in the Xiashu port 夏墅港 in the estuary of the Wujiang Creek,
when they needed shopping or to repair their boats on shore.
65

Table 2.3. A Summary of Archaeological and Historic Findings Related to Sea Nomads
in Fukien [dates of archaeological sites after Pu-bein phase from: Guo and Wu, 2002]
Archaeological

Time (BP)

Cultures
Fukuotun culture

Life

Cultural

Chinese

Pattern

Trait

Records

Chinese Dynasty

8000-5800

復國墩文化

Chuangbienshan

4200-3500

phase
庄邊山類型
Pubien upper phase

4000-3500

浦邊類型
Huangtulun culture

Sea Nomad

Neolithic Age

曇石山文化

3500-3000

黃土侖文化
Tieshan culture

3000-2400

Bronze Age

Mound Tomb

鐵山文化

夏代

Yue-Ou

Shang

越漚

商代

Seven Min

Zhou

七閩

周代

State of Yue

Spring and

越國

Autumn
春秋

Min Yue State

Warrior States

閩越國

戰國
Han
漢代

Han Culture

Iron Age

富林崗文化

Xia

2400-2000

Agriculture

Fulingang culture

黃帝
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Tan
蜑民

Mythological time

Hang Di

Historical Time

5500-4200

Geometric Stamped Pottery

Tanshishan culture

The area of Zhuhai neighborhood includes four islands in the sea. A total of
four-hundred some households live on these islands. There are no farmlands, and the
livelihood of inhabitants relies on fishing and collecting shellfishes. 煮海里，一邊
在海中，有島嶼四所，計四百餘家居焉。無田疇，人以釣魚拾螺為業。
Since the record does not name the ethnicity, the incumbent inhabitants in the record were
not necessarily sea nomads. However, there was only a slim chance that Han immigrants
from an agricultural civilization had adopted their prehistoric life pattern. In
consideration of the impossibility of cultural atavism, I am prone to agree that sea
nomads occupied Quemoy at the time. Aside from my speculation, the production pattern
of fishing and foraging indicates a primitive condition of land use, meaning that even if
Han Chinese had established settlements in or before the late tenth century, these
settlements remained insignificant. In a view of cultural evolution, inasmuch as these
settlers continued the cultural practice of sea nomads, their legacy persists and their
culture endures. The progress of cultural evolution remains at a primitive stage. Under the
circumstances, whether or not Han immigrants had established settlements before the late
tenth century is irrelevant to the current inhabitants to have any essential significance in
cultural formation or historical geography of Quemoy. As such, the prevailing insistence
on the genesis of Han settlements in Quemoy around the turn of the forth century is
essentially not a disputed issue in the realm of history, but rather a constructive one
pertaining to the locals’ identity.
2.3.5

Significance of the Discourse of Quemoy Genesis

The people in Quemoy believe they are the descendants of Huang Di 黃帝, and they
consider themselves with “no doubt” as Han Chinese (Huang et al. 2010).11 For them to
11

Huang Di is a mythological sage king in the Neolithic time who Han Chinese believe to be their
common ancestor and the founder of Chinese civilization. His tomb in northern China has been worshipped
for thousands of years. Although no archaeological relics from the Neolithic time have ever been found in
the tomb, Chinese held it as the symbol of Chinese ethnicity. The place is significant to all Han Chinese,
even in the absence of scientific confirmation. In contrast, the sea nomad relics in Quemoy are assembled
and presented as scientific findings, but the inhabitants in Quemoy find it difficult to relate to themselves.
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be Han Chinese, their ancestors had to be immigrants, because Fukien was originally a
territory of indigenous people outside of Han Chinese domain. As the place defines the
identity of its inhabitants, to establish a Han Chinese lineage, the place, too, had to be
Sinicized as early as possible. Once the place has turned into a Chinese territory,
thenceforward the successors can “naturally” be Han Chinese. The theory of “Eight Clans
into Min” offers the earliest date of the migration of Han Chinese into Fukien, so it is
indiscriminately adopted in historical gazetteers in Fukien. Besides, since the isolation of
Tan and other indigenous peoples geographically confines the non-Han ethnicities to
certain “marooned reservations” from the Chinese community, “Han” people in Fukien
can therefore proclaim themselves as one of the “purest stock” of the Chinese race. With
the production and the circulation of the knowledge through the gazetteers, prehistoric
sites of indigenous people are treated as the landscape of unrelated, if not unwanted,
Others. Under the circumstances, to relate oneself to the prehistoric Others and their
relics one risks being “un-Chinese” with lineage of inferior ethnicities. An indigenous
origin is therefore an unfavorable stigma that Quemoy people prefer to conceal, while the
Han identity, which enables them to mingle in the Chinese community, is desirable for its
cultural utility. The ethnic construction of a Han origin is a social exhibition for external
audiences in the Chinese community, and the concealment of the villagers’ opinion on
the antique bricks exemplifies such construction regardless of the local knowledge of the
bricks as foreign objects. The constructive practice suggests a strategy that Quemoy
intellectuals employ to negotiate with their fellow “Chinese” for the ethnicity of Quemoy
people, and further to consolidate their Han identity. The continuous use of problematic
historic records and the neglect of prehistoric sites in Quemoy then can be read as the
outcome of Han-centrism working on Quemoy, both the land and its people.
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The origin myth of Quemoy enunciates its marginality from the geographical and
cultural center of China. The distance from the cultural center and the geographical
characteristics of inaccessibility make Fukien a relatively late territory claimed by Han
Chinese, in comparison to neighboring areas. As an offshore island in the southern Fukien,
removed from its political and cultural center to the north, Quemoy is located on the edge
of a marginal Chinese territory. Culturally speaking, the majority of people in the
southern Fukien have been largely assimilated and, together with immigrants from the
northern China, all have been considered as Han Chinese after the eleventh century.
However, driven by the geographical marginality, Quemoy people later are still eager to
telescope their perceptional distance to the Chinese cultural hearth. They have restlessly
endeavored to demonstrate their “Chineseness” by using available testimonies of their
history, genealogy, proficiency in Confucianism, and so on. On the other hand, because
of the same marginality, one who resists the Chinese hegemony can also conveniently go
behind its boundaries, pursuing enterprises, which Chinese elites deem unconventional
and even obnoxious, such as overseas trading or piracy. The geographical marginality
therefore sets the cultural motif of Quemoy. Both the practice of resistance and
compliance to Chinese conventionality constitute the daily life of Quemoy people living
in the outskirts of Chinese civilization. Their “Chinesenss” or none are two cards in a
hand for them to play when either one is found proper to the situation, although, along
with the process of assimilation, their non-Chineseness is embraced and compromised by
Han Chinese as a regional sub-culture of “Han” in the southern Fukien.
2.4 Sequent Occupance: Industrial Trials Leaving a Mark
Development of the functioning settlement usually demands specific production
modes to secure the economic base. In Quemoy, the first two historical local industries
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were both state-owned enterprises supplying national consumption. They were horse
ranches and saltworks. Horses and salt were both important resources for the Chinese
regimes, which traditionally held state monopolizes on the two industries, and usually
would set up specific agencies to administer them.
2.4.1

Horses and Salt Industries in the Pre-modern China

The significance of horses for pre-modern China largely stemmed from their use by
the cavalry. The administration of horse breeding conventionally belonged to the
department of military affairs. The most desirable situation was state pastureland in
northwestern China, where the temperate dry climate created a suitable habitat. Otherwise,
the establishment of official horse pastures elsewhere in China often signified the
nomadic invasion in the northern territories. The establishment of official horse pasture in
Fukien was specifically a remedy for the loss of northwestern pastureland. It was the first
and the most short-lived effort to restore military horse populations. As Yu (2007), Ma
(1984), and Nie (2006) reported, during the latter half of the eighth century, the horse
shortage had forced the Chinese government to repeatedly expropriate private horses for
its military. Even though the condition continued, the imperial providers did not establish
horse ranches until 804, but acquired horses through international trade. The horse
pastures in the central and southern China were often ephemeral due to disappointing
reproduction rates, and the inevitable conflicts between ranching and farming. The horse
pastures in Fukien during the time operated only for a year (804-805), and others did not
last over fifteen years in central and southern China (Nie 2005). As a result, these efforts
failed to remedy the horse shortage. According to the Gazetteer of Quemoy (Ni 2010), the
significance of the ranching enterprise lay in its consequent influence on regional
development. The government, in order to establish horse pastures, invested
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infrastructure and manpower. These investments laid a foundation for further
development in Quemoy.
Salt on the other hand was an important revenue source for the Chinese regimes;
therefore the authorities usually enforced strict control over its production and trade.
Although Fukien was one of the regions in China capable of salt-producing, its salt
industry in China had never been prominent. According to Wang and Lü (2008), both the
scale of salt industry in Fukien and the amount of its production were the smallest among
other salt-producing regions in China. In addition, due to Fukien’s geographical
inaccessibility, the revenue of its salt industry, restrained by the transportation difficulties,
was also the lowest. All these disadvantages made the industry in Fukien less important
for the Chinese regimes. However, its insignificance granted the salt industry in Fukien
more freedom from the imperial control than others. For example, the salt industry in
Fukien was the first to adopt advanced evaporation production methods. Taking
advantage of the climate with its high evaporation rate, the evaporation method was an
invention and found widespread application in Fukien before modern times. Before 1299,
six out of ten saltworks had adopted the advanced method, when salt industries in other
provinces mandatorily followed the conventional method of boiling (Tang 1995). Wang
and Lü (2008) considered that the adoption allowed the salt industry in Fukien to
generate great surpluses, which consequently gave rise to rampant bootlegging activities
and impacted official salt marketing in the region. The situation forced the imperial
administration to lift its strict control over the salt production and trade, while
concentrating on tax collection. Salt trade, freed from the state regulation, became an
important economic base of the local society in Fukien. The privatization of the salt trade
in Fukien signified a success in the environmental adaptation. In retrospect, the
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environmental characteristics of Fukien provided suitable conditions for the people to
discover and to perfect the evaporation method, while the social milieu of marginality
enabled them to promote and to adopt the advanced technology. Taking advantages of
both the natural settings and the social milieu, the locals then constituted a specific way
of life to perpetuate their society.
2.4.2

The Early Horse Industry in Quemoy

The Gazetteer of Quemoy views the establishment of the national horse ranches in
Quemoy as the inception of a functioning and permanent Han settlement in Quemoy. The
local history indicates that the headmen with official appointments led twelve-clan
herdsmen to Quemoy in 804, and they “plan and work together to turn the wildness into a
paradise; whereby inhabitants could farm, fish, and produce salt. Their population thus
gradually increases 協謀並力，化荒墟為樂土，自是耕稼漁鹽，生聚蓋日蕃焉” (Ni 2010,
208). According to the entry, the livelihood of the later generations in Quemoy did not
rely on herding horses. Under such circumstance, the establishment becomes only an
ephemeral incident whose significance apparently lies in its contribution to the change of
Quemoy from “the wildness into a paradise” (Ni 2010, 28). The change set the
cornerstones that enabled the Han people to permanently settle in the island by farming,
fishing, and salt making. However, the entry only presents a partial account. Due to the
problematic timeframe of the horse industry, its influence on the landscape in Quemoy is
taken lightly. In fact, the horse industry existed much longer in Quemoy, and operated
long enough to commence and also to implement the initial stage of landscape formation.
A Proposal for the Timeframe of the Horse-herding Past in Quemoy
In recent years, some historians (ex. Lee 2004b; Lee 2005; Xie, Yang, and Wang
2003) express concerns about the authenticity of the information in the entry. First of all,
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the founding date of the horse pasture in Fukien and in Quemoy was the same. The latter
might borrow its founding date from the former. National historical records pertaining to
the establishment in Fukien do not name the exact locales of the five ranches in
Quanzhou prefecture, and thus can not validate the local belief of an official ranch in
Quemoy during the years 804-805. The earliest time of the establishment in Quemoy that
the national historical records can provide is the early Song Dynasty before 1009 (Yang B.
2010). The records regarding the national horse policy provide some clues to its inaugural
date in Quemoy. According to these records, only after 980 did the central government of
the Song Dynasty dispatch horses to the local official ranches (Bai 1999). Hence, the
establishment of the national horse pasture in Quemoy cannot predate 980. Also, as the
historical record in the earlier section has shown, people in Quemoy in the 980s still lived
like sea nomads without agricultural activities (Wang 2007). In the case, the entry
claiming that inhabitants in Quemoy had been living by farming, fishing, and salt making
since 804 is problematic, and it is unlikely, too, that the official ranches existed in
Quemoy before 980. According to the national historical records, the inception of the
horse herding activities in Quemoy likely happened during the years 980-1009. Besides,
in order to have a profound influence on the local development, the animal husbandry
industry, practically speaking, should have lasted longer than a year for the herdsmen to
“effect a viable, self-perpetuating society” (Zelinsky 1973, 13). If national horse ranches
did exist in Quemoy during the years 804-805, its short life cycle likely did not produce
an outcome as significant as claimed. As a reasonable speculation, the horse-ranching
activities may have existed continuously much longer in another time to bring Quemoy
the effects as the common belief has insistented. Therefore, I would propose that the
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horse industry in Quemoy began during the period 980-1009 and ended during the years
1068-1085 when the government abolished the official horse pastures.
As the local record indicated, the period during 1068-1085 was also the time when
the government first set up a thorough administrative system in Quemoy based on the
unit of households (Ni 2010). Such an establishment would inevitably involve a census
and a land survey, and proceeded with a land reformation and redistribution for the tax
purpose. Meanwhile, the government, after the abolishment of the official horse industry,
also released the pastureland to civilians for their farmsteads (Wang 2008). By piecing the
information together, the establishment of the administrative system in Quemoy thus
closely correlated with the abolishment of horse pasture, and both measures were
contingent to land reformation. With this in mind, the national and the local history then
agree that the demise of the national horse pastures in Quemoy happened during
1068-1085. After all, by pushing back the time frame, the national horse pasture could be
in operation in Quemoy for at least fifty-nine years (1009-1068), which is abundant time
for the industry to inscribe tangible influence in the landscape. In the following
paragraphs, I will discuss these landscape inscriptions. They served not only as material
evidence of the unseen past but also as present keys that unlock the past of the horse
industry in Quemoy.
Landscape Inscriptions of the Horse-herding Past
The locals commonly believe that a few landmarks in Quemoy today link them with
historical horse ranching. These landscapes include a historical shrine and a few
toponyms: the Horse-wash Creek 洗馬溪, the Horse-lake village 駟湖村, and Mt.
Bean-and-straw 菽藁山 (70m). The most prominent landscape feature of the group is
the shrine of the Pasture Lord 牧馬王祠. The shrine contains not only historic
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significance but also religious ones because the cult of the patron saint of Quemoy
originated here. Places and geographical features with names relating to horse herding
activities generally occur in the southwestern Quemoy. The legendary pastureland is
geographically defined by the Wujiang Creek on the north, Mt. Fonglian 豐蓮山 (46m)
on the west, the sea on the south, and Mt. Breast 雙乳山 (82m) on the east (Chang
1996). As the longest watercourse in Quemoy, the Wujiang Creek flows through the
middle of the western half of the island. Its southern tributary is the Horse-wash Creek.
Although the river is hardly distinguishable in the landscape today, the locals remember it
as where the herdsmen washed and watered their horses. Its course meanders by the foot
of Mt. Fonglian on its east, and then turns westward flows into the Wujian Creek. Mt.
Fonglian refers to a hilly area surrounded by a ring of five hills, which from a distance
look like green petals. The hillocky highland obtains its name that in Chinese literally
means “the great water lily.” Because of the protective topography with water source and
grassland inside, the leaders of the twelve-clan herdsmen established their headquarters in
the heartland of Mt. Fonglian. To the south of the Horse-wash Creek stands the
Horse-lake village, whose name is after a lake that no longer exists. As the largest water
body near the headquarters, Horse Lake has been an important water source for the
herdsmen, who would lead their horses to the lake and water them there. The lake also
marks the southwest corner of the legendary pastureland. Mt. Breast is located in the
middle of the island; consists of two peaks and the in-between saddle terrace. The saddle
area, called Green-mountain Plain 青山坪, is a gentle slope where the herdsmen have
built straw sheds as shelters for their horses. On the south of Mt. Breast, ravines and
gullies cut into the laterite ground, and form a broken coastal terrace overlooking the
sandy beach under the seafront cliff. A highland between two ravines called Mt.
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Bean-and-straw is where the herdsmen planted the horse fodder, and marks the southeast
corner of the legendary pasture.
Narratives in the folklore about the land use patterns not only explain how these
places were associated with the horse industry, but also materialized the horse-herding
past of Quemoy with and within these locales. Although the site selection of the pasture
facilities may have been arbitrary, their interrelation was logically sound, and the
land-use patterns suited the geographical characters of each locale. Of course, chances are
that some of these narratives are sheer fictional, coming out from folk memories and their
inspirations, but, likewise, it is hard to imagine that folklores and oral histories have
forged them all. If the existence of the horse-ranching past in Quemoy is beyond question,
the land-use patterns of these locales in the narratives should at least be partially true. The
shrine of Pasture Lord as the most prominent memorial of the horse-herding past in
Quemoy would best represent the complexity of the interwoven historical imagination
and reality. As Woodward (1974) once pointed out, “The twilight zone that lies between
living memory and written history is one of the favorite breeding places of mythology.
This particular twilight zone has been especially prolific in the breeding of legend”
(Hoelscher 2003, 663). The narratives revolving around the shrine constitute the
discourse of the Pasture Lord, and consequently blur the horse-herding past in the history.
2.4.3

The Cult of the Pasture Lord in Quemoy

The shrine of the Pasture Lord perches on top of Mt. Fonglian, and overlooks the
Anchien 庵前 village sprawling over on the southern slope below. The northern slope of
Mt. Fonglian rises immediately from the estuary of the Wujiang Creek on its southern
bank, while the Horse-wash Creek washes by the foothill of the eastern slope. The gentle
southern slope of Mt. Fonglian stretches down to valleys and lowlands. With one wing on
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the Mt. Fonglain, they each lay the other on the surrounding low hills and mounds in the
south. On the mildly undulating land a few villages are scattered. The Anchien village is
one of them. It is said to be the locale of the headquarters of the legendry horse pasture,
and the shrine is located on the northeastern corner of the village. The shrine and its front
plaza nestle on the highest terrace of Mt. Fonglian against the ascending woodland on
their back. Although the current structure is a 1843 reconstruction, the shine, according to
a poem written by a hermit, Chiu Kui 丘葵 (1244-1333), should have existed at the
location before 1333. The major divinity of the shrine is the legendary leader of the
twelve-clan herdsmen, Chen Yuan 陳淵, whom the locals deem as the founder of the
island and, with the status, the patron saint of Quemoy. Another village on the undulating
land is the Yaojing 藥井 village. It squats in a bottomland between Mt. Fonglian and Mt.
Shanqian 山前 (40m) on the west of the Anchien village. The name “Yaojing” comes
from a well of medical springs that the Pasture Lord created by wielding his sword
thrusting at the ground. With the Guangli 官裡 village on the south and the Dongsha 東
沙 village on the southeast, these villages on the undulating land encircle an area, around
which the Pasture Lord and his ghost army would occasionally patrol at night in a line of
red lanterns (Chang 1996).12 The patrolled area then marks the geographical core of the
Pasture Lord cult, and contains rich folklore and landscape features associating with the
deity.
Legends of the Pasture Lord
According to the local historical record, Chen Yuan during his lifetime was known
for his marvelous horse herding skill. He led the twelve-clan herdsmen to Quemoy in 804,
12

In the folklore, Chen Yuan was buried in a place called Turtledove Stone 斑鳩石 on the west of the
Guanli village, and for that reason he would lead his army marching down the hill from the shrine of the
Pasture Lord to his grave and therefore patrolling the area.
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and together they converted the island from a wildness to a horse pasture. Because of the
skill and his contribution to the herdsmen community, people made him a god and titled
him as the Protector-general of the Horse 護驥將軍 after his death. The location of the
shrine was said to be his home-office and where people enshrined his body as an idol. He
was said to be the incarnation of Pegasus 天降駟精 in a human form born on earth to be
Ancestor of Horse 馬祖. His death further amplified his miraculous power. In 1417,
testimonial stories about how he repeatedly manifested himself to protect the locals from
manifold misfortune by his supernatural power were well propagated. In these stories, the
Lord summoned rain to relieve drought; repelled locust swarms into the sea; created
spiritual springs to cure diseases; and led a ghost regiment to defeat malicious pirates
(Kuo 2008b). In the last incident, Chen Yuan fought the battle with his two assistant
generals and two other officers during 1335-1340, and their names were then known to
the world. After recognizing his accomplishment in the incident, the government praised
all five of them with noble titles and a full expansion of the shrine. The newly built shrine,
thereafter known as the Fuji Temple 孚濟廟, was a compound with six courtyards, and
the Lord, with his newly granted title, became the Saint Marquis of Protection and
Fortune 福佑聖侯. In addition to the miracles that the Lord had performed to aid the
local people, the local history also included a side episode: A Quemoy girl voluntarily
married to the Lord at a cost of her own death, and by his supernatural power she became
a goddess in charge of pregnancy and childbirth. After the pirate incident, the government
also recognized the marriage, and honored the goddess with a marchioness title.
The Production and Circulation of the Knowledge of the Pasture Lord
Other than folklore and oral history, knowledge of Chen Yuan in text largely comes
from the inscriptions on the stone tablets or wood planks in the shrine. The earliest one
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among these is a stone tablet engraved with an essay written in 1417 by a serviceman
stationed in Quemoy. However, without mentioning his sources of the mythological
narratives, the essay is likely a faithful record of folklores and oral histories. Information
in other inscriptions from the time basically confirms the original story yet adds records
of subsequent events. The only record showing recognizable discrepancies is an essay in
History of Yangzhai 陽翟誌 cited in the book Canghai jiyi 滄海紀遺 published in 1568.
The record indicates a different background of Chen Yuan as a figure born in the central
China (in the current Gushi 固始 County, Henan Province) during the period of the Five
Dynasties (907-979). In addition, both his two assistant generals in the battle with pirates
are replaced with famous historical military figures, and also the battle was postponed to
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). Notwithstanding, the following essay on the subject,
written by Lu Ruo-Tong 盧若騰 in commemoration of another reconstruction of the
shrine in 1661, refutes all the incongruent sayings in the previous record, and supports the
earliest version of the story. The essay then sets the tone for the story, and the discourse
about Chen Yuan has never been challenged again until recent years.
A Discussion on the Discourse of the Pasture Lord
In the discourse, a change of the divinity from a deity of horse husbandry to the
genius loci of Quemoy may be discernible. The first two titles of Chen Yuan—Pegasus
and Ancestor of Horse—are actually borrowed from the deity of horse husbandry whom
the Chinese authorities pray in the spring for horse reproduction. Of the ancient Chinese
belief, both Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse are ultimately the animal embodiment of the
Chinese constellation of Room 房宿 on Earth (Ma 1983). The deity hence stems from the
animistic cult system of natural gods (Deng 2006). In the history, a set of Confucian
rituals, prescribed and practiced since the Zhou Dynasty (700-256 BCE), first mention
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the divine trinity of horse husbandry (Ma 1983). Four ceremonies in the four seasons for
the deities of horse husbandry produce explicit instructions, and certain ranch works are
contingent to each ceremony.13 These ceremonies reflect instructions defining specific
timing for certain ranch works, through which the knowledge of the four deities circulates
among commoners. Over time, the rituals, in spite of a few modifications and
amendments, have been continuously held until modern times. The deities of horse
husbandry are literally supported by the state power, and are commonly worshipped by
administrators in charge of horse affairs. Even though no historical records show that
these rituals have been performed in the national pasture in Quemoy, they were the only
legitimate rituals that a governmental facility could perform to pray for the success in
horse husbandry in the Middle ages. With the connection to Pegasus and Ancestor of
Horse, Chen Yuan is either an indigenized variation of the Confucian deities in a later
time, or a deity of popular religion influenced by the legitimate official cult from the
beginning. In either case, the discourse of the horse-guarding god in Quemoy owes its
originality to Confucianism. In the discourse of the Pasture Lord, his first honor title “the
Protector-general of Horse” should have clearly pronounced him as a deity of horse
husbandry. In addition, all the miracles that Chen Yuan, the human incarnation of the
Pasture Lord, has performed before death are limited to the trade of horse husbandry. The
specialization should have spoken for the nature of his divinity.
Notwithstanding, after the narrative account detailed Chen Yuan’s death, the
divinity of the Pasture Lord began to change. The change most obviously appeared in his
disaster relief deeds. The Pasture Lord turned from the horse-guarding deity into a deity
13

The instructions in the ranch works include: After the spring ceremony, the herdsmen should put colts
under two years old away from females. Geld horses after the summer ceremony, so it will be tame. Prepare
horses and riders after the fall ceremony. Train coachmen and present horses to the King after the winter
ceremony (Ma 1983).
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of the place, and protected the local people instead of the pasture horses from misfortune.
The pirate incident marked the watershed of the conversion, after which the Pasture Lord
received secular recognitions with a noble title and a temple as instruments to spread the
cult. As the poem showed, when the hermit visited the shrine of the horse-guarding god
before 1333, he still addressed the deity as the Protector-general of the Horse, in spite of
his knowledge of the posthumous marriage. It was then clear that the divinity of horse
guardian persisted, but the cult might have barely survived. After the national horse ranch
had been long abolished, the hermit described the settings of the shrine as a straw hut in
the deep woods with mosses on old stone tablets. On the other hand, given the marriage
as a way to bring the deity into the local community, the conversion of the divinity to the
genius loci should have already been launched, but not yet completed. The completion
came by the governmental recognition after the alleged pirate incident during 1335-1340.
In 1417, the inscriptions on the tablet had already included all the testimonial stories and
therefore all the secularity had been imposed upon the deity. It was also by then that the
human name of the deity—Chen Yuan—first showed in the historical records. By 1568,
the cult of Chen Yuan should have spread out from its core area, and therefore people in
the Yangzhai village in the eastern half of Quemoy knewn about the deity. However,
their knowledge of the Pasture Lord was different from those in the core area. The
nuances of understanding should come from the method of the circulation of his legends,
which travelled from one narrator to another, and resulted in the discrepancies shown in
the second essay. More importantly, the discrepancies revealed that the discourse of Chen
Yuan was founded on collective improvisation instead of historical facts. In 1661, the
discrepant understandings of the Lord had been all united, so Lu in his essay asserted,
“according to the clear evidences in the past gazetteers, one should have no doubt that the
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deity is a figure in the Tang Dynasty 郡邑舊志，皆謂神唐時人，證據甚析，無可疑也”
(Hung et al. 2010, 176). The unification of the discourse in the scholarly field thus turned
the religious discourse of Chen Yuan into a taken-for-granted historical fact.
In fact, without the figure “Chen Yuan,” the discourse of the Pasture Lord can be
separated into to two sound stories, one of the horse-guarding god and the other of the
patron saint of Quemoy. In light of this, Chen Yuan actually functions in the discourse as
a human medium to connect the two narratives into a whole. Furthermore, the discourse
also uses Chen Yuan as a human agent to act and therefore to bring forth the connection
between him and the Confucian deities of horse husbandry. By performing marvels in the
art of herding horses, Chen Yuan establishes his divinity as a horse-guarding god, and
earns the titles of Pegasus and Ancestor of Horse, which connect Chen Yuan to the
Confucian deity of horse husbandry. The purpose of establishing the connection is the
same with the purpose of endowing him a social identity as an official representative.
They both aim to provide the Pasture Lord with a legitimate and orthodox origin. In that
sense, Chen Yuan likely starts out as a deity of popular religion influenced by
Confucianism. Moreover, through his posthumous marriage, the discourse also connects
the Pasture Lord to the Quemoy community. As the connection to the Confucian deity
legitimates him to assume the status of the horse-guarding god, likewise the posthumous
marriage facilitates Chen Yuan to inaugurate the status of the patron saint of Quemoy, not
to mention the co-deification of a local woman. In summary, without Chen Yuan as the
hinge, the discourse of the Pasture Lord will fall apart into two portions of individual
stories. Although the hinges are critical to the discourse as a whole, they are appendixes
to each of the stories. For them both, the role of Chen Yuan can either be acted by the
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same super being or different ones, and the change will not affect the soundness of each
story. Chen Yuan is therefore a replaceable trope in the discourse.
As mentioned previously, the knowledge of Chen Yuan ultimately stems from
folklore and oral history, so both Chen Yuan and his belongings are mythical. No historic
records can substantiate the existence of Chen Yuan during his supposed lifetime, and
even his name is a violation of the naming taboo in the Tang Dynasty (Lee 2004b; Lee
2005). The discrepancies of his birth place and date disclose an improvisational
dimension of the discourse. Both the inconsistent facts are subject to his background in
the story, depending on the narrators and their intersubjective understandings. Neither
Chen Yuan, his subordinates, nor the twelve-clan herdsmen left any descendants, so, too,
genealogies cannot provide any of their information (Huang et al. 2010). In the end, no
concrete facts can be linked to Chen Yuan, and he is more realistic as a god than a man.
However, the mythical existence of Chen Yuan and his legendary story recorded in text
in 1417 are used as historical evidence to prove the establishment of the first effective
settlement in Quemoy in 804. The abuse of the religious discourse turns itself into a
carnival mirror reflecting a distorted image of the past.
Although the theory of the first effective settlement in the Tang Dynasty originated
from the misusage of the religious discourse, the landscape and the cult of the Pasture
Lord both substantiated a horse-herding past of Quemoy. The cult may coexist with the
national horse ranches in operation, which in Quemoy stretched approximately from the
late tenth century to the late eleventh century. During the time, the agricultural population
in Quemoy increased. Therefore, after the abolishment of the national horse pasture, the
government redistributed arable land to civilians and established the administrative units
in Quemoy for tax purposes. The population growth provided a congregation for the cult,
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and turned the deity of a single trade into one protecting the locals with various
occupations. Evaluated by these social conditions, the landscape evolution in Quemoy
should have entered the peopling stage at this point. The beginning of the horse-herding
activities in Quemoy then marked the establishment of the first effective settlement,
which should have happened during the years 980-1009, a much later time than the
conventionally proposed beginning of the peopling stage.
By the distribution of the national horse pasture, two inferences of the horse-herding
past in Quemoy could be made. Since ranching activities inevitably conflicted with
farming, an ideal site of national horse pasture would be locations away from the
developed agricultural areas. In a larger scale, the site selection of an offshore island like
Quemoy in a remote territory like Fukien for national pasture congruently followed this
logic. In other words, when the horse pasture was first established in Quemoy, its
development should have remained primeval and the population of the colony did not
require intensive agriculture to sustain itself. The historical record about the livelihood in
Quemoy in the 980s also confirmed the underdeveloped condition. Second, the
concentration of horse pasture in the southwestern Quemoy also implied that the area was
less developed than other parts of the island, where other ways of life might coexist with
the ranching activity. According to Huang (2010), pioneers in Quemoy inaugurated the
salt industry in the early tenth century, and saltworks largely concentrated in northeastern
Quemoy. Although Huang might predate the salt industry in Quemoy, the coexistence
indeed explained why the ranching activity was exclusively confined to the southwestern
area. Concomitant with the development of Quemoy, the population pressure and the
demand of food gradually promoted agriculture. Arable land turned to the use of food
supply, and forced the demise of horse ranches. After the abolishment of national horse
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ranches, the southwestern Quemoy simply became an agricultural area. By contrast, the
northeast, due to its propinquity to Quanzhou city and the prosperity brought by the salt
industry, was the entrepôt and the political center of Quemoy before the late fourteenth
century. Even though the local center of Quemoy shifted to the southwest after the walled
city was completed in 1386, the salt industry in the northeast intermittently remained in
operation till 1995. The industry led the local society marching forward to the
environmental adaptation stage, and further provided the locals an economic base to
usher in the landscape impress stage.
2.4.4

The Salt Industry in Quemoy

The northeastern Quemoy commonly refers to the area on the north of Mt. Taiwu
(Figure 2.2), consisting of the coastal plain and the low hills. It is roughly in a triangular
shape with its two sides on the seafront and the other on the foot of Mt. Taiwu. The Jinsha
Creek flows straight through the middle of the triangle, and generally separates the
coastal plain on its west and the hilly area on its east. Along the curvy north coastline,
pairs of rocky headlands projecting out form beaches bracket several bays, in which the
silty clay seabed and muddy flats with a gradual descending slope create a suitable
environment for land reclamation. Among these bays, the estuary of the Jinsha Creek is
the most characteristic. Mt. Jingui 金龜山 (53m) on the rim of the estuary divides it into
two coves in a shape of a tilted “3.” The Jinsha Creek flows into the southern cove, and
via its channel, saltwater can intrude deep inland into the coastal plain due to the great
tidal range (of which the greatest value of the mean range of tide reaches 6.4m). The
intertidal flats in the open areas along the riverbanks therefore are capable of producing
salt without direct impact of tidal waves.
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Settlers in Quemoy have utilized the vast intertidal zone along the estuary and the
riverbank in various ways. The sea nomads in the Jinguishan site and the Pubian site
heavily relied on fishing and foraging marine resources in the intertidal zone for their
livelihood. Historically, the earliest utilization of the intertidal zone was similar to the
dike-and-polder farming.14 Immigrants in the latter half of the twelfth century brought
the farming method to Quemoy from Quanzhou, where a movement to construct
irrigation systems arose to cope with the population explosion. Because commoners
could not afford the construction of dikes, sluices, and irrigation channels, such
developments were often undertaken by the regional elite families with capital and
manpower to establish new colonies. Some development involved in encircling a tidal
land with stone walls and channeling fresh water into the prospective fields to ameliorate
the soil and to wash away the salty sediment. The reclamation ground usually turned into
rice paddies, while the lower land subject to intermittent tidal floods and land without
accesses to fresh water could be sites for salterns and shellfishes aquafarms. However,
these polders required constant maintenance against coastal erosion; besides, storm
surges and torrents forced repeated re-construction of dikes and levees. Maintaining
agricultural use of the intertidal zone was actually a painstaking and costly job for regular
farmers and land owners. A commemorative essay for reconstruction of flooded polders
disclosed the fragility of polder farming in the sixteenth century in the coastal Fukien
(Zheng 2009, 53):
14

Huang (2010), according to the records in the genealogy of the Chen clan in Yanzhai, proposed that the
founder of the clan introduced salt industry into Quemoy from Tong-an in 913. Yang (2010) agreed on the
opinion, and further proposed that the industry should end during 1128-1162 because of a social turbulence
aroused by roving rebels at the time. With clarification of the duration, he then proceed to hypothesize that
the abandonment of the saltworks in the first half of the twelfth century should occasion the development of
polder farming in Quemoy in the latter half of the twelfth century. However, their views of the beginning of
slat industry in Quemoy may require further historical research to substantiate in the future. Adhering to the
official history, this study takes 1297 as the inaugural year of the salt industry.
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Turbulent torrents [destroyed levees and] deluged polders into desolations. . . . [The
reconstruction] took three years and amounted to a thousand gold. . . . Over time,
floods breached levees again, and recurred after every reconstruction, which was
eventually efforts in vain but only cost toil. 溪水橫溢，决為煙莽 . . . 三年始成，
計費千金矣 . . . 歲久復决，屢築屢壞，訖無成勞。
The costly nature of polder farming did not deter farmers and landowners from
undertaking the development because of scarcity of arable land in the coastal Fukien and
its goodly yield that “could reach ten times more than regular farming 其稼收比常田利
可十倍” (Wang 2002, 140). However, the plantation economy in Quemoy based on
venture investment of foreign capital eventually declined when social turmoil aroused by
the Mongol invasion disturbed the economy of the planters’ society.
After the Mongol government established the national saltworks in 1297, workers in
order to adopt the evaporation method of salt production then repaired abandoned and
damaged polders as salterns. With state support, salt making gradually prevailed and
became the dominant land use in the intertidal zone. Nonetheless, coastal fishing and
polder farming continuously endured through time, but diminished to minor and
supplementary economic activities in this area. The variant and coexisting land-use
patterns in the intertidal zone demonstrated, on top of a geographic palimpsest of the
traces of economic activities, also a “dynamic cultural landscape mosaic that reflect how
people and their environment have co-evolved” (Clark and Tsai 2002, 427).
The co-evolution in Quemoy between landscape and human society brings forth two
facts: (1) The land-use diversity is a result of environmental adaptation, when immigrants
with different cultural baggage experimented their traditional ways of life in the colony to
determine the fittest adaptation. However, the effectiveness of a livelihood changes along
with the socioeconomic development, and over time the definition of the fittest adaptation
may change and therefore it is dynamic in different milieus. Polder farming of rice
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paddies once indicated the fittest utilization of reclaimed ground, when the immigrants
had managed the construction technology of irrigation systems. The population explosion
in the mainland also prompted the development due to a great demand of staple crops.
However, concomitant with the change of the socioeconomic development, the demand
of rice diminished before the salt industry prevailed in Quemoy. The Mongol invasion
between the Song and the Yuan dynasty decreased the population in the region, and the
establishment of the Mongol regime of the Yuan dynasty brought a shift of the ruling and
upper class. In this sense, salt production, strictly speaking, did not replace polder
farming to be the dominant land-use pattern; it just prospered with a cultural milieu that
favored this utilization. The state support manifested such a cultural advantage.
As the Vidalian possibilists proposed, “the physical environment was regarded . . .
as a factor that sets limits on the range of possible human options in an environment,” and
probablists added, “the various possibilities have varying probabilities of occurrence”
(Norton 2000, 53-4). Salt production, polder farming, and aquaculture are all possible
human options in the intertidal zone in the northeast Quemoy, but each stands with
different probabilities to thrive in distinct milieus. For the salt industry in Quemoy, the
relics of polders, repaired and then reused as salterns, indeed increased the probabilities
of occurrence for the salt industry as the successor of polder farming. Thereafter, salt
production remained as the major land-use pattern in the northeast coast in Quemoy
despite the change of socioeconomic conditions until the 1840s. Notwithstanding, its
persistence can merely result from a lack of other options of land utilization, rather than
from an absolute economic supremacy of the industry. The environmental adaptation
highlights the importance of the environment in human activities, while the evolutionary
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trajectory points out culture as the determinant for landscape changes. The mosaic
landscape in the saltern country then manifests co-evolution of nature and culture.
(2) The polyculture of the intertidal zone suggests the failure of a single occupation
in supporting the commoners’ economic requirements, and demonstrates the shift of the
major struggle from subsistence to commerce. A single livelihood oftentimes did not
suffice for commoners’ economic needs due to the scarcity of natural resources. Settlers
in coastal Quemoy could not but pursue multiple livelihoods, as a Quemoy proverb
portrayed, “Live by farms when sun rises, by aquafarms when rain falls, and by salterns
when sun scorches 日出食田坵，落雨食海坵，日炎食鹽坵” (Chen 2003, 79). Even
though salt production was a comparatively profitable mode of land utilization, the
industry did not benefit the majority of the population in the saltern country. After being
exploited by tax collectors, administrators, and merchants (who in fact were reluctant to
purchase salt from the island due to its inferior quality and the extra cost of shipment),
immigrant workers often had to live by supplementary employment. Due to stagnant
conditions, the government revoked the prohibition against the private salt trade in 1443.
However, for common workers who traded through brokers, the revocation was not much
help.
The profits of the salt trade, if any more than a minuscule amount, accumulated
within the bureaucracy and the gentry. Lee proposed, “Perhaps due to the small-scale
production, I had never learnt anyone in Quemoy got rich by the salt trade 可能是鹽場
規模不大之故，所以未聞浯洲人因販鹽而致富者” (2004b, 42). On the contrary, Huang
proposed, “the salt industry must have a great significance to the economy of Quemoy at
the time 鹽業對當時金門經濟的助益，必然佔有很重要的地位” (2010, 13). Huang’s
assertion derived from a census of the scholar-bureaucrats born in Quemoy. He found
89

that more than two third of these scholars were from the saltern country. Based on the
discovery, he argued, it was the surplus of salt trade that enabled the locals to invest in
education. Whereby their young could receive high education and subsequently pass the
imperial examination, becoming scholar-bureaucrats and literati. The incongruence
between the two views on the salt industry actually has roots in the proposition about the
major source of prosperity in the Quemoy society. Huang obviously attributes economic
gain to the salt trade, while Lee inclines toward overseas trade. On account of Huang’s
view, the monetary capital out of salt trade turned, through education, into human capital
which reciprocally contributed to the governmental personnel. The capital accumulation
and transition detained the authority within the gentry group and re-produced the
institutionalized economic inequality. Consequently, the uneven distribution of wealth
thus aroused social struggles.
During the peopling stage, population in Quemoy increased dramatically. Since the
late tenth century, the population grew at least forty times and amounted to 20,000 people
in a hundred years (Lee 2004b). In the 1560s, the estimate of population was
approximately 70,000-80,000, indicating the population increased more than a hundred
times in six-hundred years (Xie, Yang, and Wang 2003). The population growth mainly
resulted from immigration from nearby developed areas in the mainland. The reclamation
of the intertidal land by the elite families in Quanzhou was an example of such
immigration. The population explosion produced a significant impact on the landscape,
and overdevelopment of land through deforestation subsequently caused desertification
and depleted insufficient water resources. After the latter half of the sixteenth century, the
deterioration of land consequently reduced the human options for land utilization, and
encouraged employment in a narrow range of activities that were less affected by the
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environmental degradation. Salt production, fishing, and trade under the circumstances
became even more significant, and accordingly emerged as the crucial economic support
for the local society. The significance of the salt industry engendered from the
co-evolution of ecosystem and social system marked the completion of environmental
adaptation because the social stratification and the economic inequality, which the
industry sustained, changed the location of the major struggle from economy to society.
As such, even though people in Quemoy in the following ages did not stop adopting other
ways of life and other land use patterns, their central problem of life had shifted. The
problem was less about how to obtain wealth than about how to fight the wealthy class
reproducing social inequalities.
Before the late fourteenth century, immigrants mainly settled in the northeast
Quemoy because of its proximity to the developed areas with excessive population in the
mainland and its natural setting with the estuary as a natural harbor for immigrants
arriving by sea. After the imperial government established the national saltworks, its
office, as the highest administrative organ in Quemoy, was situated in northeast Quemoy.
With the population concentration and the administrative office, northeast Quemoy
served as the first economic and political center of Quemoy for ninety years until the
erection of the walled city in the southwest Quemoy. In 1387, the imperial government of
the Ming Dynasty ordered the construction of a walled city named Quemoy as a part of
the national coastal defense network in order to stop armed harassment by pirates. The
military measure officially changed the orientation of Quemoy from looking up at the
mainland to overlooking the ocean, and incurred a shift of the identity of Quemoy from
an insular colony to an imperial gateway. Meanwhile, the habitat destruction and resource
scarcity caused by overpopulation motivated settlers in the eastern half of Quemoy
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relocating themselves to the west. The area of population concentration gradually moved
to the southwest, as did the commercial center of Quemoy. Together, these
socioeconomic changes then switched Quemoy’s front and rear, left and right, and
constituted the first reversal of the situation (coordinate system) of Quemoy.

In general, the economic development in Quemoy generally followed the mercantile
model of urban development in the Latin America conceived by Sargent (2005; Figure
2.5). Nonetheless, some aspects of Quemoy’s development are incongruent with the
model, and the discrepancy underlined the exact characteristics of Quemoy. The
development of Quemoy has gone through the first exploration stage in which Han
Chinese attained knowledge of Quemoy and the indigenous population theren. The
establishment of the national horse pasture lifted the curtain of the initial settlement stage,
in which the colonial power, in this case the Chinese Empire, founded permanent
settlements with the major objective to exploit the natural resources in the colony. The
exploitation shows in two aspects of the horse industry: its objective for exportation and
its incompatibility with the subtropical environment.
In comparison with the transplanted horse industry, the development of wet-rice
cultivation and polder farming denotes a better adaptation to the environment. However,
the plantation economy established by the prestigious families from the mainland still
emanates a colonial overtone. After all, both horses and rice were essentially agricultural
commodities demanded by the market of the mother country. By contrast, the
development of saltworks displays a breakthrough from the cycle of colonial economy
when the profit from salt trade created a gentry class in Quemoy. The formation of a
stratified society connotes the establishment of an internal economic network enabling
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Figure 2.5. Sargent’s Adaption of Vance’s Mercantile
Model. The model discerns four evolutionary stages of the
economic/urban development in Latin America. Although
the development in Quemoy generally conforms to the
model in its early stages, the last stage does not occur.
[Source: Sargent 2005]
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capital accumulation in situ and retaining the industrial gains within. The network is a
direct result of population growth and establishment of new settlements. In the case of
Quemoy, the establishment of saltworks expanded the areas of economic activities from
the coastal fishery and the estuarine polder farming to the foot of Mt. Taiwu. In addition,
the recruitment of immigrant workers, who founded new settlements in the vicinities of
their salterns, also contributed to completion of the network. The development of salt
industry therefore exemplifies the stage of expansion of the network.
Up to this point, the evolutionary progress of the economic development in Quemoy,
in spite of a few nuances, basically conforms to Sargent’s model, however, of which the
last stage, infilling the network, did not happen in the successive time in Quemoy. The
reversal of its geographical situation (coordinate system) prevented the development of
this final stage. The shift of the political and economic centers inevitably interrupted the
evolutionary progress of the economic/urban network, and consequently spurred its
mutation. Whereas Sargent (2005) and Vance (1970) conceived their mercantile models
by the empirical data from continents, their inconsistency in the latter stage with the
phenomena in Quemoy is not surprising. The “islandness” of Quemoy has absolute effect
on its landscape evolution, and the susceptibility of Quemoy to changes—from inside: the
environmental degradation, from outside: the state policies, and from the border-crossing:
the population explosion—also exemplifies the geographical characteristic of
islandness.15
As an offshore islet, Quemoy was not immune to the political and socioeconomic
influence of the mainland society. Significant changes in the national scale brought

15

For a summary of the current geographical discussions on islands, islandness, and insularity, please refer
to the special issues of Geographical Review 97(2) and Cultural Geographies 20 (2) on islands.
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cataclysmic impacts to the insular society. Examples abound, and one is that the refugees
escaping nomad invasions resulted in the population explosion and subsequent
environmental degradation in Quemoy. Sometimes, even only in the provincial scale,
trends and policies can significantly influence the island landscape, and about that, the
establishment of horse pastures and the construction movement of irrigation systems
provided pertinent demonstrations. Due to the social and the environmental sensitivity,
landscape in a small island, compared with those in the mainland, is relatively capricious.
The mutability is less perceptible during the initial stage of development due to the
long-lasting primordial land-use patterns and the insignificant economic activities of the
agro-pastoral life. It often requires further maturity of the socioeconomic system and the
magnitude of changes in the colony to overtly reveal the characteristic. In the process of
environmental adaptation, the development of the salt industry delivered a social maturity
by the formulation of an economic/urban network and class stratification. Against the
social condition, the reversal of the coordinate system, as a result of military, political
fulfillment, inducing a sharp change in the landscape pertinently exposes the mutability
of Quemoy. The shifting landscape thus discloses the susceptibility of a small island.
2.5 Landscape Impress: Hammering a Nail along the Imperial Edge
Pirates had long been a thorny issue in South Fukien where the society thrived on
overseas trade. Whereas armed mercantile fleets pursuing overseas trade were
simultaneously capable of piracy, pirates and merchants were actually two permutable
identities for sailors in the sixteenth century (Office of Historiography 1990; Lee 2004a;
Zheng 1999). Mercantile pirates had been active in the vicinity of Quemoy since the
thirteenth century. However, no historical documentation indicates islanders in Quemoy
were involved in any pirating or overseas trading activities until the sixteenth century.
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Nonetheless Quemoy people had randomly suffered from pirate raids since the
mid-fourteenth century, as the inscription regarding the sanctification of Chen Yuan
showed. Before the construction of the walled city in 1387, piratical pillage in Quemoy
happened only once. In other words, the islanders were, for the most part, passively
implicated in the conflicts between the imperial forces and the maritime powers when the
imperial government first established the coastal defense network in the late fourteenth
century. The design of the walled city was thus more to guard the mainland than the
border island.
The movement of walled city construction in Fukien as the embodiment of the state
policy of coastal defense consolidated the governmental control and its authority over the
seaboard region of Fukien (Xu 1999). The walled city in Quemoy, as the centerpiece of
the defense network of the island, was also an emblem of the state hegemony. In addition
to the walled city, the imperial government constructed four citadels on the southern and
the eastern coast of Quemoy, and in-between the city and citadels distributed six
encampments, beacons towers, and a navy base. In all these military facilities, the
government stationed 1,800 soldiers. In a conservative estimate, the garrisons and their
dependants in the walled city amounted to at least 4,000 people (Jiang 2003). By this
calculation, the population in Quemoy increased to a total of at least 5,000 people,
including soldiers and their families in the four citadels. These new immigrants, coupled
with workers in the state saltworks, accounted for a great proportion of the local
population. The population boost of the governmental personnel suggested an emerging
hegemony that empire could exert over the everyday life of the islanders, in addition to
the military control and regular civil administration. Having Quemoy exposed to the
national impact, the fulfillment of the defense policy inducted cultural uniformity that
96

gradually formed through the shared life experience among inhabitants in the imperial
outpost. By the master plan of military deployment, islanders come to conceptualize
Quemoy as a whole instead of separate neighborhoods or individual villages. It is based
on the shared living condition and the holistic perception that islanders first developed an
identity with Quemoy (Kuo 2006b).
Through the implementation of the coastal defense network, imperial authorities
arbitrarily imposed two divided social categories upon the inhabitants in the coastal
Fukien: They were either imperial subjects or malicious outlaws (Chen 2010). The great
divide reposed geographically on the imperial defense line. People outside the line were
pirates whereas people inside were obedient subjects. Coinciding with the construction of
defenses on the seaboard, the authorities simultaneously evacuated inhabitants in the
islands along the Fukien coast to isolate the maritime powers. According to the strategy
of eviction, one who escaped from the eviction and whom the government left behind
after the relocation deadline became “pirates” indiscriminately (Wang 2008). In addition
to control of place, imperial powers deprived the locals of their own identities. To enforce
the imperial demarcation, the empire required a large army guarding the military facilities
on its seafront border. For this purpose, the government conscribed a large number of
involuntary civilians, and a portion of the evacuated residents received immediate
assignments to serve in garrisons on the military outposts. The rest of the inhabitants,
following the governmental instructions, resettled in new towns on the seaboard as
reserves for military levies. Serving at garrisons in the borderland was a form of
banishment in the pre-modern China, and military service was mandatory for all the male
descendants of borderland soldiers. Based on a coeval Jesuits missioner’s observations,
lives of these soldiers resembled that of a pariah class (Ricci 1953, 89-90):
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There probably is no class of people in the country [China in the sixteenth century]
as degraded and as lazy as soldiers. Everyone under arms necessarily leads a
miserable life because he is following his calling . . . solely as a subject laboring for
an employer. The greater part of the army are bondmen to the crown, and serve in
slavery either for their own crimes or for those of their ancestors. When they are not
actually engaged in military activities they are assigned to the lowest menial
employments . . . .
Conscription accordingly was a form of punishment. According to the imperial definition,
the soldiers in the coastal defenses in the Southeast China were supposedly criminals.
They consisted of the inhabitants in the seaboards and coastal islands, boat-dwelling sea
nomads (largely Tan), and seamen serving in the former warlords’ navies. The empire
conscribed these people because they lived outside or along the defense line. In this
situation, the empire punished these people merely for the geographical locations of their
settlements. The rationale for relocation as punishment was that empire considered that
these people were, or potentially would be, accomplices of the maritime Others. Wang
pointed out that the governmental purpose of the conscription was “to finalize further
troubles in the future and to make use of them [as the imperial forces] 以絕後患，且得其
用” (2008, 59). The authorities employed conscription as a complementary measure to
their defense strategy. The line drawn by the ruling class realized the dichotomy which
was instrumental in drawing distinctions between subjects of empire and malicious
pirates. The geopolitical borderline thereby works on the local society, and constituted
social segregation. The imperial dichotomy arbitrarily created two domains and a social
group of Others. In fact, the dichotomy resembled much in the nationalist/communist one
that the Chinese nationalist established in Quemoy after 1949. The imposition brought
both a great impact on the local culture and on the daily life of the local civilians.
Quemoy as a military outpost of empire was ostensibly a land of obedient subjects.
Social identity has a profound effect on the culture of Quemoy. Living on a borderland,
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the islanders in Quemoy had been under constant suspicion of involvement in overseas
trade and piracy. To offset that impression, Quemoy people “endeavored to mold an
image of local culture congruent to the social institutions that empire expected 努力型塑
符合朝廷礼治的地方文化形象” (Chen 2010, 83). The image articulated the locals’
submission to the imperial social institution and power relations, especially those
between empire and Others. The most frequently employed demonstrations were the
accomplishments of the scholar-bureaucrats and the literati from Quemoy. Their
achievements signified the local political and cultural submission to the empire. Through
imperial examinations, the local gentry attained the status of scholar-bureaucrats whose
service for empire implemented the imperial will in the local regions, and became proof
of the Quemoy locals’ support to the imperial political and social institution. The local
literati’s proficiency at Chinese high culture and Confucianism, on the other hand, served
as the manifestation of the locals’ conformity to the imperial cultural and moral canons.
Although the institution of the upper class in Quemoy ultimately sustained the
socioeconomic inequality, the locals have considered the social production of these
scholar-officials as an exceptional achievement of their insular community. These historic
figures were undoubtedly the cultural and social capital of Quemoy, and their historic
significance should partially originate from their social utility as bargaining chips in the
identity negotiation with empire. The material culture remains in relation to them were
therefore the early landscape impress central to the identity of Quemoy.
To adapt to the social category of obedient subjects, the islanders also “normalize
and interpret their everyday life according to the imperial ideologies and social institution
按照国家的典章制度与意识型态来规范和解释自己的日常生活” (Chen 2010, 83).
They interpreted their everyday life to demonstrate their socio-political correctness and
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affiliation, and by the interpretation appropriated and justified incoherent conduct.
Together with the overt statements of the local obedience, the normalization carried out a
tacit proposition, by which the locals implicitly rebutted the common suspicion about
their conspiracy with pirates. It was central for them to claim by the compilation that they,
at large, did not engage in overseas trading that empire deemed as a crime and therefore a
cultural practice of Others. As such, the cultural image of an imperial frontier community
embedded in the text of the local history, and resulted in a dominant representation of
Quemoy. The elaborately constituted local knowledge thereby engaged itself in the
creation of a “discourse,” which as Foucault defined (Weedon 1987, 108), refers to:
ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of
subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations
between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning.
They constitute the ‘nature’ of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and
emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.
By adopting the imperial view, the Quemoy residents’ discourse attached meanings to
local affairs, and convinced other imperial subjects of their affinity to the empire. More
importantly, it communicated explicitly who they were and implicitly who they were not,
according to the imperial dichotomy. Whereas the collective constitution of the discourse
first emerged as a cultural strategy to negotiate with the imperial others about the locals’
identity, over time the discourse conversely overrode these people. The identity of
Quemoy and its residents that the border society strategically conceived to sustain itself
due to the imperial maritime policies, in turn, overwhelmed the locals, who thus
consciously and unconsciously affiliated themselves to the empire. Subsequently, the
latter generations living in the different milieus took and have taken the cultural identity
of obedient imperial subjects for granted. The social strategy thus excises critical effects
on the constitution of local subjectivity and the cultural identity.

100

From the scheme of local historical knowledge, it should be now comprehensible
why Huang (2010) proposed that Quemoy’s wealth, which contributed to the social
stratification, derived from the salt trade instead of overseas trade as Lee (2004b)
suggested. Lee pointed out that the salt industry in Quemoy was on the verge of
bankruptcy in the 1540s (Lee 2004b, 42; Yang B. 2010, 379):
Because of the difficulties of overseas transportation and the inferiority of salt,
merchants did not want to withdraw [salt from Quemoy] . . . The warehouses
eventually collapsed and the government let these sites to civilians for farming 因海
洋遠涉，兼且鹽色低點，商人不願支[領]…其倉[厫]遂至倒廢，地基招民耕種.”
However, most of the gentry in Quemoy had assumed the status of scholar-bureaucrats
after the mid-sixteenth century, when the salt trade could not sustain the local gentry. By
contrast, piracy, smuggling, and overseas trade were rampant in the vicinities of Quemoy
at this time (Zheng 1999; Chen 2010). As historians (Chen 2010; Lee 2004b; Yang 1998)
reported, the coeval inhabitants in Quemoy also actively took part in the Others’
operations. The imposed demarcation between the two social groups was fading away.
And, their involvement in the trade rewarded them with great fortune (Chen 2010). In this
light, the overemphasis on economic effects of the salt trade connotes a latent
disparagement to the overseas trading, and more importantly, articulates the discourse
that persists to the present.
I witnessed a scene in the 2008 Conference of Quemology, when Chen (2010)
presented his research on the historical piracy in Quemoy. He reported that the categories
of “pirates” and “decent subjects” were merely social constructions delineated by the
Ming Empire. Inhabitants in Quemoy continuously engaged in the “piratical trade” for
extenuating reasons. After his presentation, one Quemoy historian immediately expressed
his discontent by asking why Chen defamed their forebears as pirates because, according
to the local gazetteers, the vast majority in Quemoy were decent people! Evidently, it was
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not much a question but more of a declaration. Although apparently the “defamation”
triggered his defensive attitude; in a deeper sense, it was the threat to the historical
discourse of the social dichotomy provoked his “compulsion to defend” (Nostrand 1992,
214).
“The past is a foreign country,” as Lowenthal remarked, “whose features are shaped
by today’s predilections, its strangeness domesticated by our own preservation of its
vestiges” (1985, xvii). Similarly, the historical discourse of Quemoy knitted together a
“foreign past” for its general public audience when the first gazetteer of Quemoy came
into being in the 1830s. The gazetteer “preserved” the foreign past shaped by the coeval
predilections. Under the category of social custom, Lin (1987) described Quemoy as a
simple utopian community: It was the birthplace of prestigious officials and celebrated
literati; land of Confucianism; and home of unsophisticated farmers and fishermen. Such
a portrayal of the “foreign” Quemoy remains authoritative even today. The 1830s’
discourse therefore resembles in a historical Orientalism, producing knowledge of
representation “for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over” Quemoy (Said
1978, 3). By analogy, my intention is to emphasize the temporal distance from the foreign
past that enables an Orientalist lens to work on knowledge production of Quemoy. Along
with the dominance, the discursive practices concurrently constructed an “imaginative
geography,” which Said explained (1978, 55),
For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to
intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference between
what is close to it and what is far away.
Likewise, the locals in Quemoy, by intensification and dramatization, developed the
identity with place and the demarcation between self and others. Put differently, the
locals’ image of Quemoy as a homeland was actually the partial reification of this
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imaginative geography. Through their dominance, the locals acquired control of place;
developed feelings of attachment; and when the discourse was under threat, as in the
Conference of Quemology, the compulsion to defend immediately roused up (Nostrand
1992). The bonding with place therefore hinged on a foreign country.
The imperial social categories evidently have significant influence on the local
society in Quemoy. However, their significance and persistence did not mean their
institution came from an absence of negotiation. Trading activities, despite their
insignificance, should have existed in Quemoy since the peopling stage for the growing
demand for staples and crafts. As in the face of changes, the locals did not merely comply
without resistance. The assigned social category did not impede Quemoy people’s pursuit
in smuggling and overseas trade at the time, but turned the economic activities under the
table. The neglect of negotiation is, as Thomas (1994) criticized, one pitfall of
postcolonial theories today that “treat colonial discourse as ‘impervious to active marking
and reformulation by the Other’” (Clayton 2005, 452). Clayton concurrently criticized the
same presupposition (2005, 452),
Postcolonialism runs a fine line between subverting and aggrandizing the grip of the
colonial past on the present by placing colonialism too securely in the past or
placing the colonial past too firmly in the present.
It is obvious that the nineteenth-century Orientalist discourse of Quemoy shared the same
pitfalls, and the current-day local historians inherited them.
The defense policy, through its civil administrative measures, begot destructive
consequences to the local economy. With the defense line drawn and the seaboard
inhabitants evicted, the government further decreed an isolationist maritime policy—the
Seafaring Ban 海禁—by which the imperial government prohibited its subjects to sail on
the sea. The purpose was to prevent its subjects from contagion by or conspiracy with the
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maritime powers. Border-crossing activities due to the decree became transgressions, and
trade with sea merchants was illegal and analogous to harboring felons. The regional
economy which relied heavily on overseas trade faced a fatal challenge. In addition to
trade, the Seafaring Ban directly hampered the operation of fisheries because the policy
limited the fishing grounds and the fishing seasons. Consequently, the ban prompted the
local fishers to change their occupation or to pursue multiple livelihoods (Ouyang 1998).
The ban indirectly effected the stagnation of the salt industry. The diminution of the
fishery reduced the demand for salt—the major preservative at the time—and the strict
control over water traffic brought complications to shipping freight. In terms of
commoners’ livelihoods in Quemoy, fishery and salt production gradually became
unsustainable. The ban eventually left these imperial subjects only degraded land which
resulted from intense population pressure. Besides, the income from multi-livelihoods
was insufficient for survival due to heavy tax and bureaucratic extortions before the
Seafaring Ban decree. After the ban further limited their economic activities, the poor
farmers and workers reluctantly deserted their fields and salterns to be free from the
unsustainable exploitation: “The sea is Fukien people’s farms. [Due to the enforcement of
Seafaring Ban] those in the coastal region could not make a living, and suffered from
repeated famines. The poor among them often would gather together and form fugitive
gangs and engage in piracy 海者閩人之田，海濱民眾，生理無路，兼以饑饉薦臻，窮
民往往入海從盜，嘯聚亡命” (Fu 2007b, 146). The gravity of economic destruction
eventually forced commoners in coastal China to take on the social status that empire
defined as “pirates,” while people in their social networks—families, kins, and
friends—remained “imperial subjects.”
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Chinese historians today commonly consider that the “pirate” problem in
sixteen-century China resulted from the rigorous enforcement of the Seafaring Ban
largely because it maximally constrained the locals to engage in seafaring economic
activities even on the quiet (see Chen 2010; Dai 1982; Office of Historiography 1990;
Wang 2006; Yang 1998). While the poor in desperation accounted for the majority of
“pirates,” the maritime powers nonetheless consisted of individuals from all social tiers
simply attracted by the considerable profit of smuggling and overseas trade. On top of the
practical reasons, overseas trading was also essential to the regional culture. Since the
twelfth century, the locals in Quemoy had been involved in overseas trading (Lee 2004b).
As Chen remarked, for people in Southeast coastal China in the sixteenth century,
overseas trading was not only a way of life but “a part of their daily life” and “a local
cultural tradition” (2010, 87). Because of the tradition, there was a fine line between
decent civilians and “pirates.” As one scholar-official commented, people along the
seaboards “were all decent civilians before pirates landed, but after they arrived all
became accomplices 賊未至皆良民，賊已至皆奸民” (Office of Historiography 1990,
79). Although the portrayal might exaggerate the connection, the local conspiracy with
the maritime powers “was common in Jiangsu and Zhejiang province; serious in Fukien;
and especially serious in its Quanzhou and Zhangzhou prefectures 浙直皆然，閩為甚，
閩之漳泉尤甚” (Office of Historiography 1990, 79). Chen elaborated, “the
half-mercantile and half-piratical operations [that the smugglers in the southern Fukien
conducted] oftentimes had the locals’ support and was under protection of their clans 这
种亦商亦盗的行径，往往得到民众的支持与乡族的庇护” (2006, 226). The locals
treated smuggling and even piracy as “an occupation, a pursuit of the good life, or at least
a way of life” (Zheng 1999, 350-1). Their involvement in smuggling, overseas trading,
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and piracy supported hundreds of thousands people’s lives in the coastal Fukien (Zheng
1999). Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that one official-scholar cogently
stated, “everyone living in the coast was pirates 海濱人人皆賊” (Dai 1982, 32). On
account of the situation, Wang (2006) commented that the imperial enforcement of
isolationism signified its immature maritime policy and also exposed the unfamiliarity of
an agriculture-based civilization with the maritime culture. The cultural clash obviously
resulted in the official-scholar’s prejudice against all seaboard inhabitants as sea rovers.
The maritime powers consisted of various bands of sea rovers with loose
organization in ongoing conflicts. They by no means were all single-mindedly
cooperating with one another, and the relationships among them were oftentimes strategic
maneuvers. Chen made a general but straightforward definition about the identity of the
actors in the maritime powers: “The so-called ‘pirates’ [in the sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century China] in fact were sea-merchant bands involved in the smuggling
trade” (Chen 2010, 85). Based on their backgrounds, historians divided Chinese pirates at
the time into two general social groups—the proletarians and the capitalists (Dai 1982;
Wang 2006; Zheng 1999). The latter consisting of landocrats, bureaucrats, and the local
magnates, mainly undertook international trade, while the former mostly initiated with
smuggling. Even so, both groups undertook pillage as an approach to accumulate capital
(Fu 2007b). At the same time, Japanese ronins also embarked on piracy on the southeast
coast of China, while the Western adventurers, first Portuguese and then Dutch,
sequentially arrived at Chinese coast. All of them had more than once engaged in armed
conflicts with empire, and all of them had done so for one single purpose—trade. Their
complicated relationships between each other and the empire, as He remarked, teemed
with “deceitful intrigues and precarious calculations,” but all depended on benefits (2006,
106

8). By all means, they bribed, lobbied battled, and repeatedly negotiated with the empire
for free trade, but each was unsuccessful. On the situation, Fu commented, “these sea
merchants’ activities and resistance to the feudal governance was significant to the
socio-economy in southern seaboard China. However, their every resistance largely
ended with failure” (2007b, 141).
Quemoy was at the center of the armed conflicts, set out as a form of negotiations
between the maritime powers and empire. During the years 1522-1620, Xu and Tang
(2009) reported forty-seven historical entries in relation to the armed conflicts between
the maritime powers and empire in Quemoy and its vicinities, and thirty-one during the
years 1620-1645. Based on these findings, they explained the intensity of the armed
conflicts in Quemoy (Xu and Tang 2009, 1):
In the mid-Ming dynasty, the private trade prospered in southeast China. Quemoy
due to its geographical location was the hot spot of trade in East Asia, and the
situation consequently coined its maritime characteristic. [Sequentially] conflicts of
interests constantly happened [in Quemoy and its vicinities]. They first showed in
the Japanese pirates’ harassment and later in Chinese pirates’ occupation.
In this view, the “maritime characteristic” of Quemoy emerged through the practice of
piratical trade, which occurred due to the geographical location of Quemoy, and
consequently aroused the constant armed negotiation. If so, the distinctive image of
Quemoy, hinged upon its geographical location and the regional cultural practice,
appeared for the first time at this time.
Quemoy is located at the entrance of Xiamen Bay, and, during the age of sailboats, it
was the last stop before sailing to the ocean. Seaward sailors would often reprovision
their ships and wait for favorable winds in Quemoy. Conversely, for the seaborne ships
arriving Southern Fukien, Quemoy was often the terra firma when voyagers cry out
“Land-Ho!” Its location granted Quemoy significance in the nautical age. However, as
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Chen explained the causes of Southern Fukien people’s enterprising characteristics, he
clarified, “living in the seafront was only an environmental factor responsible for
Southern Fukien people’s enthusiasm for overseas trade and exploration, but not the
cultural factor” (2006, 230). Chen also indicated the people had a tradition of undertaking
overseas trade that other people on the coastal Fukien did not have. And so, without
historical factors in the equation, an investigation into the formation of the maritime
characteristics of Quemoy would be incomplete.
After implementation of the scorched earth policy and eviction, most islanders,
according to the imperial definition, became pirates. During the fourteenth to the
seventeen century, their islands were the abandoned land of empire, and were largely land
“out of governmental reach and free from imperial sovereignty” (Zheng 1999, 15). These
coastal islands were therefore the territory of the maritime powers, and some of them
were ideal sites for pirate hideouts. Although Quemoy was obviously not an ideal site,
most islands in its surrounding waters were the lebensraum of the maritime powers. An
island ten miles southwest to Quemoy, Wuyu 浯嶼, was the major center of pirates at the
time. Wuyu and Quemoy were both on the outer edge of Xiamen Bay facing the Taiwan
Strait. While Wuyu guarded the west entrance of the bay, Quemoy did so for the east.
They were like the pair of guardian lion statues of Xiamen Bay. The Chinese navy had
used Wuyu as their base until 1489, but thereafter pirates occupied the island in the early
sixteenth century. Yang (2006) reported that during the years 1518-1549 Portuguese had
also established their trading post in Wuyu with a settlement of five to six hundred
inhabitants. The main reason for their presence was trade. Two major commercial port
cities along the rim of Xiamem Bay, Yuegang 月港 on the west inner corner and Anhai
安海 on the east one, provided the prospective markets for pirates and overseas
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merchants. Due to the proximity to the markets and the convenient access to the sea,
Wuyu became a favorable habitat for pirates. In terms of the rationale behind the
selection of settlement sites, He elaborated on the Wuyu case (2006, 8):
These pillagers [pirates] often selected a small island near the mainland as their
lair . . . It often possessed multiple functions, including the venue for transactions,
the beachhead for raid, the depository for provisions, plunder, and hostages for
ransoms.
As the maritime powers established their base in Wuyu for the Southern Fukien markets,
Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese pirates, and even the Dutch in the seventeenth century
were all active in the area. They did not limit their activities to Wuyu, but used all the
islands in Xiamen Bay for different purposes as needed. Yang (2006), according to
Portuguese documentation, mentioned that Portuguese traders/pirates had loaded their
goods in Leiyu; repaired their ships and replenished provisions in Haimen 海門; and
robbed and burnt civilian boats in a port in Amoy. Their rampant activities in the area, on
one hand, contributed to the local prosperity from trade, but on the other hand intensified
their conflicts with the empire. Quemoy as the gateway to the trade centers inevitably
played a crucial role in the game of negotiation.
The role Quemoy played was not in line with the imperial expectations. As shown
by the Portuguese documentation, in Quemoy they had conducted trade, bought
necessities, recruited sailors, refilled fresh water, and waited for the favorable winds for
sailing out to the ocean (Yang 2006). Chinese historical documentations congruently
complemented the Western documentation of the pirate activities in Quemoy. A leading
official in the anti-pirate war had explicitly indicated that two locations in Quemoy,
Wusha 烏紗[烏沙] and Laulo 料羅, were where pirates harbored and awaited assistance
(Chen 2010), while a Quemoy scholar in the mid-sixteenth century bitterly stated that
“Laulo was a pirate lair 料羅為賊巢穴” (Kuo 2008b, 184). In addition, recent historic
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research also shows that some Quemoy inhabitants in the sixteenth century also actively
engaged in maritime enterprises, a felony at the time. Among these people, commoners
conducted overseas trade in Taiwan and Ryukyu Kingdom (current Okinawa, Japan) on a
regular basis, and the gentry through their pirate kins accumulated tremendous fortunes
(Chen 2010). Furthermore, Quemoyans did not always commit the felony for economic
activities but also for noncritical reasons, which suggested international travel was
commonplace in Quemoy: A married townsman who enjoy travel sold all his inherited
properties for the hobby, eventually abandoned his wife to journey to Luzon, the
Philippines, and died there (Chen 2010; Lee 2004b). Informed by these historical records
and studies, it is clear that Quemoy residents had long standing involvement in maritime
activities. They accommodated the sea rovers and had a complicated relationship with
them far from the simple friend-foe dichotomy as the empire designated. On the other
hand, pirates did not stop visiting Quemoy even though the island was an “imperial
territory,” nor did the deployment of coastal defenses deter them. For the local inhabitants,
who constantly embarked on border-crossing activities, it is doubtful how effective the
political demarcation of the empire could severe the locals from their conventional
lifeworld, from their ties with the sea voyagers, and from their traditional ways of life.
The locals’ cognitive territory, in this case, obviously coexisted with the imposed imperial
defense line, in the negotiation of forming a new territorial conception.
In addition, some of the facts unraveled by the historical documentation, though they
might not be representative of all inhabitants’ conduct at the time, manifested that the
locals in Quemoy were not absent from the center stage of the nautical age albeit their
pursuits were illegal in imperial eyes. Their involvement in the maritime enterprise
developed the distinctive characteristic of Quemoy, which however did not signify a total
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conversion of Quemoy into a maritime powers’ territory. The island was still home of
imperial subjects, who however could be simultaneously maritime adventurers since their
viking identity was undercover and fluid. The place identity of Quemoy at the time was
neither an imperial outpost nor a pirate lair, but developed into a continuous process of
dialectic becoming in the negotiation. The constructed social reality of Quemoy then
articulated the hybrid and ambiguous identities of a border island.
By the neither/nor strategy of identity negotiation, the locals in opposition to the
binary identities of Quemoy attained control of place and developed bonding with place
in the struggle against pirate raids. In response to the social condition, landscape in
Quemoy changed accordingly, and the same ambiguity and hybridity showed in the
landscape. In addition to the state fortifications, civilians constructed considerable
defense works to protect themselves from pirates. In 1558, only in the western capital of
Quemoy, Hopu 後浦, the locals “built a hundred and three forts 築堡百三座” (Wang
2006, 83). Throughout this time, destruction of fortifications in pirate raids aroused
another reconstruction with even more fortifications. These defense works militarized the
landscape in Quemoy, and gradually consolidated the image of an imperial outpost. On
the other hand, the number of ports also greatly increased. Among them, seven ports had
ferries in operation to four mainland seaboard cities in the Quanzhou and Chincheo
prefecture, while Laulo on the southeast corner of Quemoy was the major port to
overseas islands like Pescadores (current Penghu county, Taiwan), Taiwan, the Ryukyu
Kingdom (Xu and Tang 2009). The appearances of these transportation facilities
emphasized the busy water traffic and the local reliance on the maritime activities in the
nautical age. Together the development of water transportation and construction of
fortifications revealed a weakening imperial isolationism on its maritime policy and the
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locals’ damage control in their pursuit of the maritime activities. The both/and also
identity of Quemoy in between an imperial outpost and a maritime adventurers’ habitat
emerged, while the fortifications, that articulated the local everyday practice of living in
an imperial outpost and pursuing the maritime ventures, became the landscape memorials
which embodied the locals’ negotiation with empire and the maritime powers in the
constitution of their homeland.
Since the Ming Empire constructed the walled city, Quemoy in 1387, the island’s
front reversed from the mainland and turned defensively toward the sea. In opposition,
when the maritime powers confronting the Ming Empire captured Quemoy, they would
deploy their front toward the mainland. The struggle between the empire and the sea
powers had briefly affected the front-rear disposition of Quemoy a few times in the
history. Oftentimes, due to the nature of roving bands, their occupation of Quemoy ended
swiftly after they completed pillaging raids. Following their departure, the disposition
soon turned back with the front toward the sea. However, anomalies did happen. In the
seventeenth century, a maritime regime originating in Anhai held Quemoy captive as its
capital for two generations, and changed the front-rear disposition for more than half a
century.
The band of rovers led by Nicholas Iquan 鄭芝龍 primarily undertook overseas
trading, which made them wanted by the government. After consecutive victories over
the imperial army, the emerging maritime powers overwhelmed the defensive forces of
the declining empire in the region and gradually gained control of Southern Fukien from
the 1620s. When Iquan’s fleet anchored on Quemoy and Amoy in 1626, thousands of
islanders voluntarily enrolled in his gang. The expansion also helped Iquan to monopolize
international trade, especially silk in East Asia. His power grew to the extent that
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eventually impelled the empire to compromise, and offered him the position of a naval
officer to nominally subsume his fleets under the imperial authority in 1629. The title
empowered Iquan and granted his gang official support to “righteously” eradicate his
business competitors—other bands of sea rovers. The privilege eventually made his gang
a hegemonic power in the South and East China Sea. The Xiamen Bay area, the
homeland of most of Iquan’s gang, was the core of this maritime regime—an area that
had long been troubled by its ambiguous identities between a pirate hive and the nursery
of imperial officialdom. Iquan’s success no doubt maximized the inbetweeness of the
identity that its people incubated for centuries to liberate themselves from the dreadful
dichotomy of the two conflicting place identities.
In 1644, the Manchu people vanquished the Ming Empire and established the last
dynasty of the imperial China, the Qing Dynasty. Iquan’s son, Koxinga 鄭成功, lead his
army into battle against the invading troops of the new land regime in order to recover
China from the non-Han rule and to restore the Ming Empire. Based in Quemoy and
Amoy, his battle against the newly established Qing Empire lasted for thirty-four years
until his retreat to Taiwan in 1680. During the war, the imperial troops captured Quemoy
twice, and scorched the island during their occupation, evicting everyone on the island.
Although the desertion consequently dissolved the six-century development in Quemoy,
it simultaneously allowed the overpopulated environment a recess that allowed some
natural ecosystem restoration. The evacuation of Quemoy deterritorialized the island, and
vaporized its front-rear disposition. Inasmuch as Quemoy turned into an uninhabited
island in the buffer zone between the two regimes, the loss of identity abstracted Quemoy
from its historical context. Its prepositional relations—front vs. back, upside vs. downside,
and right vs. left—largely called in correspondence only to the cardinal points on the
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compass. The war wiped out the place identity along with its sense of places. Not until
the Qing Empire annexed Taiwan in 1683 and returned the Quemoy natives to their
homeland, did Quemoy regain its sense of orientation within a sound geopolitical context.
2.6 Homeland: Diffusion of Quemoy Fraternity Guilds
Since the mid-sixteenth century, emigration from Quemoy followed its
overpopulated environmental destruction, the pirate war, and the economic stagnation
induced by the Seafaring Ban. Certainly, the development of maritime navigation during
the nautical age also promoted emigration to southeast Asia and Taiwan. During the
sixteenth and seventeenth century, pirates and overseas merchants were the two major
groups of emigrants. Compared with the later overseas emigration waves, the number of
emigrants before the mid-seventeenth century was relatively small. After Imperial China
annexed Taiwan in 1683, the geopolitical importance of Quemoy, as an imperial frontier,
declined. The forefront of empire advanced to Taiwan, and whereby the Taiwan Strait
became an imperial territory. Meanwhile, because Amoy Island in Xiamen Bay gradually
developed into a major international trading port in the eighteenth century, its growing
influence deprived Quemoy of its status as the port of embarkation for overseas voyages.
Consequently, most Quemoy ports during the eighteenth century became facilities for
domestic traffic (Lee 2004b). Even so, the local enthusiasm for maritime activities did not
wither away, and the acquisition of Taiwan as the new imperial territory motivated
Quemoyans to embark on overseas expansion through emigration. The Pescadores
Archipelago, midway between Taiwan and Quemoy, was the stepping stone in this pursuit.
Their expansion to the archipelago resulted in 70 percent of its current population
originating from Quemoy (Xie, Yang and Wang 2003). Moving forward, a considerable
number of Quemoy emigrants also settled in the major port cities in Taiwan during the
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eighteenth century. In these colonies, they built temples for their beliefs, and, by their
adherence to the homeland deities, organized fraternity guilds to assist each other in
adapting to the new life. Unlike the earlier time when the emigrants from Quemoy were
merchants or pirates, the majority of emigrants at the time were peasants. The change of
emigrant groups indicated a different objective for permanent settlements instead of
trading outposts. The aspiration for the fertile land and opportunities then initiated a new
wave of emigration and subsequently set off another landscape evolution by the
immigrant communities in Taiwan.
Emigration from Quemoy climaxed after Amoy became one of the five treaty ports
of China in 1842. During 1915-1929, a surge of emigration removed 40 percent of the
population from Quemoy, amounting to roughly 30,000 people (Fan 2010). Because most
of the young worked abroad, the economy of their original society heavily relied on their
remittances. Via Amoy, most of the Quemoy young at the age of sixteen or seventeen
would leave for the European colonial countries in southeast Asian countries, mainly
Singapore, and worked there as contract workers. Some of the single men would return
and got married after a few years abroad. After marriage, they would again head to work
abroad, and send back remittances to support their families. Among them, a few would be
successful enough to return to Quemoy with their savings, by which they generally would
build a flamboyant Western-style mansion 洋樓 as the family residence and their
retirement home. After construction, these overseas merchants would leave again to their
immigrant countries, and worked there until retirement. For the emigrants, marriage,
house building, and retirement were their three rites of passage known as “the trilogy of
overseas Chinese” (Fan 2010). However, their fate, as a Quemoy proverb figuratively
portrayed, was grim, and most of them returned home in coffins: “six die; three stay; and
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one returns 六亡三在一回頭” (Chen 2003, 84). In reality, the proportion of returning
emigrants was lower than one tenth; “only one or two of a hundred could return home,
and not more than two or three of a thousand could return with gains 得歸者百無一、二
焉，其貿易獲利歸者千無二、三焉” (Lin 1987, 395). For those who could return for
retirement, the Western-style mansions were the tokens of their success in the foreign
countries, and also the pompous statement made to the public on the homeland (Jiang
2003). In this sense, the construction of the Western-style mansions encompassed more
than the functional purpose of retirement abodes but also a cultural purpose to show off.16
As the construction turned into a customary practice for the returned emigrants, these
mansions also became the preeminent landscape signifiers of the emigrant culture.
In Singapore, their major colony, emigrants from Quemoy initially affiliated
themselves to the Fukien group, but the majority of the Fukien group—emigrants from
other areas of Fukien including Chincheo, Quanzhou, and Yongchun 永
春—marginalized Quemoyans due to their origin from a small island (Chi 2003). After
growing in number, these Quemoy emigrants then organized their own fraternity guilds
on the basis of common lineages, trades, or beliefs. Due to the process of chain
emigration, the lineage-based guilds, as the infrastructural but independent units of their
emigrant organizations, often outnumbered other guilds organized by profession and
religion. However, neither of the two influential guilds with most members was lineage
based because the Quemoy emigrants worked only in a few trades in their colonies but
came from numerous clans in Quemoy. These organizations often shared similar
objectives, such as assisting and accommodating new comers, settling disputes between
Quemoy emigrants, gathering strength in conflicts with other ethnic groups, and raising
16

On the subject of showing-off, please refer to Philip Wagner’s monograph (1996) for details.
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funds for dead members’ burials. Among these fraternity guilds, the Quemoy Association
金門會館 was the most significant one. Quemoy migrants in Singapore, Malaysia, and
Indonesia were all welcome to join. The guild was located in the temple of Pasture Lord
which had the same name—Fuji Temple—as the original in Quemoy. The location and
the naming of place both intended to construct the representativeness of the guild. “The
Singapore Fuji Temple symbolized Quemoy,” and by the symbolization “the [founders’]
intention to make it the supreme organization of all Quemoyans was obvious” (Chi 2003,
3). In this view, not only the homeland culture, the Pasture Lord belief here, shaped their
collective identity as Quemoyans, but the Quemoy emigrants also employed the culture
as instruments to structure their power relations and hierarchy in the colony.
The power structure in the colony was often an extension of what existed in the
Chinese homeland. For Fukien migrants, Quemoyans from a small border island were
marginal and insignificant. Mainland emigrants perceptually discriminated against these
islanders in their group and marginalized them. The belittling treatment spurred
Quemoyans to establish their own fraternity guilds, and further reinforced their
independent group identity. The counteraction to marginalization and the
acknowledgement of their independent group identity eventually led the overseas
Quemoyans to appeal for the establishment of Quemoy County in 1913. The Fukien
provincial government approved the appeal in 1915, and upgraded Quemoy from a
neighborhood to a county. The autonomous uplift empowered the overseas Quemoyans in
their negotiation with other ethnic groups in the colonies since Quemoy attained a higher
status in the administrative system. The change of homeland could also influence the
emigrant society. For Quemoy migrants, their clan-centered ideology and localism were
how they constituted their imagined community and constructed their group identities in
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the homeland. The chain emigration from lineage villages assured the continuity of these
ideologies which cued the overseas Quemoyans to conventionally organize their guilds
according to clanship. The sectionalism also prompted them to act on the benefits of their
own clans and fraternity guilds. The reinvented simulacrum of their home society in the
colony thereby reproduced and transplanted the power relations, especially those between
clans, from their homeland to the emigrant societies. The politics among Quemoy
emigrant groups certainly existed and their fraternity organizations teemed with exclusive
sectionalism.
Nonetheless, in the face of challenges from other ethnic groups, Quemoy emigrants
were also able to stick together under the same flag of a common local belief. The
establishment of the non-exclusive guilds was their strategy to coup with marginalized
situation in dealing with others—the mainland ethnic groups and the Western colonial
governments—while at the meantime showcasing their collective identity. Even though
their fraternity guilds were mostly based on the homeland-bound localism, the same
localism also facilitated them to transcend the political boundaries between Southeast
Asian countries and to entitle all Quemoy emigrants eligible to be members of the
Quemoy Association. The contrast between their insistence on the specific geography of
homeland and their indifference to the colonial geography disclosed the unsettled
geographical understanding of their residence. Deterritorialization and reterritorialization
in this sense came hand in hand with cultural diffusion in the diaspora.
While Quemoy exported its people and culture to southeast Asia, a backflow of
colonial cultures also imbued Quemoy with modern exotic charm. The Western-style
mansions were the most prominent symbol of the emigrant culture in the homeland
landscape attesting to the cultural exchange. The two- or three-floor mansions were often
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in a hybrid style between Chinese traditional architecture and the Western colonial one.
They were made to be readable for the locals in Quemoy about the owners’ overseas
success. Despite the hybridity, the architectural principles of Chinese tradition, such as
fengshui, still overwhelmingly conditioned and contextualized these buildings in the
traditional folk villages.17 Their layout, orientation, and interior design were all
compromises between the two styles, while their architectural design, especially of the
façade, comprehensively adopted the classic and Baroque architectural features,
iconography, and ornamentation (Jiang 2003). On top of iconography (such as British
soldiers, Indian policemen, clocks, angels, and the globe), some of the mansions also
included owners’ Romanized names, the completion dates in Christian calendar, and even
English idioms, like “Union Is Strength” on the façade. With their exotic elements, the
great size of these mansions made them prominent statements in the landscape. Both their
pomposity and heterogeneity challenged the traditional ideologies and conventions, and
aroused another cultural adaptation.
The overseas merchants, as the nouveau riche, formed a new class of capitalists at
the time in China. Their rise challenged the conventional social stratification and the
gentry’s authority in the feudal society. As nouveau riche gestures in the landscape, these
Western-style mansions signified “the formation of a new power structure different from
the one in the past in which clan heads and the gentry had the authority” (Jiang 2003,
123). Heights of the mansion were often an issue between the returned emigrants and the
authority in their home villages because the traditional architecture principles forbade
houses standing above the ancestral halls. The two- or three-floor modern buildings

17

For details on symbolism, fengshui, and iconography of Chinese folk housing, please refer to Knapp’s
book (1999) for details.
119

however oftentimes were higher than the one-story ancestor hall. In a traditional village,
the villagers would restrain the construction of the Western-style buildings, and expected
the returned emigrants to reinvent their inherited properties inside the village, abiding by
the conventional construction guidelines of fengshui. Otherwise, for those with the
intention to boast their overseas success by the flamboyant architecture, their mansions
were rarely situated in the villages. They would need to acquire another lot on the
outskirts of the villages to complete their pompous statement to their kins. Nonetheless,
even a location on the outskirts could bring conflicts with conventional guidelines
obviously when topography was involved in the site selection: As shown in most hillside
villages, the periphery, due to its altitude, could still be higher than the ancestor halls, and
further complicated site selection. Other than abiding by the conventions, nouveau riche
sometimes disregarded the traditional principles, and situated their mansions inside the
village.18 In other cases, as villagers generally well adapted to the foreign culture
(especially in villages with a large population working abroad) they might by fundraising
rebuild the ancestor hall in the Western style to maintain its prominent stance in the
community. In this manner, emergence of the mansions in traditional folk villages often
had undergone a process of adaptation and negotiation over their locations, orientation,
and other architecture details. The negotiated outcome was “an important indicator of
social transformation of the overseas Chinese home villages” (Jiang 2003, 169).
These merchants’ wide adoption of the Western material culture in their everyday
lives, such as flush toilets, western attire, and culinary fashion, was their way to
18

Jiang (2003) provides Chen Qin-Ji’s 陳清吉 mansion in the Bishan 碧山 village as an example of the
disregard of conventions. His three-story mansion is located next to a two-story ancestor hall also in the
Western architectural style after renovation. A year before the mansion construction in 1931, villagers had
renovated the ancestor hall through fundraising (Jiang 2002). Their tolerance for the mansion might
partially attribute to the acceptance of the architectural style since the ancestor hall had already adopted it.
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distinguish themselves from their fellow villagers and to flaunt their life experience in
foreign countries. Modern inventions symbolized the European colonialists’ privileges of
the ruling class in the colonies that most of these emigrants could not attain under their
rule in the colonial cities. By the possession of these novelties, the returned emigrants
figuratively transferred the colonialist authority to themselves, and employed modernity
as their cultural capital construing their social position in their homeland. The cultural
superiority derived from the heterogeneity ultimately associating with imperialism in
southeast Asia. Their fondness for the Western culture treated as the advanced and the
superior inevitably discomforted nationalists and conservatives in the revolutionary era.
The conflicts between the authority in the homeland and the overseas merchants were
basically ideological, and fundamentally stemmed from their expressive cultural practice
and its spatial production. As Quemoy people conventionally addressed the emigration to
southeast Asia as “down to the barbarians’ 落番,” the out-of-placeness of these
emigrants’ everyday practice and cultural creations against the homeland culture
articulated the distinctness of other cultures and more importantly the struggles aroused
by the impingement of cultural exchange.
As the cultural transmitters, the overseas Quemoy emigrants mediated the mutual
cultural diffusion and brought about cultural hybridity in their colonies and the homeland.
Living out-of-place in the foreign lands, they transplanted the homeland culture to be
being-in-the-world of Quemoy, while living at home in Quemoy, they transferred the
colonial culture to be out-of-place. Their out of placeness and placelessness revealed their
constantly dwelling inbetween home and foreign countries. The location of their hybrid
culture was neither the homeland nor their colonies but intersubjectivity of its
congregation; whereby the place-bound identity of these emigrants was fluid and unstable,
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always in motion. The border-crossing activities, as the prevailing cultural practice of
Quemoy inhabitants, emancipated their identity from the bonds to a single place. Their
identities thus reposed in the multilocality. Through the omnipresent heterogeneity in the
landscape, the deterritorialization at home set the Quemoy locals in travel: They were at
home in the physical landscape of Quemoy, but were simultaneously not-at-home
surrounded by foreign simulacra, novelties, and iconographies/ideologies. The
ambivalence of multicultural formations “celebrates the space of margins, of
inbetweeness and hybridity, as privileged locations from which to challenge hegemonic
notions” (McEwan 2004, 506). For Quemoy inhabitants, the agents of hybrid culture, the
border island was the cultural arena to perform and to negotiate with Chinese tradition.
The ambiguity and polysemy embedded in the landscape embodied their negotiations to
insinuate heterogeneous material culture, such as the Western-style mansions, which
articulated their immediate experience of “travelling-in-dwelling and
dwelling-in-travelling” (Lury 1997, 78). Their saga was seeking to locate or relocate their
culture amid intersubjectivity, to retrieve or reinvent their homeland image in motion
continued until the nationalist army isolated Quemoy from outside communication after
the Chinese Civil War in 1949.
A distinctive phenomenon in the last negotiation is worth extra attention. Since the
sixteenth century, the locals had endeavored to mold an image of Quemoy in accordance
with Chinese conventions and cultural norms to showcase their conformity to the
dominant culture and to counteract its marginalization. In opposition to this intention, the
appearance of the Western-style mansions in the landscape of Quemoy marked the
cessation of the social construction. The introduction of European cultural features to the
landscape of Quemoy inevitably contaminated the local Chineseness and subsequently
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substantiated the marginality of the community. However, in constructing a homeland of
overseas Chinese, the insular community compromised their adherence to the Chinese
tradition and accommodated heterogenous cultures through negotiation. In this case, the
Quemoy locals’ acceptance of Otherness, which tended to undermine their
hundreds-years efforts of image producing, signified not only a shift of cultural paradigm
but also their emancipation from the labor of Chineseness construction. After all,
Chineseness was, from its beginning, a fake issue. Its construction was just a strategy of
identity politics for lives in an imperial frontier. With the paradigm shift, when the locals
in Quemoy switched their concerns on the clash between the Chinese and the Western
cultures, cultural negotiation found itself another arena in the relevant discursive fields. It
was just that, however, this time the Quemoy locals would have to negotiate with their
own creation.
Through my examination of Quemoy’s history, I identify three geographical
characters that promote the occurrence of the historical events: a maritime traffic hub, a
supply plantation, and an imperial frontier. These three characters reveal in Quemoy in a
temporal order, but affect Quemoy interactively. In addition, all of them contribute to the
cultural hybridity of Quemoy. From the beginning of human occupation, Quemoy
benefited from its geographical situation and environmental condition, both of which
make it an ideal habitat of sea nomads. Quemoy was on the migration route along the
southeast coast of China, and more importantly was the starting point of the overseas
voyage to Taiwan and other islands on the Pacific Rim. Its character then positioned
Quemoy at the intersection of the maritime traffic, and later facilitated the locals in
Quemoy to establish their trade network in Taiwan, Japan, and the southeast Asian
countries. Due to its geographical situation, Quemoy became a favorable contact point of
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the maritime powers with imperial China, and the genealogical origin of many inhabitants
in Pescadores and Taiwan. Its character as a traffic node nourished its maritime
characteristics in the nautical age and its inhabitants’ enthusiasm for maritime activities,
which eventually made Quemoy a homeland of overseas Chinese in the modern time.
On the other hand, its geographical location excluded Quemoy from the Han
Chinese cultural sphere. Even long after Chinese annexed the island into its territory,
Quemoy never shrugged off its marginal identity. The geographical marginality of
Quemoy constantly vexes its inhabitants with consequent cultural marginality. They
struggle against their possible identities of inferior others and alternative cultural
practitioners, like Tan and the maritime powers. To counteract the marginalization, the
Quemoy locals have fostered a tendency to predate their history so as to Sinicize their
ancestors and their land as early as possible. For the same purpose, they have also
devoted themselves to production of historical discourse that conveys an image of
Quemoy in accordance with the Chinese core values of Confucianism. These efforts and
the molded image consequently govern the locals’ understanding of their past. Challenges
to the taken-for-granted understanding may trigger the defense mechanism out of their
bonding with place and control of place through knowledge. However, their construction
of the representative image of Quemoy does not always convince their Chinese coevals of
their adherence to the Han-centric culture. Ultimately, some of their cultural praxes,
especially those of their traditional ways of life, can hardly be attributed to the category.
All the livelihoods transplanted to Quemoy by empire eventually proved
unsuccessful and even the best adaptive land use, salt-making, degraded to merely one
slightly better option among worse alternatives against maritime economic activities.
Although environmental adaptation, as a necessary process of landscape evolution,
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contributed to the development of a place in the end, it nonetheless connoted an
exploitative nature of colonial enterprises during the adaptive process. The imposition of
the livelihoods and of the market demands of the dominant society upon others in the
colony constituted the very basis of a plantation economy. The heavy reliance of these
colonial industries on the foreign investments in the local economic development
explained their susceptibility to the socio-political condition in the mainland. In addition,
the arbitrary establishment accompanying with immigration crashed the ecosystem with
overpopulation, and the consequent environmental degradation manifested the sensitivity
of the islandness of Quemoy. After all, its lack of land and the extra expenditure on
shipping had preconditioned Quemoy’s development of these land-based industries, and
was often the direct causality responsible for their unproductivity.
Nonetheless, these experimental industries left the Quemoy community essential
legacies of which the belief of Pasture Lord, as the genius loci of Quemoy, ranks
foremost. The deity and its temple over time becomes one of the cultural emblems of
Quemoy. Secondly, the environmental adaptation enabled the constitution of a stratified
society and an independent economic network. With the success of environmental
adaptation, the emerging local gentry kept the industrial gains within the insular
community, and by accumulation ushered the community into its “post-colonial” period.
The island thence no longer served as a supply plantation for the mainland market.
However, during its development, an essential part of the economic network, the overseas
trade, conflicted with the imperial interests. The incongruity led the empire to interrupt
the fledging economic development by the construction of an imperial frontier. The
coordinate system of Quemoy reversed after the construction along with the gradual
development of southwest Quemoy into the economic and political center. Perhaps, in the
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imperial view, the imperial frontier should be the best and conclusive environmental
adaptation of Quemoy, but for the islanders, being an absolutely obedient subject was an
unbearable renouncement to their collective past and future altogether.
The character of an imperial frontier thus constantly provoked negotiation. Through
manifold ways—knowledge production, everyday practice, economic activities, and
armed conflicts—the locals negotiated with empire about their group identity and the
identity of Quemoy. The negotiation brought forth an ambiguous and hybrid landscape
that responsively articulated a both/and also identity of Quemoy in between an imperial
outpost and a sea rovers’ home. The third-space that the Quemoy locals created then
enabled them to resist the hegemonic dichotomy of the imposed place identities, and
exempted them from falling into either category of the rival identities. The
“real-and-imagined” places were where their homeland identity resided, and the
negotiation was their continuous journey to locate the homeland-anchored identity. The
homeland turned even more impressive and experiential when the locals in Quemoy
initiated chain emigration to southeast Asian countries. In the face of Otherness, the
Quemoy emigrants’ everyday cultural performance, or cultural reenactment, reasserted
their homeland-bound identities. The repetitive construction of their group identities in
the everyday out-of-placeness constituted the daily experience of Quemoyans abroad. To
feel at-home, the emigrants in the colonies created a simulacrum of Quemoy to live in,
while for Quemoy to be the homeland of its overseas habitants its landscape also have to
shine an exotic tint. The deterritorialization injected another dimension of cultural
negotiation into the identity evolution of the border island. The multiculturality engaged
the real-and-imagined homeland in a continuous process of negotiations.
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Through Quemoy’s geographical biography, a repetitive theme emerges in company
with negotiations between the locals and empire due to Quemoy’s geographical and
cultural marginality. After the Han settlers dislodged the sea nomads and established
functioning colonies in Quemoy, the immigrant society, relying on the mainland
resources and market, orientated the front toward its mother country. This front-rear
disposition persisted till the imperial construction of military facilities along Quemoy’s
south and east coast that moved its social center to the western half and drew the social
attention toward the sea. The first reversal of Quemoy’s front-rear orientation greatly
contributed to the formation of local place identity and group subjectivity, and forwarded
the immigrant society into landscape impress stage. The formation of a local gentry class
and a stratified society also celebrated and consolidated the Quemoy’s new disposition.
With the developing subjectivity and identification, Quemoyans negotiated with empire
to adopt a new evaporation method for slat-making and to permit privatization of salt
trade so to end economic stagnation. The imperial concession of its salt policy
nonetheless did not suffice to sustain the local economy, but allowed the locals to operate
mercantile vessels despite the Seafaring Ban. Overseas trade thus grasped Quemoy’s
social-economic attention. To the climax of this identity formation, Iquan and Koxinga
led the locals to form a maritime regime confronting with the empires based on Quemoy
and Amoy. The confrontation re-orientated Quemoy’s front as well as its social concerns
toward the mainland for nearly six decades till the imperial annexation of Taiwan in 1683
terminated the maritime regime and the second reversal of Quemoy’s orientation. The
imperial military and political expansion to Taiwan ignited the local aspiration for
overseas colonization in the new imperial territory and, later, southeast Asian countries.
The migration waves re-directed the local social concerns outward toward the sea, and
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incurred the third reversal. The new front remained true for 266 years till the Chinese
Civil War cordoned off Quemoy to be the forefront of the nationalist regime in Taiwan in
1949. The repetitive reversals of the insular dispositions in the pre-modern Quemoy
thematized its history, and ultimately forged its border island identity.

128

CHAPTER 3 REVERSING THE GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATE SYSTEM:
MILITARIZATION AFTER 1949
The orientation of the geographical prepositions, the insular front toward the land or
the sea, articulates the social condition of the insular community and its geopolitical
relations to other groups in the vicinities. As the reversal and the dissolution of the
front-rear disposition has shown, change in the disposition often involves critical social
transformation, which, likewise, often brings forth overall landscape change, the
construction of fortifications, for instance. For this reason, an investigation into landscape
change in regard to the geographical prepositional relations will account for the social
relations of Quemoy. This is to say that not only the geopolitical relations of Quemoy are
embedded in its landscape, but also its internal social relations are inscribed therein. The
prepositional relations represent a schema of social configuration, and provide a general
reading of the social state through the landscape composition. With the prepositional
relations as measurement, the significance of changes in the landscape can thus be
comprehensible.
Symbolisms of the Geographical Coordinate System
A geographical coordinate system denotes for spatial relations generating from
bodily experience which produces a set of dichotomous ideas about direction, location,
and distance—front-back, up-down, right-left, and by the relative distance in-out (Figure
3.1). Derived from ontological experience, these dichotomous ideas mean more than
spatial indexes but also comprise symbolism associated with positive and negative values.
Although these values are culturally bound rather than universal, Tuan indicates “certain
cross-cultural similarities exist” (1977, 34). Concurring, Richardson further clarifies the
value-laden symbolism of the coordinate system (2003, 34-5):
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In this particular model, space that is ahead, above, and to the right of the body has a
greater positive value than space that is behind, below, and to the left. Translated
into time, the future beckons ahead and above, and the past fades behind and
beneath. Translated into Christian cosmology, heaven rises above, hell resides
below . . . .
Future

Figure 3.1. Spatial Prepositions of Human Body
Coordinate and Their Symbolisms [Source: Tuan 1977]
By the clarification, human structuring of their experiential world through sensory organs
is both individual and collective. The individuality of the construct hinges up on the
bodily engagement in the spatial organization, while the collectiveness unfolds in the
process of ramification that culturally begets one signifier after another and another.
The symbolic dimension of the spatial prepositions hence manifests the underlying
intersubjectivity carrying the value-laden sense of space. Accounting for the
collectiveness, Tuan further expands the application of this symbolism from a human
body to a man-made environment, and proposes that “the historical movement of a
people can give a sense of spatial asymmetry to a whole region or nation” (1977, 42). In
other words, a geographic area, for historical or cultural reasons, can also acquire its
value-laden spatial prepositions and together a geographical coordinate system. The
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symbolism thus constitutes the spatial order that culturally instructs people how to
(re)structure their landscape. In a planned environment, people tend to situate things that
are important and engaging in the front, on the right, to the top, and at the center.
Changes of the coordinate system often signifies a value shift that the important and
engaging foci no longer draw social attention. Such a switch of social foci evidently and
dramatically emerges when the geographical coordinate system reverses.
In Quemoy, the reversal of its coordinate system has occurred four times since 1387.
The fourth reversal of the coordinate system occurred in 1949, when the Chinese
Nationalists militarized Quemoy against the communist military deterrence (Tsai 1999).
The reversal resembled in Koxinga’s military resistance to the imperial rule in the second
reversal, but went even further. Militarization in the modern total war not only induced
the front-back reversal and the left-right relocation of the local center, but with its
completion also produced a military landscape with rigid demarcations, pragmatic utility,
and strict hierarchy. This chapter explores the landscape manifestation of Quemoy’s
coordinate system’s last reversal after 1949 under militarization that has hitherto oriented
the island to the mainland, and briefly discusses the current dissolution of the forth
reversal under demilitarization.
3.1

A New Front toward the Mainland China

After China won the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Chinese
nationalists turned their guns toward the communists. U.S. President Truman sent George
Marshall to conciliate the conflict between the two major parties of the Republic of China
(R.O.C.). Marshall spent a year in China, but left in failure in 1947. Upon his return, the
U.S. government declared a non-intervention policy toward the Chinese domestic
situation. The Chinese Civil War quickly burst out, and resulted in the establishment of
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the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.). The war reached a deadlock in 1949 after the
nationalist army won the battle of Guningtou 古寧頭 in Quemoy. By the victory, the
nationalist troops successfully stopped the communist troops from advancing further, but
the victory also separated Quemoy from the mainland. The arbitrary separation severed
the traditional social ties between people in Quemoy and those in the mainland, and
ripped apart the economic networks, the religious cults, and the kindred community
between the two sides of Xiamen Bay.
Following the collapse of the social structure, the nationalist regime further imposed
an antagonistic relationship upon Quemoyans toward the “communist bandits” on the
other side of the waters. In an interview with a local historian, Huang, I asked how the
Quemoy people today deal with the wartime memory when undertaking reconciliation
with the people in the P.R.C., who as the former enemy had killed and injured their close
ones in the conflicts and caused their suffering under the shellfire. To answer my question,
Huang first pointed out a stranded community of Quemoyans in the mainland, suggesting
the civilian impotence during the war and its arbitrariness: When the war burst out in
1949, a considerable number of Quemoy people then travelling in the mainland were
involuntarily stranded on the communist side.19 They generally included three groups of
people—first, war fugitives fleeing to the mainland during the second Sino-Japanese War
(1937-1945); second, businessmen and employees working in the mainland before the
Civil War (1947-1950); and third in rare cases, enlistees in the nationalist army.20 Due to
the detention, many relatives or acquaintances of Quemoyans have long been in the
19

Although the total of Quemoy people in the mainland today is unknown, estimates of those in the Fukien
range from 4,000 (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 7th Feb. 2001) to 24,000 (Quemoy Daily, 23 Sep. 2004).
20
Several news reports concerning the reunion of people in the two sides illustrate this matter in details:
See stories of Wu (Strait Weekly [Xiamen], 20 Jan. 2006), of Chiu (Quemoy Daily, 26 Jun. 2003), of Xu
(Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 7 Feb. 2001), and of Lin (Quemoy Daily, 9 Nov. 2004).
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former “enemy” side since 1949. Mentioning the situation, he then asked, “how do you
define [who is the] enemy?” (Huang 2004b). Today for the locals freed from the imposed
relationship to the mainlanders, the “evil communist bandits 萬惡的共匪” appearing in
the past nationalist slogans were ideological creation of the authoritative propaganda and
McCarthyism (Figure 3.2). Huang reminiscently concluded his answer with a proverb:
“Being a dog in a peaceful time is better than being a man in a chaotic period 寧為太平
犬，不做亂世人. It [the war] was the great tragedy of the epoch 大時代的悲劇” (Huang
2004b). His answer suggested the local elite’s attitude toward the past conflict and the
local common desire for peace through reconciliation with the mainland society. In order
to undertake the reconciliation, he attributed the past suffering to the turbulent milieu of
the anticommunist era, and alienated himself and his fellow Quemoyans from their
involvement, if not contributions, in the war. He further totalized all participants in the
warfare as victims of the epoch. In so doing, the discourse exempted the past enemy from
their responsibility for the local suffering, and emancipated the local community from the
antagonistic relationship. The oblivion and alienation therefore assisted the locals to
transcend the past conflict in the new age of reconciliation.
The imposition of the binary opposition between we (patriotic civilians) and they
(communist bandits) resembled the imperial dichotomy between the obedient subjects
and the sea rovers in the late sixteenth century and Koxinga’s dichotomy between the
Han nationalists and the un-Chinese invaders in the seventeenth century. As the conflicts
constructed the group identities and vice versa the manipulation of identity politics
sustained the belligerent condition, the similarities between these wars which caused
reversals and dissolutions of the geographical coordinate system of Quemoy revealed a
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Figure 3.2.
A Slogan on the Folk House. The slogan read
as “Annihilate the Evil Communist Bandits” showed on a
wall of the folk house at the entrance of Oucuo 歐厝
village. When I visited the village in 2008, villagers covered
the slogan with a new layer of white paint to disguise it, but
the original words were still readable. [Source of the old
photo: Firefly Image Company 1994]
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tendency toward historical repetition. However, unlike the historical conflicts, the modern
war did not allow the locals to simultaneously remain politically correct and exempt from
taking one of the opposite identities. Strategic exercise of the both/and also and
neither/nor identity in the pre-modern times was barely feasible when the involvement of
civilians and combatants were equally necessary in the modern total warfare. Specifically
in an isolated environment like Quemoy where the soldiers greatly outnumbered the
civilian population, everyone in the island was under strict and mutual surveillance. The
social Panopticon not only articulated the overwhelming totality of military rule over the
individual and the local interests, but also ensured the locals to adapt to the identity of
patriotic civilians manifested through their daily practice in accordance. The mobilized
social synergy swiftly militarized the landscape in Quemoy and installed a reverse
geographical coordinate system. The reversal, in comparison with those in the past, was
the most thorough and readable one in terms of its landscape inscriptions as geographical
statements.
The thorough militarization, which engendered the clarity of geographical
statements, largely stems from the characteristics of modern total wars. The scope of war,
in addition to the war pattern, also contributed to its thoroughness. Starting as a Chinese
civil war, the confrontation in Quemoy over time turned into a conflict between the First
and the Second World especially after the Korean War dragged the U.S. into the
anti-communist theater (Figure 3.3). Quemoy thereby became an arena of the two global
alliances during the Cold War period. On the situation Szonyi remarked (2008, 4):
Militarization on Jinmen [Quemoy] was closely interconnected to geopoliticization . . . [as] the ways in which life on Jinmen became connected to global
politics. . . . Jinmen was affected by outside events tied to international politics. . . .
The periodic bombings of the island were driven by issues that had little direct
connection to Jinmen.
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Figure 3.3. Quemoy in the Global Disposition of the Anti-communist Campaign.
Like a wedge in the communist bloc, Quemoy was the front post of the US-led
campaign on the Bamboo Curtain in 1954. [Source: Time 1955]
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As a Cold-War front, the island’s affiliation became a global issue. To stop communist
troops from advancing, the U.S. troops supported the nationalists’ effort to maintain their
defenses in Quemoy. The U.S. support successfully contained the expansion of
communists, and consequently incurred a series of conflicts taking place in Quemoy
(Table 3.1). Among them, the last three were largely the Chinese communists’ reaction to
the international containment policy. The military operations were thus not simply means
to occupy territory but were tied up with geopoliticization.
Table 3.1. The Major Military Conflicts over Quemoy 1949-1979
Name of the Conflict

Time

Forms

Duration

Casualties

1. The Battle of
Guningtou

1949

Landing
operation

3 days

8,700 soldiers

2. The First Taiwan
Strait Crisis

1954-5

Intermittent
shelling

9 months

189 civilians

3. The Second Taiwan
Strait Crisis

1958

Intensive shelling

44 days

222 civilians

4.

1959-79

Shelling on
alternate days

20 years

578 civilians

“Shelling on oddnumbered days; no
shelling on even days”

[Statistics from Kuo 2010]
3.1.1

The U.S. Intervention and the American Aid Programs

After the battle of Guningtou that secured the nationalist control of Quemoy and
Taiwan, the Chinese nationalists relocated their central government to Taipei in 1949. The
next year the Korean War started, and completely changed the American policy toward
Chinese Civil War. Truman issued a statement of the U.S. response to the Chinese
communist military involvement in the Korean War (Truman 1979, 257):
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed
beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use
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armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area . . . .
Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. . . . The
determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security
in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
The Truman administration stretched the U.S. defense line in the east Pacific Rim to
Taiwan, but did not include islands along the Chinese coast. Nonetheless the American
intervention assisted the Chinese nationalist troops in Quemoy to undertake militarization,
and the arrival of the seventh Fleet at the Taiwan Strait efficiently deterred aggression of
the communist army. In addition, following the execution of the Marshall Plan, American
aid officially entered Taiwan in 1951, and stabilized the political and social unrest under
the looming shadow of wars. American intervention directed the confrontation to an
equilibrium, which tentatively decreased the possible strikes from the communist army.
In the situation, the nationalist defensive strategy accordingly changed. Construction of
temporary defenses in the coastal zone stopped, and the army started to root in the island.
Using steel and cement provided by American aid, the soldiers in Quemoy embarked
on construction of military infrastructures, pillboxes, barracks, and sentry posts on the
strategic points on the island. In addition to the deployment and accommodations,
American aid also relieved the shortage of military supplies.21 In the mid-1950s the
estimate of nationalist troops in Quemoy amounted to 72,000, and in the late 1950s the
total of soldiers had grown to 100,000 (Kallgren 1963, 38). As a small island with an
approximate population of 50,000 civilians, the agriculture-based society could hardly
provide sufficient necessities for the soldiers. The timely arrival of American aid helped
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Huang (2004b) indicated the influence of the American Aid program. When the soldiers first retreated to
Quemoy in 1949, civilians had to provide them with everything. They fed the soldiers; lived together under
the same roof; and worked for the army in construction of defenses. However, after the supplies of
American aid arrived at Quemoy in 1954, soldiers’ life became better than the civilians’, and some of them
would share their provisions with the local civilians.
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the nationalist government in Taipei solve the problem and relieved the Quemoy locals
from the unbearable burden.
The American Aid Program
The Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) and the Economic
Cooperation Administration (ECA), which respectfully managed the military and
economic aid, were the two official organizations subjugated to the U.S. embassy in
charge of the American Aid program. The U.S. government established the MAAG in
Taipei in 1951 to manage the military aid provided for the nationalist troops to defend
Taiwan, Pescadores, Quemoy, and Matsu. The MAAG mainly assisted the nationalist
army in three ways. As the aided country submitted a list of requirements, the MAAG
reviewed the requested weapons, equipment, and supplies, and remitted the list to the U.S.
for approval (Scott 1951). Its veterans also assisted the nationalist army to familiarize
them with American-supplied weapons, ranging from small firearms to battle vessels and
aircraft and provided operational training and technical support. Its military consultants
provided advice on the military strategy from the blueprint of the overall defensive plan
to the tactics of a single skirmish. The MAAG had a subdivision in Quemoy—Kinmen
Defense Command Advisory Team (KDCAT), which provided “expert advice and
technical assistance” (Figure 3.4; Shor 1959, 420) to the stationed troops. Their tasks
included monitoring the activities of the Communist army and reporting the intelligence
of the troops in Quemoy to the headquarters in Taipei (Huang 2003, 70). Meanwhile, the
ECA did similar work in the area of economic incentives. It examined and submitted a
list of the requested aid to the U.S. for approval. The list of economic aid usually
comprised a few major categories: first, material aid (including flour, medication, and
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Figure 3.4. The KDCAT in Quemoy. A KDCAT officer
in a gun emplacement lectured on shell fuses to the
nationalist gun crew. [Source: Shor 1959]
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fertilizer); second, heavy construction equipment; and third technical support.22 In
addition to MAAG and ECA, the CIA also had a branch in Quemoy operating under the
disguise of the West Enterprise Company during 1951-1954 (Weng 1991). The company
trained and equipped the nationalist guerillas to conduct military operations behind the
enemy lines, and to collect intelligence of the P.R.C. troops through the guerilla war. With
CIA support, the nationalist guerillas launched a series of assaults on the southeast coast
of China in the early 1950s. The CIA agents left Quemoy after the Korean War, but the
guerillas they trained and equipped remained active in the 1960s. The American activities
in Quemoy assisted the nationalist army in turning the island into a full-fledged battle
station.
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954
As the soldiers fortified the island with American aid and advice taken from KDCAT,
the Chinese nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, also intensively prepared to invade
communist China. Although General MacArthur’s visit in 1950 to Taipei temporarily
uplifted the nationalists’ aspiration for recovering the mainland China, their hopes faded
away quickly, when President Truman dismissed MacArthur from his duty in 1951.
Truman’s policy to retain the war inside Korea disillusioned the Chinese nationalist
expectations to launch a full-scale general war in the mainland. In addition, Truman urged
Chiang to surrender islands along the Chinese coast in order to neutralize Taiwan. By
these political and diplomatic measures, the Truman administration successfully
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The MAAG and ECA commonly remained on the policy-making and the administrative level, but did
not directly involve in implementation for their policies, which relied on the assistance from the American
private sector. For example, the Civil Air Transport Inc. (CAT) headed by Claire Lee Chennault provided
transportation for the supplies. The J. G. White Engineering Corporation, a New-York-based company,
constructed the majority of infrastructures and industrial facilities in Taiwan.
141

stabilized the turmoil in the Far East, and prompted a cease-fire agreement that led to the
Korean armistice and the end of the Korean War in 1953.
The U.S. adopted a containment policy toward the communist bloc by signing
mutual security pacts with the free countries in Asia since the breakout of Korean War.
The U.S. policy put the regimes of South Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan on notice
that the global political climate did not favor their intentions to recover their original
territories. For the three regimes, the policy solidified the political reality of the loss of
these territories. In the meantime, the policy also secured their status quo as political
entities. The Chinese communist leader, Mao Tse-Dong, knew that the American
involvement had blocked his chance to take over Taiwan, and the Chinese regime in
Taiwan would contaminate the legitimacy of his regime and the credibility of his
leadership. As the U.S. forces were the major obstacle to his conquest of the whole of
China, further development of the cooperative partnership between America and Taiwan
would frustrated his master plan. As a result, while John Dulles was signing the Manila
Pact in 1954, Mao ordered his artillery to bombard Quemoy in hopes of influencing
America’s interests in signing a similar treaty with Taiwan. Military historians recognized
the incident as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, which lasted for nine months and consisted
of several episodes (Figure 3.5).23
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Military historians also mentioned other triggers for the episodic bombardment. In August 1954,
Eisenhower, under the Anti-communist request, lifted the Seventh Fleet's blockade to allow Chiang’s army
to invade China. Chiang soon dispatched reinforcements to Quemoy and Matsu. In response to Chiang’s
maneuver, Mao also intended to take the chance to “liberate” Taiwan. The bombardment against Quemoy in
September 1954 was the prolog of this incident. (Pixley 2005, 12). Dreyer (1997) considered the
bombardment as a decoy. The operation aimed to distract the nationalist attention from the communist real
target—the Tachen 大陳 Islands. In January 1955, the communist troops undertook their onslaught on a
peripheral island of the Tachens—Ichiang 一江山—whose occupation extended their gun range over the
islands of Tachen. Meanwhile, the communist navy also successfully blockaded the logistic line of the
islands from Formosa, and the blockade forced the nationalist troops to retreat and to evict civilians in the
islands in February 1955 (Dreyer 1997, 16).
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Figure 3.5. A Timeline of the Episodes in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis

Figure 3.6. The Stalemate in the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait in 1955. After the nationalist
troops retreated from the Tachen Islands in February 1955, Quemoy and Matsu were the
only two offshore islands left for the nationalists. [Source: US News, 15 Apr. 1955]
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In response to the bombardment, Eisenhower adopted a brinkmanship strategy to
browbeat China with nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Khrushchev was not as supportive as
Stalin was in the Korean War, and the Soviet indifference drove China to submit to the
brinkmanship strategy. To express the stern American stance to defend Taiwan,
Eisenhower asked John Foster Dulles to stop by Taipei on his way back to the U.S. from
the SEATO meeting, and he signed the Sino-America Mutual Defense Treaty with the
regime in Taiwan in December 1954. Furthermore, in January 1955 both U.S. houses of
Congress approved the Taiwan Resolution, which authorized the U.S. President to
employ military intervention to defend Taiwan. Thereby Eisenhower openly announced
his consideration of using nuclear bombs on mainland China (Figure 3.6). Before signing
the mutual defense treaty, the Eisenhower administration asked Chiang to agree on two
conditions: first, to surrender the islands along the Chinese coast to communists, and
second not to invade China without notifying America in advance. Chiang agreed on the
second condition, but he refused to surrender Quemoy and Matsu for the strategic and
political considerations for his government in exile.24
Strategically, by the control of Quemoy and Matsu, the nationalists could push their
front forward 173 miles to the mainland seaboards, and applied full control to the Taiwan
Strait. The reins of Quemoy and Matsu therefore secured Taiwan as the rear base
supplying the two fronts with provisions, personnel, and ammunition. Politically, the
24

In two interviews with American reporters in March 1955, Chiang declared his decision on the
Quemoy-Matsu issue. In the interview with Salzburg, he stated, “In any circumstances, our troop will not
retreat from the offshore islands. . . It will be a mistake to expect our retreat from Quemoy and Matsu based
on our withdrawal from the Tachens. We will indeed fight for the two islands” (Kuo 2003, 49). In another
interview with Howard, he repeated, “With or without American support, the Republic of China will by all
means defend Quemoy and Matsu regardless of any consequence” (Kuo 2003, 49). In a later interview with
a UPI reporter, Miller, in January 1956, Chiang revealed his reason for holding the two islands. He
remarked, “We will resolutely defend Quemoy and Matsu till death. We will not give an inch to the
communists because Quemoy and Matsu are a part of the overall defense system of Taiwan” (Kuo 2003,
49).
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value of Quemoy and Matsu signified that the governance of Chiang’s regime reached
Fukien, a traditional territory of China, and subsequently continued Chiang’s legitimacy
as the Chinese ruler. In other words, by the inclusion of Fukien territory under the R.O.C.
sovereignty, Chiang defined the political reality as two regimes of one China, and
renounced the “Two Chinas” scheme. Due to the symbolization, Chiang’s regime turned
the two islands into its anti-communist sanctuaries, especially following its arduous
victory in the battle of Guningtou in Quemoy. Noticing Chiang’s determination,
Eisenhower eventually signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in March 1955,
but the areas covered by the treaty excluded Quemoy and Matsu. The treaty nonetheless
bought soldiers in Quemoy a few more years to prepare for the upcoming war, which was
commonly termed as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (Pixley 2005).
The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958
After the communist troops completed their preparation and deployment, they again
intensively bombarded Quemoy on August 23rd in 1958 (Figure 3.7). In the first two
hours of the bombardment, the communist artillery fired 57,533 projectiles at the island
with an area of fifty-eight square miles. The bombardment lasted for forty-four days and
a total of 444,423 projectiles landed on Quemoy. In a month, the artillery war caused 222
civilian casualties and demolished 1,918 civilian houses (Kuo 2010). On October fifth,
the communist artillery ceased fire for two weeks and announced their subsequent rule of
engagement that they would shell Quemoy on every odd number date. The form of
engagement, termed as “shelling on odd-numbered days; no shelling on even days 單打
雙不打,” lasted for twenty years until the U.S. and the P.R.C. established official
diplomatic relations in 1978. Although the P.R.C. guns mainly fired propaganda shells in
the twenty-one-year shelling on odd number days, they still caused considerable
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Figure 3.7. Deployment of the Communist Batteries during the Second Taiwan Strait
Crisis. Unlike those in the First Crisis, the gun range of communist artillery in the
Second Crisis covered the whole island and the Liaolo (Laulo) Bay. Consequently,
there were no safe places in the island. The situation urged the movement of building
underground facilities during the post-war reconstruction. [Source: Shor 1959]
casualties and destruction. Together with the forty-four-day August 23rd bombardment,
the twenty-one-year shelling caused eight-hundred civilian casualties (162 dead; 638
injured) and demolished 9,053 houses in Quemoy. Some folk villages, such as Guningtou,
were nearly leveled to the ground by the August 23rd bombardment, and continuously
exposed to the random threats of propaganda shells after reconstruction.
Nonethless, the destruction and the casualties were not the worst consequence of the
artillery wars, but the life under constant threat for twenty-one years mattered. The
communist rule of engagement practically meant that their artillery would not shell
Quemoy on even number dates, but might or might not do so on the odd number dates.
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However, after midnight of an even number date the communist artillery could strike
anytime. As a result, people in Quemoy could only sleep soundly in the first half of the
night on an even number date and in the latter half on an odd number day. When the
confrontation turned intensive between the two sides, the locals would sleep in the
air-raid shelter every night. No one knew the exact what time of the day and how many
times a day the communist artillery would strike. The shelling then greatly affected the
local daily life, and forced the locals to adapt to the battlefield life under shellfire. For
example, to discern different sounds that projectiles made through the air was a necessary
survival skill for the locals because these sounds could inform them of how near the
projectiles might strike. With the knowledge of the potential impact distance, they then
could decide to disregard the shelling or to rush to nearby shelters.
The intense barrage in 1958 sought to force the nationalist troops in Quemoy to
surrender, and the communist artillery also employed the fierce shelling as a way to
blockade the island from the nationalist logistics from Taiwan. After the inception of the
crisis, the Eisenhower administration promptly responded (Szonyi 2008, 71):
President Eisenhower ordered an increase in military aid transfers to the ROC
(including artillery capable of firing atomic weapons) and the reinforcement of the
Seventh Fleet . . . [said as] the “largest nuclear navy” ever assembled in the history.
With the escort of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the nationalist supply convoys successfully
broke through the embargo barrages and supplied the troops in Quemoy. The
American-aided heavy artillery (M115 howitzers) also enabled the nationalist soldiers to
effectively retaliate and suppress the communist fire, and therefore the nationalists have
often considered the American aid as the determining factor of the defense’s success of
Quemoy in the crisis. Since the first blast of the crisis, political figures in the U.S.-led
alliance of the First World urged Chiang to surrender Quemoy and Matsu. In the
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international political climate, the increase in U.S. military aid was actually a trade for
Chiang’s renouncement to invade the mainland China in a Sino-American communiqué
(Chi and Chen 2003, 14). Achieving the diplomatic victory, Mao then ordered his troops
to stop the intensive shelling but to shell Quemoy on alternate days to symbolically
continue the engagement as a warning to Taiwan and the U.S.
In addition, the international urge to neutralize Taiwan by surrendering the two
offshore islands on the Chinese coast also influenced Mao’s ceasefire decision. In both
Mao’s and Chiang’s understanding, the two offshore islands were the connection of their
two regimes and “[t]he ROC presence on Jinmen [Quemoy] was a reminder that both
regimes agreed there was only ‘One China’ that would one day be reunified” (Szonyi
2008, 72). Consequently, either side of the Taiwan Strait would not want the connection
relinquished, and, as Szonyi commented, Mao’s ultimate objective of shelling Quemoy
was not to capture the island (2008, 73):
As a symbolic link between Taiwan and the mainland, [nationalist] abandonment of
the island would be a setback to the goal of preventing permanent separation of the
two regimes on either side of the Taiwan Strait. If Jinmen [Quemoy] fell to the PLA
[communist troops], “Two Chinas” would be one step closer to reality.
The artillery war that did not aim for a military conquest became an eccentric way for
both the regimes to maintain the integrity of their statehood against the international
intervention. Likewise, the following alternate-day shelling, a symbolic warfare, also
sought to employ military operations to achieve political goals. Therefore, when
Eisenhower visited Taipei in 1960, the communist artillery fiercely bombarded Quemoy
for three consecutive days, and claimed the shelling was their tokens of welcome and
farewell to his visit to Taiwan (Kuo 2010).

148

Significance of War History in the Age of Reconciliation
Recent studies of the Cold War attribute the crises in Quemoy to international,
especially Sino-American, diplomacy and high politics (e.g. Chi and Chen 2003; Jiang
2005; Lee 2005; Szonyi 2008), circulation of knowledge in the age of reconciliation
avails the local society against past antagonisms. In recent years, due to the demarcation
in the post-Cold-War period, information of the militarized past of Quemoy has become
available for researchers. The sensitive and classified documentation in the past
concerning the diplomacy and high politics also become accessible, and local
interviewees are comparatively at ease and willing to relate their personal experiences
during the time of military rule (1949-1992). The availability of these sources of
information has initiated a trend of Cold War studies in Quemoy. From the populace’s
perspective, these studies of Cold-War Quemoy deliberately weave a past by the
collective memory, and challenge the conventional history that they consider serving as
the handmaid of nationalist pedagogy (Jiang 2007).
The shift of authorship in the historical narratives from high politics to civilian life
brings out a contrasting interpretation of the past. The conventional narratives of the
Cold-War Quemoy emphasize the patriotism showing in the collaborative efforts between
the local populace and the military and how they eagerly engaged in the anticommunist
struggle. Together, they single-mindedly defeated the national enemy and helped each
other through predicaments under the enemy threats (see Xu 1996). By contrast,
portraying the daily life in a battlefield where the military supremacy and the national
hegemony prevailed, narratives in post-Cold-War studies describe the commoners’
powerlessness to resist the military labor levy, property requisition, and strict control over
their daily life. While stating their involuntary compliance with the military governance
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now, most interviewees also express their understanding of the necessity for civilian
mobilization and the emergent measures taken on the brink or under the threats of war
(see Xu 2000).
Incorporating information from the two sources, studies of the Cold-War Quemoy
(e.g. Chi and Chen 2003; Szonyi 2008) largely present participants in the
state-orchestrated anticommunist struggle as chess pieces manipulated by an invisible
hand of the high politics: Civilians acted upon orders of mobilization form the military
hierarchical system, which implemented the national strategies contingent on the global
politics. By stating that Mao did not intend to occupy Quemoy to avoid “Two Chinas”
and Chiang had also secretly given up retaking China to trade for American protection,
Chi and Chen comment, “The civilians and soldiers in Quemoy were involuntarily put on
the gambling table [as bargaining chips] for the regimes on the two sides of the Taiwan
Strait to play a Cold-War game 金門的百姓與守軍被迫上了賭台陪兩岸政治體玩一場
冷戰遊戲” (2003, 16). Instead of holding everyone in the total war responsible for the
suffering and hardships, institutionalization of the past excuses civilians and soldiers in
Quemoy from the responsibility for their collective creations that constituted, in Huang’s
(2004b) words, “the great tragedy of the times.”
As the (pre)tension that the high politics between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait
maintained was a carefully calibrated performance (Szonyi 2008), the efforts that the
soldiers and mobilized civilians made to the militarization after the 1960s becomes ironic.
Their collaborative preparation against the communist invasion is futile from the
beginning since their anticommunist struggle could not change the political and territorial
status quo. Likewise, due to the prearrangement of high politics, the value of their
sacrifice, as they believed then, for their nation and other sublime causes—for example,
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to rescue the suffering compatriots under the communist oppression—was denied
beforehand. Even if the militarization and their praxes of the civil religion of nationalism
are teleologically meaningless for any political and military achievement, the militarized
past is of critical significance to the soldiers and the locals in Quemoy. Especially for the
locals, much of their life memory is constructed upon the communal experience under the
forty-three-year military rule in the battlefield. To rest their past in geopoliticization that
brought the meaningless tragedy upon them is to vanish their selves in nihility. For the
reason, it is therefore essential for the post-conflict society to redefine its past in order to
move forward.
By painting the past as a tragedy, the prevailing appeasement today redefines the
significance of the Cold-War past, and proposes that the local experience of war should
have provided lessons about its ruthlessness and the valuableness of peace (Dong and
Huang 2007; Kinmen National Park 2005; Lee 2006). As one of the major proponents,
Jiang remarks on the trend of the Cold-War study in Quemoy (2007, 149),
I think it is extremely essential to advocate narrating the war memory for the time
being. Only through the process of reinterpreting the history, the civil society in
Quemoy can have opportunities to review their own past; to retrospect the cruelty of
war; and sequentially to detach from the historical tragedy.
In his view, narrating and writing about the past are ways to depart from the tragedy
rather than to sustain it. In re-narrating the past, a new translation of the battlefield
experience, apart from patriotism, is necessary. As the meaning of the past is now
commonly construed as a reassertion of the valuableness of peace (see Kuo 2008a; Lin
2005), the reinterpretation then facilitates reconciliation and assists the locals in Quemoy
to demilitarize their past.
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3.1.2

The Front-Back Deployment of the Militarized Quemoy

Accounting for the militarization of Quemoy, Chang has once used a metaphor to
describe Quemoy as a “big military camp” where the sense of place resides in (2008, 67),
the orderly arranged roadside trees, clean streets, and straight avenues. Military
stations guard the periphery of every village, while the interiors of villages are
monitored [by civil defense] in the village halls. There are many things that the
Quemoy locals cannot do nor possess. These phenomena are similar to those only
found in a military camp.
As described, the militarization in Quemoy appears in three elements: construction of
military facilities, mobilization of civil defense, and regulation of daily life. In addition to
the regular military structures, construction of military facilities includes installation of
infrastructures that sustain the troops in Quemoy and facilitate their operation. As the
military laid out its infrastructure, their installation inaugurated modernization of Quemoy,
and its process, according to Jiang, resembled in the “one of ‘colonial modernity’ . . .
established upon the structure of absolute authority of military rule” (2005, 21). The road
network was the most palpable landscape manifestation of militarization for it connected
military stations in the island to form a collaborative defense network, and its design
made the transportation infrastructure a part of the defense system (Figure 3.8). To
enhance mobility and efficiency, the military engineers designed a road network for
Quemoy that was the densest among all counties in the R.O.C. (Yang B. 2010), and kept
the alignment of major traffic arteries in as a straight line as possible. The intersections of
routes often took the form of a traffic circle, at the center of which a cylindrical pillbox or
a monument was the common visual foci. These centerpiece structures would block the
sight of incoming traffic. In addition, to disorient intruders, these intersections often
adopted a misaligned layout so that the avenues obliquely converged on the traffic circle
and were not in line with one another (Figure 3.9). For the same purpose, there were no
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Figure 3.8 (A.B.C). The Road Network in
Quemoy. Straight avenues and traffic circles
are the characteristics of the road network in
Quemoy. At the centers of these traffic circles
were military monuments or bunkers.
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Figure 3.9. The Misaligned
Layout of the Traffic Circles in
Quemoy. Avenues obliquely
converging on the traffic circle and
share similar streetscape. The
centerpiece blocked eyesight of
automobilists moving around the
bunker. The design of traffic circles
aims to disorient outsiders.
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direction signs and mileposts, and most of the street trees were monotonously the same
species to create a labyrinth. The pillboxes were designed with a machine-gun
emplacement atop and rifle embrasures at the eye-level aligning the axes of the
convergent roads. The soldiers stationed in the pillboxes would monitor the traffic on the
straight avenues heading to the intersection. By these designs, the military engineers
incorporated the road system into the overall defense plan of Quemoy. Likewise,
establishment of other infrastructure during the time of military rule also enhanced
military considerations, and aimed to facilitate military operations. Through these
constituent infrastructure elements, the military could thoroughly militarize Quemoy.
The construction of the military facilities concentrated on the establishment of
coastal defense and an underground tunnel networks. Since the late 1940s, troops in
Quemoy had established and managed coastal defenses. Their long-term efforts resulted
in a well fortified coastline. Estuaries and lagoons with their outlets sealed off by
embankments became water reservoirs. All ports, except a few on the west and south
shores that remained in use for transportation to Leiyu and Taiwan, were abandoned
(Figure 3.10). Vertically from the tidal zone to the uplands, anti-landing devices, stone
walls along the beach edges, minefields in the coastal shrubbery, and military posts atop
the sea cliffs are common landscape features in the Quemoy coast (Figure 3.11).
Surrounding the military positions, barbed wire, shattered glass implanted on rocks,
thorny plants, and occasionally moats are common elements to reinforce the island’s
defense (Figure 3.12). The vast majority of the seafront military structures were bunkers
stationed with infantry and nearby subordinate sentry posts. These concrete fortresses,
often designed with multifaceted walls with embrasures toward the sea and beach,
guarded the final line of the coastal defense (Figure 3.13). They were distributed densely
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Figure 3.10. The Ports and Water Reservoirs in Quemoy. The military constructed
embankments to seal off the topographical gaps, and ordered port abandonment on the
north shore. Both the measures facilitated the coastal defense, while the construction of
ports on the southern shore strengthened ties with Taiwan. [Source: photo by the author;
map remade by the author; base map by Ministry of the Interior, R.O.C. 2007]
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A defense wall on the north
shore extends out from the
ramparts of the military
compound. It blocks the way of
enemy marines and also controls
villagers’ access to the sea.

A waning sign on the barbwire
in front of a cactus bush appears
on the roadside. Minefields are
common defense measures
surrounding the military
compound on a sandy beach

Anti-landing sticks are also common
defenses in the intertidal flats ideal
for landing. They were made of
segments of rails with one end
sharpened and the other mounted on
a concrete base to pierce the bottom
landing crafts. [photo by the author]

Fig. 3.11. A Military Post on the Sandy Beach.
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Figure 3.12. Common Defenses of Military Compounds
on the Rocky Beaches. Shattered glass and barbed wire are
two popular defenses on the rocky beach. Soldiers use
cement as adhesive to attach shattered glass on the rocks
around their compound. Behind the area of broken glass are
obstacles consisting of layers of barbed wire. Sisals and
cactuses growing over stone walls and surveillance posts
form natural barriers and provide disguise. [photo by the
author]
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Fig. 3.13. Bastions of the Coastal Fortification. Oftentimes, one will
find bastions projecting out under a seafront cliff. They guard segments
of narrow sandy shores with their gun embrasures on the multi-faceted
bastion walls pointing to all directions of the beach. The seafront
military posts usually contained a squad or a platoon position to enable a
dense disposition along the coastline since the goal is to guard the entire
north and western shores that are mainly sandy beaches. [photo by the
author]
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along the north and east shore of Quemoy, while the west shore beyond Leiyu and the
south shore facing the Taiwan Strait were less intensively guarded.
In addition to the infantry bunkers, the north and south shore, due to their relative
positions to the mainland, each became sites ideal for specific facilities. The north shore
with a view of the enemy was ideal for observation and broadcast stations. On the
northeast corner of Quemoy, the projecting tombolo, Mashan 馬山, is the closest
location to the mainland and one of the settings for these facilities. Due to its short
distance to the P.R.C. territory—1,800 meters on the ebb—an observation station and a
broadcast station were located on the island. Also for the proximity to the mainland, the
northwest corner of Quemoy was the location of the other broadcast station. The two
broadcast stations were apparatus of psychological warfare, and through arrays of
loudspeakers embedded on walls erected at the seaside soft female voices resonate in the
air to the P.R.C. troops in the seaboards along Xiamen bay. To maximize the effect of
propaganda, the military set the facilities on the forefront to allow the voices to reach to
the mainland.
Compared with the north shore which was heavily populated with infantry, the south
shore of Quemoy harbored a greater diversity of troops. As materiel for the troops in
Quemoy depended on the cross-strait transportation from Taiwan, ports and the airfield
were all located on the south shore facing the Taiwan Strait. One of the assignments of
the infantry stationed on the south shore was to collaborate with the navy and air force in
Quemoy to defend these facilities and to secure the supply lines. For this purpose, these
infantry positions were heavily armed with artillery or tanks to defend against enemy
maritime vessels. Due to the location of ports, the logistics corps also stationed a motor
transport company on the south shore to distribute the unloaded materiel. Besides the
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logistics troops, the infantry, the navy and the air force, the artillery and the frogmen also
had the positions on the south shore. Not only the distance from the mainland made the
south shore a relative secure site for logistics troops and transportation facilities, but its
position beyond Mt. Taiwu and Leiyu also provided geographical protection for the
southern Quemoy to allow the deployment of the non-combat facilities and those of
anti-aircraft artillery. For the same geographical advantages, hospitals, warehouses,
training facilities, shooting ranges, and the bases of reserve troops were largely located on
the southern, especially the southeastern, Quemoy.
Behind the coastal defenses, most military facilities deployed on the second line
were artillery troops. Their positions usually hid behind highlands near the coast so that
their gun could reach further into the mainland while the geography concealed their
locations from any retaliating shelling. Also on the second line were company
headquarters occupying strategic points. While coordinating subordinate platoons and
squads sent out to guard the coastline, officers commanded a portion of the company’s
force to defend its own position on the second line. Further inland the higher ranking
officers resided in central Quemoy. The general rule of deployment constituted a
systematic defense network in Quemoy and thereby embodied a military hierarchy in its
landscape.
Before demilitarization, the army had stationed at least three divisions of troops in
Quemoy besides those directly under the command of the Quemoy Defense Headquarter
(QDH). In the western half of Quemoy, the army consistently maintained a division of
defense forces, while in the eastern half two divisions was respectively stationed in the
northeast and southeast Quemoy. Each of the three divisions commanded three infantry
brigades as the defense forces and other subordinate troops of other military occupations
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such as those in charge of assaulting operations, combat service support operations, and
so on. The three infantry brigades dispersed in their division’s defense area each guarded
a portion of it, while the division headquarter at the center guarded the core area. In the
same manner, battalions under the same brigade also had their assigned areas of defense
surrounding their brigade headquarter. The ramification of defense responsibility and of
defense areas further applied to the military units of lower tiers, namely companies and
platoons, and resulted in a branched structure of the defense system (Figure 3.14). In the
structure, the military headquarters of all ranks, from the DQH to a company headquarter,
are situated at the branching points in a manner that the higher the ranking of the
headquarters, the further away from the coast their positions were. The QDH as the core
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of the branch structure commands all the army troops in Quemoy through the defense
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Figure 3.14. A Model of the Defense System in Quemoy. The hierarchical system
spreads roots into the entire island to make sure that it is well-defended, and
meanwhile is under the total control of the military. The core and sphere denote
respectively for the locations of headquarters and their wartime defense areas.
[Source: by the author]
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system. The landscape of Quemoy therefore is enforced with a rigid, utilitarian, and
hierarchical order that articulates the military culture.
By the deployment of troops, the military reversed the front and back of Quemoy.
The newly formed front of Quemoy, facing the mainland to counter the P.R.C. military
deterrence, replaced the one of the past few centuries on the south shore defending hostile
parties from the sea. The concentration of coastal defense on the north coast blocked off
the water traffic and the traditional connections between Quemoy and the seaboard areas
along Xiamen Bay. In exchange, the construction of modern port facilities and the
deployment of logistics troops on the south shore manifested the establishment of a new
connection with Taiwan after 1949. With the reversal of fronts, the mainland became the
outside, the territory of Others, while Taiwan across the Strait became the inside
supporting troops and people in Quemoy to proceed with the military struggle in the
forefront. The reposition of orientation reflected the changing external relationships
between Quemoy and its surrounding areas, and meanwhile initiated an internal
(re)organization of a multi-layered defense system of Quemoy.
3.2 Construction of the Inside Quemoy
As an island the natural settings of Quemoy predetermined its inside and outside
demarcation along the coastline, and the defense system established after the reversal
further consolidated the spatial demarcation. Due to the small size of Quemoy, a major
purpose of the defense deployment was to bog down the invading enemies and logistical
communication. The military deployment therefore formed defense lines encompassing
the QDH inside in a hierarchical order. The arrangement produced internal layers of the
structural defense network, and consequently highlighted the inside of Quemoy.
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3.2.1

Reformulation of the Overall Configuration

The application of multiple layers of defense on Quemoy was a novel praxis in the
modern times. Previously defense forces concentrated on the coastline to form a single
and strong front line. Implementation of the modern strategy gave prominence to the
inside as the core of the defense system, and spurred development inside Quemoy. The
Taiwu Range as the spine of the island stretched from central Quemoy to the island’s
eastern end, and divided its eastern half into two quarters. Headquarters of the Eastern
Quemoy Division were to the east while headquarters of the Southern Quemoy (aka
Nanxiong 南雄) Division occupied the southern flank of the range. Formerly, the
headquarters of the Central Quemoy Division was on the west end of the range before the
military reorganization in 1984. Surrounded by these division headquarters was the QDH
in the middle of the range. Situated on the southern hillsides of the range the command
centers were protected from shelling, and their concentration drew clusters of military
facilities, infrastructure installations, and administrative personnel to the highlands.
Due to the defense buildup, the barren, rocky area that had thitherto remained
underdeveloped turned into the political center of Quemoy, and usurped the role formerly
played by southwestern Quemoy from 1387. In addition, militarization of Quemoy also
influenced the pre-existing economic structure. Before formation of the defense system in
the 1950s, the port cities, Hopu, in southwestern Quemoy was the major economic center
because it served as the point of attachment for the prosperous treaty port, Amoy, which
served west Quemoy. As Quemoy’s economy increasingly relied on the military after
militarization, the economic center of Quemoy accordingly moved to the area with
military concentration. Eastern Quemoy, with the three divisions of defense forces and
the garrison of the DQH, accommodated a great proportion of the total troops in the
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island. The large military population therein shifted the economic center from the
southwest to the new town, Xinshi 新市, in southeastern Quemoy. The relocation of the
economic center then synchronized with the change of the insular front and back, and the
new economic center happened to be on the right (east) side of the new orientation. With
the shifts of front and back as well as left and right, the modern precept of military
defense brought forth an innovative configuration of Quemoy. These landscape changes
induced by militarization thereby presented the reversed geographical coordinate system.
3.2.2

Development of the Underground Inside

When war consisted of intensive bombardments from 1954 to 1960, the garrison in
Quemoy modified their defenses in response to the new type of warfare. Construction of
semi-underground and underground defenses supplemented soldiers’ regular duties, and
their endeavors to transfer the military facilities underground created another dimension
of inside Quemoy. The most representative work of the sort was the DQH in Mt. Taiwu,
where the military took advantage of its granitic geology as the natural air-raid shelter.
The military moved all critical military facilities, ranging from small ammunition depots
to the wartime command center with nearly eight-hundred seats into these granitic caves
underground, and thereby constructed an underground labyrinth with few entrances in the
mountain valleys. Numerous underground tunnels connected the excavated caves at
different depths, and the subterranean thoroughfares penetrating though the mountain
served as the routes for tank troops. Consequently, the militarization of Mt. Taiwu
formed a network linking up the division headquarters around the hilly area with the
DQH. While the QDH ordinarily collected its forces in the underground chambers, the
tunnel network inside Mt. Taiwu enabled these forces to effectively reach out as
reinforcements. Due to the advantages of defense and incompatibility with agricultural
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use, the area of Mt. Taiwu that had largely remained undeveloped before militarization
became the ideal site for military facilities.
In addition to Mt. Taiwu, the military also constructed underground facilities in
the low hills on the outer rings of the multi-layered defense system. Since rocky hills
were mostly undeveloped land outside villages, these strategic highlands became
preferable sites for military stations, which consisted partly of underground structures.
Their prevalence in Quemoy reached an extent that, as Huang commended, “in the early
1960s, as long as the military stations were built in the granitic terrain, there were
constructions of underground tunnels in the bedrock in process” (2003, 93). Apart from
infantry stations, artillery positions were one of the common facilities taking advantage of
the bedrock-exposed hills in Quemoy. Entrances of these underground facilities were
generally on the inside behind the hills, while gun embrasures aiming toward the
mainland were dispersed on the outside of the hills. Branched shaped tunnels connected
the entrances and the underground gun emplacement chambers (Figure 3.15). By the
design, only the gun emplacements were exposed to the threat of enemy fire, which if hit
through an embrasure would only cost a gun emplacement on a branch of the position.
The design therefore maximized the defense effects, and minimized the risk from enemy
fire. Like artillery positions, landing sites for supplies on the south shore where the
materiel arrived were the other target of enemy fire. To ensure successful delivery, the
military embarked on the construction of underground docks (Figure 3.16), so that the
carrying vessels (LCM or LCVP) could transport supplies from their mother ships to the
docks in the granitic caves. From there, the garrison then moved supplies through series
of stairways to the grounds behind the hills on the inside of the island. These facilities in
the granitic terrain, due to their essential function, attracted converging enemy fire, and
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Fig. 3.15. An Artillery Tunnel. The entrance of the artillery tunnel is
constantly on the inside behind the hill while its gun-emplacement
chambers on the outside rim of the hillfoot. The curvy main
(communication) tunnel and its sub-tunnels stretching outward connect the
entrance and the peripheral gun-emplacement chambers. Both the curvy
tunnel design and the tree-shape layout can reduce the impact and damage
by the blast of retaliatory fire. [photo by the author]
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Figure 3.16. An Underground Dock for Carrying Vessels. A long
stairway connects the underground tunnel to the ground facilities
behind the coastal hill. The tunnel can harbor sixty-eight small carrying
vessels (LCVP) to unload the supply along the A-shape layout of the
channels. Due to the resonant effect in the tunnel, KNP has held a few
concerts of classic music therein with the band playing on a barge
drifting along the water channel. [Source: photo by the author]
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therefore required well fortified positions to withstand the shelling. The endeavor to
excavate and mold the granitic caves and tunnels into military use not only created a
series of impregnable strongholds but popular tourist attractions after demilitarization due
to their ingenuity and sublimity in construction.
In contrast to the military facilities in the rocky hills that took advantage of the
protective granitic chambers, installations located in other geological settings, mainly
laterite, resorted to the thick reinforced concrete walls to withstand shellings. The military
compounds in the areas of earthen hills were usually a combination of tunnels,
communication trenches, semi-underground bunkers, and aboveground structures with
camouflage. Their layout in the compound closely collaborated with the topography, and
important structures were often partially embedded in or covered with earth.
Application of the same defense measures also occurred in the civilian domain. After
the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, construction of public air-raid shelters initiated the
underground facilities for folk villages. Subsequently, the development of underground
facilities coincided with the organization of combat villages, by which the military turned
the folk villages into quasi-military compounds. A combat village as the basic tactical
unit of civil defense consisted of a few small folk villages or a large single one. In these
villages, tunnels connected air-raid shelters, folk houses, public buildings, and bunkers on
the periphery of villages to form an underground network that enabled the efficient
maneuvering of the militia defending their own villages, while providing shelters for the
non-combat personnel. For this purpose, the military further commanded the militia to
excavate underground command centers, weapon caches, food storage, and wells to
sustain the militia in a long-term defense. Consequently, if enemy troops intended to
capture a combat village, they would have to break through the defenses on the periphery
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of the village; pacify the resistance in the streets inside the village; and eradicate the
reserves underground. The combat village thereby comprised three layers of defenses
supporting each other (Dong and Hung 2007). Through the underground tunnels, the
militia could synchronically support the two other battle venues in the streets inside the
village and on the village borders. The underground structures by linking up with the two
other defense deployments considerably enhanced the defensive strength of the combat
villages. These underground facilities were essentially the hard-core defenses of the
villages. With the development of civil defense, the spatial demarcations of the civilian
domain appeared, especially when the multi-layered defenses clearly separated the inside
and outside on the ground and created another dimension of the deep inside of the folk
villages underground. Militarization of the civilian domain thus consolidated the spatial
prepositions by the twofold inside.
3.3 Militia and the Civilian Life in the War Zone
Militarization in Quemoy was certainly not limited to the landscape, but well
extended to the brains and bodies of the Quemoy natives in the form of biopower which
“regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and
rearticulating it” (Hart and Negri 2000, 23-4). The bio-political production in Quemoy
mainly relied on mobilization of the civil defense and regulation of daily life. The two
approaches to implement social disciplinarity, “[p]utting this society to work and
ensuring obedience to its rule and its mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion,” (Hart
and Negri 2000, 23) subsequently militarized bodies and minds of the population.
3.3.1

Establishment of the Militia: Marching Quemoy to a Disciplinary Society

The militia in Quemoy was not formally founded until the martial government
conducted a census in the 1950s. After the military acquired the exact number of the
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able-bodied men and women in every village, they were obligated to serve.25 The
military government mandated men over sixteen and under fifty-five and single women
over sixteen and under thirty-five in the combat villages to serve in the militia. Among
them, teenagers between sixteen and seventeen and adult males over forty-five served in
the reserve militia. Adolescents between twelve and fifteen, married women, and healthy
men over fifty-five, although were not officially conscripted, were required to support the
militia. As a result, the vast majority of the islanders collectively shared the experience of
military life, and all received standard military training from veterans that the military
assigned to their villages as drillmasters. Xu (1999) indicated that on New Year’s Day in
1953 the chief commander of the QDH reviewed 5,000 militiamen in a parade in Quemoy,
while in 1955 the population of the whole island totaled 40,782. By the fact, the military
in 1953 had already turned one eighth of the local population into crack militia troops,
and established a disciplinary society in Quemoy.
The general training program for the militia comprised operational practice and
political/psychological education. The former aimed to familiarize trainees with the
military basics—making/changing formations, simple martial art moves, bayonet-fighting
techniques, small arms maintenance, marksmanship, and so on. Besides the field exercise,
the trainees spent an equivalent time on political education, which aimed to strengthen
the militiamen’s anti-communist beliefs and to prevent the infiltration of the fifth column.
The militia held the annual training twice a year with a total of ninety-six training hours
and the regular training with two or three terms that each lasted for three months. During
the regular training, militiamen reported to their drillmasters two days a week for four
25

In the early period of the militia, only parenthood could exempt women from the militia duty, but
concomitant with transformation of the conflict into a cold war, the change of confrontation patterns
excused all married young women in Quemoy from the militia duty (Xu 1999).
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hours of training in the morning (Xu 1999). The drillmasters would lead the militiamen
through drill repetitions with emphases on the defense of villages. In addition to the
training, the military also requested that the militia participate in military exercises,
which usually took three or four days every half a year, to enhance the collaboration
between the military and the civil defense. Altogether, the training and the war games
would take nearly two months from the islanders’ engagement in their livelihood.
Nonetheless, due to the loose schedule of these militia duties, which were widely
dispersed in a calendar year, Quemoy locals were constantly involved in the military
activities. The military enactment gradually blended with everyday practices and became
a fundamental aspect of the local life.
3.3.2

Capillaries of Militarization: Regulation of the Daily Life

Since the battle of Guningtou turned Quemoy into a warzone, Chiang’s regime
imposed martial law on the island to maintain military rule. In the subsequent forty-three
years, enforcement of the law isolated Quemoy from the rest of the world, but allowed
only the military personnel and, in some cases, civilians with official permits to enter or
leave the island. The military government ruled the insular environment for a single
purpose: to construct the island into an exclusive military stronghold. Due to the military
superiority, achievement on other ends along the process of militarization, such as
socioeconomic development, were at best welcome byproducts or contingencies in
fulfilling the ultimate purpose (Szonyi 2008, 146). Under prevailing circumstances, the
economy in Quemoy, without foreign markets, relied heavily on military consumption
(Jiang 2005; Yang and Hsing 2001). As the inhabitants built their lives around the military,
it in turn controlled Quemoy’s political, social, and economic realms. More significantly,
the militarized economy provided a cultural hotbed for the development of capillaries of
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militarization that “fed and molded social institutions seemingly little connected to the
battle” (Lutz 2002, 724). Drawing on Lutz’s insight into the cultural effect of
militarization, it is possible to see that the military regulation of daily life extended over
the surveillance and police activities, and encompassed the underlying control, grounded
in the everyday practice.
Battlefield Management: Indexical Performance of Militarization
In addition to the militia duties and the shelling on alternate days, the local activities
in Quemoy that helped to define its geographical identity as a war zone stemmed from the
regulation of daily life. From standard measures of battlefield management (e.g. curfew,
movement/travel restrictions, mail inspections) to miscellaneous constraints on petty
activities (e.g. prohibition of swimming and enforcement of military etiquette), the
military government exerted totalitarian controls over Quemoy (enforcement of military
etiquette see Chang 2008; others see Chi and Chen 2003; Dong and Huang 2007; Huang
2003; Jiang 2005; Jiang 2007; Xu 1999). The arbitrary power bolstered military
supremacy and ensured the seclusion of Quemoy from outside reach. Enforcement of
these regulations disciplined the local population to submit to the military control, and
simultaneously imposed an authoritarian military ethos on the social mechanisms in
Quemoy. As bodies became the depository of social orders, the disciplining/disciplined
practice produced spaces where militarization bodily took place, and where the sense of
battlefield experientially revealed itself in the everyday life. The omnipresence of
militarization articulated by the daily routines, such as traffic control around bunkers, was
largely why Chang (2008) as a Quemoy native compared her home island to a “big
military camp.”
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The Immanent Control: Cultural Effect of Militarization
Nonetheless, constitution of the disciplined society also works discreetly in an
immanent and spontaneous manner that regulates the local daily life without perceptible
coercion and sometimes even awareness of control. The regime of power as Foucault
indicated is Biopower (Hart and Negri 2000, 24):
When power becomes entirely biopolitical, the whole social body is comprised by
power’s machine and developed in its virtuality. This relatioanship [between power
and the social body] is open, qualitative, and affective. Society, subsumed within a
power that reaches down to the ganglia of the social structure and its processes of
development, reacts like a single body. Power is thus expressed as a control that
extends throughout the depths of the consciousnesses and bodies of the
population—and at the same time across the entirety of social relations.
From the first gunshot of the battle of Guningtou, the nationalist army unceasingly
utilized the looming and lingering shadow of war to motivate the Quemoy locals to
surrender themselves to militarization. Such was what the drillmasters preached during
the militia training that militarization was the only salvation for everyone in the island
standing in the face of war (Chen 2003). The military deterrence from the mainland
greatly incapacitated resistance to the militarization, and the life under shellfire also
encouraged voluntary affiliation with the military. Apparently, the voluntariness for
military enactment presented merely an adaptive strategy to survive the confrontation, if
one disregarded the underlying discourses prompting such an action. This is to say that
when the nationalist regime preconditioned the binary opposition and held Quemoyan
hostage in the same anticommunist boat, the fabrication of discourses allowing the
“mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion” to work in the local social life had proceeded
(Hart and Negri 2000, 23). The discourses of nationalist civil religion presupposed
righteousness of its cause of war, and demonized communists as the public enemies who
would harm not only the nationalist proponents but also the general public. It was on the
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basis of such a priori knowledge derived from the nationalist discourses that the
voluntariness for military enactment in Quemoy could carry any significance.
Furthermore, it was also by identification of the apriority concealed by the nationalist
discourses that the visage of biopower emerged like the tip of the iceberg from the
taken-for-granted institution.
As an observable form of biopower, militarization in Quemoy, besides construction
of a semiotic structure to attach meanings to the military matters, culturally insinuates
itself into the local social life to ensure its reproduction. Given the insinuation, the form
of power “is thus expressed as a control that extends throughout the depths of the
consciousnesses and bodies of the population—and at the same time across the entirety of
social relations” (Hart and Negri 2000, 24). As such, militarization is, rather than merely
bound to militia matters or to the military control on the everyday practices, much more
far-reaching that its economic and cultural effect comprehensively integrates into all
aspects of the social life. Thereby, militarization works on Quemoy not only by the
hierarchical defense system in the landscape but also through its immanent engagements
in the local society. In order to survive the warfare, the social synergy conducted by the
biopower constitutes, in the daily life, particular livelihoods of combat economy and local
knowledge. Development of the knowledge and formation of the economy corresponds to
the locals’ best interests. Unlike militia duties and regular control through surveillance,
the epistemological development and the economic formation happen spontaneously for
the locals to better adapt to the battlefield. Inasmuch as militarization preconditions all
social relations, their expressive performance (signifying) and the reflexive landscapes
(the signifier)—the consequences and the venues of these performances—together
constitute an explanatory image of the battlefield (the signified). In this light, the cultural
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effect of militarization, founded on the collective experiences of everyday practice, and
reinvents the local culture that resulted in the cultural hybridity. The cultural
militarization, in other words, formation of the battlefield culture, prominently shows in
two aspects of the daily life: first, the change of production modes and then the
development of local knowledge. Both aspects ultimately indicate a social adaptation to
the life in a belligerent situation.
The Combat Economy
After the military cordoned off Quemoy in 1949, “the situation hindered the
development of productive forces” (Yang and Hsing 2001, 78), and the regular remittance
from overseas Quemoy workers, which had long supported the local economy, no longer
were within reach. Meanwhile, the great number of soldiers, retreating from the mainland
theater and swarming into the island, brought with them chaos and demands that
stimulated new business. In response to these geopolitical changes, islanders developed a
new set of livelihoods that adapted to the war-zone milieu and brought about what Szonyi
(2008) called combat economy. The state-owned enterprises and G. I. Joe
business—another term coined by Szonyi referring to the retail and service trade with
nationalist soldiers in Quemoy—were the economy’s major props. In the 1970s, over 40
percent of the households in Quemoy operated a business, and approximately half of
them were in the trade with garrison soldiers. Also, over a quarter of the work force in
Quemoy was constantly employed in the public sector during the military rule (Huang et
al. 2010). The two economic props, on the one hand, recruited the islanders to serve for
the military government, and on the other through the “heavy reliance of the civilian
populace on G. I. Joe business created an additional resource to control that populace”
(Szonyi 2008, 145). As a result, “the reliance on G. I. Joe business made locals very
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vulnerable to changes in the provision of service to the troops and even more to the
overall number of troops” (Szonyi 2008, 146). By the economic activities, civilians in the
military island tied their lives up with the military and formed an intricate
interdependence. The relationship, as observed by Lutz, also occurred in an American
military town that after a long history of civilian-military interaction (2001, 251-2),
the conditions of life for [inhabitants of the town] . . . were subtly reshaped. They
became drawn . . . into a collaborative role, though the full extent of their job
remained camouflaged. . . . [M]any decades of a national security culture and state
have obscured the reality that the distinction between the civilian and the military
has worn down rather than intensified.
The blurring of two identities signifies cultural militarization at work, and proclaims its
mode of spatial reproduction in the military city.
Development of Local Knowledge
The living experience in the dynamics of militarization provided the mutual
understanding to develop local knowledge that encompasses and interprets all cultural
particularities contextually in situ. Some of these local “common senses” are necessary
for survival, such as the skill to discern the target locations of shellfire by its sound. Some
attach meanings to occurrences in the island, the polysemy of gunshots, for example. The
military regularly held target practice for anti-aircraft machine guns (M45 Quadmount)
emplaced atop bunkers at the traffic intersections in the island at dawn each month. All
the guns would fire simultaneously at a signal flare in the southern sky. The loud noise of
gunshots immediately woke up all islanders, but the persistent sounds soon put them back
to sleep as they recognized the monthly, routine practice (Dong and Huang 2007). The
theatricality of the event—its suddenness, intensiveness, and persistence—instead of
signifying great danger, deprived the gunshots of such connotation. Their recognition
displays the characteristic of common sense as “an interpretation of the immediacies of
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experience” (Geertz 1983, 76); whereby the locals, after the first precautious moments,
interpret the events insignificance. Without the understanding, the sound could be
associated with massive destruction, and may well stir panic reactions.
Oftentimes, people who do not share the local common sense found themselves out
of place or even embarrassed in particular situations when their “normal” responses
misconstrued the local context, and sometimes brought ironic results. An anecdote in an
article narrated by a colonel in KDCAT about his young colleague’s fuss over
bombardment supplied such irony. Answering a reporter’s question about casualties of
the advisory team in the 1958 bombardment, the colonel humorously remarked (Shor
1958, 422-3):
“I think the worst injury any of this team had suffered was to his pride,”
Colonel Dahl laughed. “It happened to a very young second lieutenant who was
flown here.”
The fledgling officer’s plane landed on a Quemoy airfield which was under
heavy shell fire. Before the craft came to a halt, the passengers threw the door open,
leaped to the ground, and dashed to the nearest trench.
There had been recent rain, and the trench was a mudhole. When the firing
ceased, the lieutenant’s new uniform was a sodden mess. He hailed a jeep, was
driven to his quarters, and jumped into a shower.
“He had just gotten thoroughly soaped,” the colonel continued, “when the Reds
open up again. The shells were uncomfortably close and everyone was ordered out
to the shelters. Our newcomer raced out of the building, struggled a hundred yards
up the hill, yanked open a door, and plunged into our communication cave.
“Wearing only a few bubbles of lather, he found himself face to face with a
colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and three majors, none of whom he had ever seen
before. He saluted, gasped ‘Lieutenant ——— reporting for duty, sir,’ and spent the
rest of the bombardment trying to keep out of sight.
The second lieutenant’s reflexes to hide for safety counter-intentionally made him the
worst injured in his exhibition to the team members. His embarrassment might have
resulted from misfortune, or from his adherence to the universal practice and his
ignorance of the local knowledge.
Other than downplaying, a more significant characteristic of common sense is its
constructive end that nurtures particular associations in the local semantic system. In
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Quemoy residents’ understanding, bullets and shell shrapnel were associated with their
childhood memory of sweetness. Due to a great demand of metal during the wartime,
children would forage for bullet and gun shells in the field to trade for sweets in the
grocery store. A local ironsmith recollected his source of scrap metal (Szoyi 2008, 121):
We’d [he and his father] buy shells from the people. Kids would collect the shells,
and trade them for candy. You could use them in village shops to buy eggs or
whatever, and then the shopkeeper would resell them.
The candy trade was so central to the childhood memory of the post-war generation that it
left an enduring impression on their lives. A local candy maker explained the design of
his famous confection, the bullet peanut candy 子彈餅 (Zhang 2007, G-4-20):
I wanted these peanut candies to represent peace between Taiwan and P.R.C. These
bullet-shape peanut candies symbolise those bullets that were left behind after the
war. We don’t want anymore conflict, so the best way to deal with these excess
bullets, is to eat them!
Without knowledge of the candy trade, it was hard to understand why he suggested that
bullets were eatable and eating was “the best way” to manage them. Only by referring to
the local children’s interpretation of bullets, can his symbolism between candies and
peace be comprehensible. In another interview, he further explained his design by the
personal recollections of his childhood instead of the political aspiration (Shi 2010):
My earliest memory is that I was collecting bullets, selling them to the hardware
store, and took the money to buy me some candies. So, I [as a candy maker] came
up with an idea—turning bullets immediately into a gourmet food [bullet peanut
candies] so that there is no need to collect bullet anymore.
The statement contextualized the design with his personal experience, and regardless of
the design intention, apolitical or not, its inspiration was clearly derived from the
particular battlefield situation in Quemoy. Whereas bullets in children’s understanding
had turned into, first and foremost, a trope of candies, the metonymy could be only
possible through the engagement in the dynamics of militarization over time. The
semantic transition and semiotic association disclosed the constructive mechanism of
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cultural militarization, which underscored Geertz’s comment on common sense as “a
cultural system, though not usually a very tightly integrated one . . . ; the conviction . . . is
of its value and validity. Here, as elsewhere, things are what you make of them” (Geertz
1983, 76).
In addition to sweets, shells were also associated with playfulness and excitement
for the local children. After the 1958 bombardment, the P.R.C. artillery shelled Quemoy
on alternate days for twenty years. During the period, the major type of projectiles that
the P.R.C. batteries fired was, instead of a lethal one, propaganda leaflet shells, designed
to explode before landing to release the leaflets inside. Despite being non-lethal, these
propaganda shells, due to the kinetic energy and weight they carried, also caused
hundreds of casualties over the years. For adults, although these shells contingently
brought them, sometimes considerable, extra income to relieve their economic
predicaments, they were nonetheless deemed ominous and pernicious. By contrast,
children at the time shared a more delightful perception. Foraging gun shells in the wild
provoked a treasure-hunting excitement for children, and collecting the colorful leaflets
with vivid illustrations was adventurous. In the article titled as “Things Accompanying
My Childhood,” the author introduced the popular outdoor activities among the children
(Quemoy Daily, 15 May 2005):
Except the game of tag, the most popular activities among kids were the “great
adventure.” Plans of the adventure were, not less than, a dare of the nocturnal
journey to air-raid shelters, a search for shrapnel to trade for maltose, and the gather
of propaganda shells’ leaflets for awards, prizes, and whatnot from school teachers.
Propaganda leaflets, as a form of psychological warfare, were considered threats to the
defense of Quemoy. The military government mobilized school children through their
teachers to gather these “mental contaminants,” and to turn them in for honor awards,
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prizes, or bonus points. The strategy to contain the effect of propaganda accidentally
made the leaflets into a competing item for the local children (Lin 2006, 81):
After a night bombardment of propaganda shells, everyone would hurry out in the
morning to collect leaflets, and competed to see who could get the most. Later on,
striving for winning, everyone got smarter: [We] would tear up leaflets into pieces to
increase their number since we thought that paper carried by shells should naturally
be fragmental [after explosion].
With their fringe benefits, shells in Quemoy carried complicated messages. Unlike the
coeval adults who despised these projectiles, children in the 1960s and 1970s had a
different point of view of shells, or even of shelling that could be a sign of the plentiful
harvest of leaflets the following morning. As expressed in recent reminiscences, shells for
them meant more than destruction but also self-achievement, sensual pleasures and
entertainment. Yang, a native writer born in 1962, remembered that after the communist
artillery ceased fire in 1978, his playmates and he distressed at the change jointly yelled
at the night sky, “Commie! Why don’t you fire shells here anymore? 阿共啊，你為什麼
不再打炮來” (1998, 86). Their childhood memories conveyed, on the contrary to
common understanding, an interpretation that shelling on particular occasions could also
be desirable. Without the twenty-year shelling, people growing up under the shellfire
could not have taken it for granted, neither could they integrate the artillery warfare into
their daily life, so as to make the most out of it. Based on their a priori engagement of
being-in-the-battlefield, the locals cultivated a particular set of understandings which
through the continuous social adaptation to the war condition in Quemoy seeped into
local knowledge. Since the war preconditioned the local life, the local knowledge that
provided interpretations for the people’s living situations stood for the outcome of their
negotiations with militarization. An example of the changed understanding was the local
people’s judgment upon the propriety of certain activities to be held on certain days.

180

Chinese almanacs in a form of lunar calendar conventionally indicated a list of
appropriate and aversive events for each day. In Quemoy tradition, people usually
referred to an almanac beforehand to decide an auspicious day for their planned activities,
such as a wedding ceremony or a funeral. During the twenty-year artillery war, although
Quemoy people persistently retained the traditional belief in, as well as the knowledge of,
the distinction between auspicious or ominous days, their praxes became simplified
(Dong and Huang 2007, 73-4):
In the twenty years, nearly each commoner in Quemoy would not forget what date
the day was. Everyone firmly remembered what day the odd-number dates and the
even-number dates were. . . . [For any kind of events], people would have to hold
them on an even-number day, which was the most propitious day than any
auspicious days indicated in an almanac. In those days, the [modern, solar] calendar
dominated everyone’s life in the island.
Even though the distinction remained, people strategically adapted the traditional practice
to the battlefield condition, and along with the conversion reinvented an updated
understanding of the appropriateness of event dates. The necessity of negotiation with the
belligerent condition, which the locals dwelled in, made their cultural practice a product
of power struggle that revealed itself as (Bourdieu 1990, 16),
a social strategy . . . oriented towards the maximizing of material and symbolic
profit; . . . a reproduction strategy, taking on its meaning in a system of strategies . . .
and oriented towards realization of the same social function . . . .
As the local knowledge, derived form the particular system of strategies, was socially
constructed and power-conditioned, this essential aspect of cultural militarization
function as the most subtle and elusive device of social control for reproduction of the
power structure until peace was restored.
3.4 Mystery Unraveled in De-militarization
After the tensions between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait eased, and China’s
acquisition of sophisticated weapons devalued the strategic significance of Quemoy, the
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R.O.C. government discharged Quemoy from its military duty, and gradually reduced the
number of garrisons since 1992. The local quest for new place identities began. For a
society that possessed a large service industry for the temporary emigrants—conscripts
performing military duties mostly from Taiwan—the best strategy to continue its
monstrous service sector in the post-conflict era was to attract foreign tourists.
Considering the lack of potential for manufacturing and commerce, people in Quemoy
took advantage of the legacy as a military stronghold and developed heritage tourism
based on its fortifications. At first, tourism was a great success. Attracted by the
mysterious quality of a war zone, tourists from Taiwan swarmed into the former
forbidden island. The familiar political iconographies, which often appeared in the media;
historic sites predating most of those in Taiwan; pre-modern vernacular life patterns; and
a pre-industrial environment fascinated Taiwanese tourists. However, poor amenities and
unreasonably high prices made a tour to Quemoy a one-time-only proposition (Huang
2003). The climax of the tourist business took place when 531,683 people visited
Quemoy in 1997, and thereafter the decline started. Responsive measures introduced to
manage the stagnant situation generally fell into two categories: expansion of the target
markets and diversification of tourist resources.
In 2001, when the R.O.C. government declared a new China policy known as
Mini-three Links, which allowed the inhabitants in Quemoy and the P.R.C. citizens to
visit each other by ferries. By the policy (Mini-three Link), the mainlanders became
potential customers to the tourist industry in Quemoy. However, the mainland tourists did
not contribute much to the tourist business in Quemoy at this point in time. Instead, the
policy that allowed direct transportation between Quemoy and mainland ports turned the
island into a gateway on the border. Taiwanese entrepreneurs and corporate executives
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who owned or operated their overseas establishments in China travel to the country via
Quemoy. Since Taiwanese government prohibited a direct flight between Taiwan and
China, the policy made Quemoy a major transit port for Taiwanese business travelers.
The traffic route to China remained a privilege of Quemoy until the Taiwanese
government sanctioned direct flights to China in 2008. As the Mini-three Link went into
effect in 2001, the number of visitors to Quemoy dramatically increased. The increase
came directly from the passage of the Taiwanese businessmen (Yang Z. 2010). The
majority of them were in a hurry: They took a domestic fight to Quemoy; hopped on a
bus to the ferry station; and sailed to Amoy via the first ferry they could catch. The travel
agency would usually plan a tight schedule for them, so that these businessmen could
waste little time waiting for their connection. The enactment of Mini-three Links was not
of much help to the tourist business in Quemoy, but a policy opened the door for Quemoy
to pursue another identity—a gateway city to mainland China.
Since the 1997 decline, the travel agencies initiated a competition that in the end
constituted a zero-sum outcome. The competitive agencies often had to offer a price
lower than the tour budget to attract business. To cover the difference or just to earn a
little profit, tours guides working for the agencies would take tourists to souvenir stores,
which allied with travel agencies and paid guides and tour bus drivers commissions based
on the number of tourists they brought in. Consequently, in the worst cases, tourists
would involuntarily spend approximately one third of their tour shopping (Quemoy Daily,
15 Dec. 2006). For this reason, the package tour business reached the worst situation. In
the winter of group tours, self-guided tours germinated, and the new pattern of tourism
slowly took over the market. The rise of self-guided tours meant more than the burst of
the tourist bubble. Travelers’ preliminary fantasy arose from the geographic impression of
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the mythical forbidden land, and the excitement of chances to break former political and
social taboos in a war zone. The transition from group tours to self-guided tours also
signified the achievement of an advanced stage of tourism, which also met the
requirements for sustaining in-depth tourism. The prerequisites—for example, the
implementation of a bicycle trail system, the establishment of bed and breakfast business,
and the installation of the interpretative materials—were often the work of Kinmen
National Park.
Kinmen National Park (KNP) is a national bureau of the Ministry of the Interior in
Taiwan. The Taiwanese government established the national park in 1995 to preserve the
unique landscapes, especially the military ones, in Quemoy. Its area covers approximately
a quarter of the island, and as a matter of course, most places with cultural significance
and natural spectacles are under its control. In other words, the central government
acquired a great portion of the tourist resources in Quemoy. The involvement of KNP in
tourism contributes greatly not only to the transition in tourist patterns but also the
diversity of the tourist resources. In addition to the installation of the infrastructure for
tourism, the most recognizable achievement of the national park was the promotion of the
local traditional culture. Before 1995, tourist investments mainly concentrated on the
military landscape and historic sites. The national park renovated traditional settlements
within its territory, and chose a few representatives as eco-museums to showcase the
classic layouts of southern Fukien villages. In these settlements, newly-paved grounds,
interpretive boards, manicured landscaping, and street furniture not only beautified the
folk villages but also signified the park’s intention to promote tourism. These renovation
projects through beautification re-structured the outdoor spaces of these compact
settlements so that they could accommodate the intrusive, inquisitive tourists into the
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local everyday life. To create tourist attractions, the national park at times also restored
public buildings in these folk villages, such as an old public school or a vintage village
hall, and reused them as KNP’s regional offices or theme museums. In addition to
revitalization of public spaces, KNP also encouraged private parties to submit proposals
for grants to restore and then reuse old folk houses. The restored architecture commonly
became family second home, sometimes a future retirement home. The rest became
tourist facilities and amenities, such as bed and breakfasts, cafés, and again theme
museums which entice visitors into the island’s past to experience the authentic Quemoy.
Both the renovation of village grounds and the reuse of folk houses prompted the
settlements to open themselves to visitors and diminished the former demarcations
between inside and outside.
With the sociopolitical and economic changes following demilitarization and
touristification, the former geographical coordinate system of Quemoy dissolved and the
island seemingly had been engaging in another reversal since 1992. The rapid decrease in
the number of soldiers caused the former economic base to collapse, and the eastern half
with its former prosperous combat economy became a war-time relict. The businesses on
the main streets in the villages are mostly closed with their iron curtains rolled down.
After crowds of soldiers withdraw from Quemoy, bathhouses, pool rooms, laundries, and
numerous service industries went out of business. Only a few service businesses which
had local customers, such as barbershops and snack-bars tenaciously but barely hold on.
The economic center has returned to southwest Quemoy where the native population
concentrates, as in the past few centuries.
The ferry station as the portal of Quemoy for the Mini-three Links is located on the
southwestern corner. Installation for tourist facilities and modern consumption
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industries—convenience stores, theme restaurants, revitalized historic districts, and so
on—commonly distributed in the southwestern half of the island. The right and left as
well as the bustling side and the sluggish side reversed again after the 1949 reversal of
the geographical coordinate system. The regressive turnover does not happen solely to the
left-right but also the front-rear dispositions. When nature took over the majority of the
seafront fortifications after abandonment or destruction, smuggling from P.R.C. to
Quemoy became rampant on the northern and the eastern shore, especially in the waters
near the abandoned fortifications. Desperate locals smuggle low-price Chinese produce
and merchandise to Quemoy for their own daily consumption or for retail (Xi and Weng
2003). Based on the simple exchange of goods, the tie between Quemoy and cities on the
rim of Xiamen Bay has grown stronger over time. This reconciliation encouraged an
attempt to construct a “communal living sphere” between Quemoy and Amoy (Quemoy
Daily 29 Jan. 2002). The former battlefront faces the current resource hinterland. To
fulfill the objective of a “communal living sphere,” some Quemoyan, led by the county
head during 2001-2009, denounced the China policy of the pro-independent
administration in Taiwan. They considered the policy that emphasized the national
security conservative and it neglected the local needs of Quemoy to reconcile with China
(Quemoy Daily 15 May 2006). It furthermore tied their hands from pursuing a symbiosis
between Quemoy and Amoy, and deprived Quemoy of a promising future. The county’s
leader’s personal critique towards the Taipei administration spread like wildfire during his
term of office (2001-2009), and provoked local resentment against the administration due
to its border-crossing regulations (Nownews 30 Nov. 2005; Qyemoy Daily 14 Mar. 2007).
By portraying the Taipei administration as an unfit authority that was marginalizing
Quemoy, the county government made the central government an obnoxious obstruction
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that the islanders should fight in order to win autonomy in developing desirable
China-Quemoy relations (Quemoy Daily 27 Apr. 2007; Quemoy Daily 14 June 2008). In
the political climate, a new front of the insular society emerged. The front-rear, right-left
and in-out reversed again as the irony simultaneously appeared.
The 2008 presidential election in Taiwan produced a pro-China administration, and
brought significant influence to Quemoy. The new administration adopted a more open
China policy. It sanctioned direct flights between Taiwan and China, and admitted
Chinese sightseeing tourists to Taiwan. In addition, the regime revoked constraints of
Mini-three Links so that all Taiwanese citizens could take advantage of the traffic route.
These policies tremendously affected the tourist business in Quemoy, and marshaled
tourist development into its third wave (2008-today; Figure 3.17). After 1992, the borders
of Quemoy opened to Taiwanese tourists whose forays blew away the mysterious allure
of Quemoy during the military rule era. As a journey of demystification, the military
landscape in Quemoy was the major tourist attractions. Most military facilities were still
in operation and thus unavailable to common tourists, which however lively displayed the
sense of battlefield and satisfied the visitors’ expectations. When the first wave
(1992-2000) concluded, the Chinese market was still inaccessible; the Taiwanese group
tour market dried up; and the self-guided tour was just emerging. Also, after the military
completed its first disarmament plan in 2000, the number of soldiers greatly decreased
and the abandoned military facilities increased in Quemoy. With the departure of soldiers,
the economic depression turned worse, and local ties with the mainland grew rapidly. The
KNP had tentatively participated in the tourist development; embarked on renovating folk
villages, historical architectures, and military facilities released from the military to
multiply tourist attractions. The implementation of the Mini-three Link initiated the
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Figure 3.17. Three Waves of Tourist Development in Quemoy. The implementation of Mini-three Links in 2001 CE enables Chinese
visitors to enter Quemoy. Not until Taiwanese government granted Chinese tourists admission to Taiwan in 2008 CE, the number of
Chinese tourists in Quemoy remained insignificant. [Data Source: Kinmen County Government and the Mainland Affair Council.]
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second wave (2001-2007). Although the policy rejuvenated the number of visitors,
throughout the second wave the increase in the visitor numbers mostly arose from the
cross-border traffic. The business travelers passing through Quemoy in transit did not
contribute to the local economy so the locals often contemptuously depreciated the
Mini-three Link 小三通 by calling it “linking-not 通三小” (Quemoy Daily 14 Nov.
2003). In this situation, the county government actively devoted itself to the tourist
development by holding cultural events, war memorials, and local festivals to attract
tourists. In the meantime, the KNP’s continuous efforts to diversify tourist resources
eventually paid off. The installation of tourist infrastructure and promotion of the local
traditional culture successfully invited independent tourists to visit the traditional folk
villages. Tourists’ arrival at folk villages exposed the formerly protected interior of
combat villages, that after demilitarization the tourist planners purposely put in display to
attract outsiders exploring the underground tunnels, the significant public buildings, and
sceneries behind every turn on the narrow red brick alleys. With the combat villages
turning inside-out and their spatial demarcations dissolving, the tourist silhouettes on the
stone walls in traditional villages thus lifted another layer of mystique of Quemoy.
The journey of demystification reached a new climax after 2008. Since the
Taiwanese government granted admission to Chinese tourists to sightsee in Taiwan, the
number of Chinese tourists in Quemoy also increased. Quemoy became an important
transitional port for both the Taiwanese businessmen and the Chinese tourists, who often
spent a few days in Quemoy before carrying out their main itinerary in Taiwan. The
military heritage in Quemoy is of great interest to them. However, all Quemoy travel
agencies are specifically instructed not to take Chinese tourists to war museums or any
politically sensitive places that may convey controversial interpretations of the past
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causing unnecessary confusion. Notwithstanding, some Chinese tourists will still visit
these facilities on their own. For them, it is exactly the political sensitivity about the past
conflicts that intrigues and attracts them to visit Quemoy. In contrast to the increasing
number of tourists, the number of soldiers has decreased to approximate 5,000 since the
implementation of the second disarmament plan in 2003. The number of soldiers dropped
90 percent (50,000 to 5,000) in twenty years; 50 percent (10,000 to 5,000) in five years.
The rapid decrease soon exposed a shortage of manpower to maintain numerous military
installations in the island, and consequently the military considered releasing installation
to KNP or the county government for tourist use before abandoning them. Otherwise, the
county government and KNP at times also request collaboration from the military to open
certain military facilities to the general public. Through this approach, a few highly
sensitive military facilities, such as the underground tunnel of the QDH, became tourist
friendly and accessible. As the hardcore Quemoy unfolds before the world, the last
curtain hiding the inner mystery of Quemoy thus arises.
Inasmuch as touristification comes hand in hand with demilitarization, their
collaboration however introduces a dilemma: For former military facilities reused for
tourism, the further the demilitarization is, the further Quemoy is from its image as a
battlefield, and the less attractive it is for battlefield tourism. The current remedy for such
irony is to reintroduce military simulacra to demilitarized facilities: soldier mannequins in
the renovated military camps or reenactors to perform gun operations in an artillery
tunnel (Quemoy Daily 16 Aug. 2008). The dilemma articulates Quemoy’s ambiguity and
ambivalence in transition.
Quemoy’s geographical coordinate system, mainly its front-rear disposition, also
shows the unsettlement in transition. With an unstable geopolitical relation in transition,
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the front-rear disposition is swiveling back and forth. After the 2008 election put the
pro-China partisans in power, their open policies in dealing with China eased the tension
between the county government and the Taipei administration. Quemoy’s front against
Taiwanese marginalization diminished, even though Quemoy as a remote island from
Taiwan is subject to Taipei administration’s marginalization due to Taiwanese subjectivity
and priority. With an open China policy allowing a closer relationship between
Quemoyans and mainlanders, opportunities in the mainland became the latest social
concerns in the border island. As shown in the back and forth swivel of the coordinate
system, a collectively engaging goal of the insular society unlikely persists, so that a
constant direction of the island’s front is momentarily unattainable. In fact, the current
front of Quemoy may well face the sea and the mainland at the same time, as
self-identification once even aroused a proposal for Quemoy independence (Quemoy
Daily 25 Aug. 2007).26 Just as Iquan’s occupation of Quemoy four hundred years ago
blurred the island’s identities between a pirate lair and an imperial base, Quemoy today
revives the both/and also ambiguity. Both touristification and demilitarization are future
directions with social consent, only that the two are ultimately at odds with each other:
The battlefield tourism demands authentic military experience that demilitarization
reduces. Their ambivalent collaboration brought an obscure identity of Quemoy as both a
battlefield and a tourist island; a frontier and a gateway. In the postmodern juxtaposition
with multivocality and multilocality, Quemoy’s both/and also identities shine through its
terrain of babel to imbue the landscape rich with ironies.
26

Lou (2010) advocates Quemoiology for the purpose “to develop a cultural Quemoy nationalism, which
through texts, turns imagination [of imagined community] into reality, through [re-narrating] historical
narratives, evokes Quemoyans’ collective consciousness. In the process of development, [Quemoiology]
sequentially embeds a latent seed of separatism, quietly awaiting for [favorable] changes of political
situations in the future” (6).
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CHAPTER 4 SUBVERTING THE CONFLICTS: LANDSCAPE IRONY
IN DEMILITARIZATION
One often-told anecdote highlights the tourist attraction of Quemoy to the mainland
Chinese and is set in a popular cruise departing from Amoy. Known as “watching
Quemoy on the sea 海上看金門,” the boat takes Chinese tourists offshore to observe the
“nationalist” islands and the coastal fortifications. The story goes that at the finale of the
cruise, passengers keep urging their boat master to sail closer toward Quemoy despite
their transgression over the borderline. “Just a little more,” they repeatedly appeal. The
boat eventually arrives at a sandbar near the heavily guarded coast. One passenger looks
at the beach with aspiration and murmurs (Huang 2004b): “If only I can step on it, how
thrilling would that be!” The story breaks the local people’s confidence in the tourist
appeal of Quemoy, and more importantly their strong belief that once the central
government removes the barriers hindering the cross-border activities, prosperous
tourism will revive Quemoy from economic depression (Quemoy Daily 6 Nov. 2011).
The attraction of Quemoy to the Chinese mainlanders stems from their curiosity
about Quemoy as the nationalist territory and a battlefield of the recent wars (Chen 2009).
For this reason, the tourist’s attention is especially drawn to the obsolete war apparatus—
fortifications, military camps, and political propaganda facilities—of which their raison
d'être is to deter and then to disperse the mainlanders from Quemoy. However, the
military landscape in Quemoy has now become the most compelling tourist resource for
the mainland Chinese. Contrary to their recently-gained popularity, the coastal defenses
were formidable in the past. According to the rules of engagement before 1992, to deal
with the situation as depicted in the story, the batteries and machine-gunners would have
fired warning shots when the boat transgressed into the territorial waters (Xiao 2008).
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Besides, in order to promptly respond to sudden occurrences, the major task for soldiers
on their sentry duty was to closely watch the water channels between Quemoy and the
mainland. Far from where the boat crew could clearly observe fortifications ashore, their
transgression over the boundary would have prompted a response. The intensive defense
mechanism made these fortifications grim repellents for mainland fishing boats, and
prevented any possible tourist cruises in the dangerous waters. Today, like a switch of
magnetic poles, demilitarization drastically changes the role of fortifications in the
mainlanders’ perception from repellents to attractions. Without demilitarization, the
mainlander tourists could not leisurely approach and appreciate the military structures nor
could they yell at silhouettes of soldiers on guard therein (SkyBlue 2011). The polarized
changes simultaneously stir a strong feeling of tempo-spatial displacement, as a Quemoy
veteran remarked (Quemoy Daily 9 Aug. 2010),
Everyday, forty to fifty tourist boats from Amoy touring “watching Quemoy on the
sea” constantly sails to the front of the slogan wall, read as “Unify China with Three
Principles of the People,” with full loads of tourists. Their zealous greetings to the
garrisons on the island present another image of the peacetime. However,
[witnessing these] one cannot help to feel a chaotic sentiment towards the
tempo-spatial displacement.
As the selling point of the cruise, the propaganda wall supplies the final crescendo for the
tour, and attracts mainlanders to spend their “several days’ wages” on shooting photos of
the slogan. Observing that, a Quemoy veteran comments on the situation (Lin 2009, 138):
It is unimaginable that the wall of psychological warfare contrarily creates a greatly
profitable niche for the tourist business in the mainland China, which allows the
Chinese communists to earn a monthly revenue of twenty to thirty million RMB.
This is absurd!
The irony is thus perceivable to the locals by the logic that the anti-communist slogan not
only is futile, but produces communists with a grand profit. This specific tour discloses
multiple layers of irony. First, the polysemy of fortifications, like a sarcasm denoting
opposite meanings (war apparatus or peace tokens), ignites a symbolic irony due to the
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connotative contradiction. Second, the drastic change of the military landscapes from
deterrence (as an active subject) to attraction (as a passive object) produces a historical
irony in the tempo-spatial displacement. Last, the absurdity of the conflictual landscape
reveals the counter-intentionality that the harmful devices turn to profit the enemies. The
locals’ acknowledgement of the irony after demilitarization unravels the vanity of the past
conflict, and destabilizes its significance to avail the progression of reconciliation. The
discussion of the boat tour outlines a miniature of the post-conflict society, and reveals
how the major social dynamics in Quemoy—touristification, demilitarization, and
reconciliation—generally interlock with one another. Their interplay in a holistic view
constitutes the dissolution and the ongoing reversal of the geographical coordinate system.
This chapter examines how the change of the geographical coordinate system works in
the ontological scale in terms of the landscape features, especially the military structures
reinvented for tourist attractions.
4.1 Irony and Ironic Landscape
Irony emerges when the outer—literal—meaning introduces the inner, if not
sarcastic, meaning (Fernandez and Huber 2001). The subject, instead of being understood
by its literal meaning through the indexical mechanism, begets another meaning and
begets another and begets etc., thereby carrying out a symbolic communication. In other
words, the delivered irony, by accentuating the extraordinary voices of the mentioned
subject, coveys its polysemic meanings to one who can simultaneously comprehend its
multivocality. Irony in landscape does the same thing (Rodman 2003, 212). When the
meaning of a three-foot-thick wall of a bunker departs from impregnability to the
ferociousness of shelling, to the misery of civilian life, to the ruthlessness of wars, to the
righteousness of peace, etc, the bunker per se draws its meaning from association. The
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latest meaning through association justifies the locals’ present mindset of appeasement
and renders the military structures a caveat to war in Quemoy; whereby the war apparatus
turns into a trope against itself (Figure 4.1).
The contrast aggravates after the authorities’ quest for the new identity of Quemoy
as a tourist island where military landscapes become everybody’s entertainment to
increase revenue. Their exclusivity, now as their attractive traits, invites even the past
enemies to discover their impregnability. The local ambition of tourism unfolds in the
sparkling look of the newly renovated military facilities. Therefore, bunkers at
thoroughfare intersections bear welcome signs. The bastion at the end of the pier bears
decoration of popular cartoon characters. All these changes corroborate the irony in
landscape and dismiss the sense of battlefield. The dismissal thereby uncovers a colossal
irony that the development of battlefield tourism in fact destroys the battlefield rather
than preserves it. The official remedy for such self-destruction is to re-introduce military
features and performance to the demilitarized structures to reinforce the diluted image of

Figure. 4.1. Semiotic Associations of Bunkers. The different social milieux in the
wartime and the post-bellum period produce two sets of contradictory meanings of a
bunker, while the latest meaning attached to bunkers oppose their indexical meaning.
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the battlefield. The reinvention of military relics and the contract reenactments
thematically deliver a verisimilar battlefield—an eclectic mosaic “made up of historical
accretions of partial legacies superimposed in multiple layers upon each other” (Harvey
2000, 77). As a work of the current generation, the nostalgic collage is more manipulatble
for the demilitarized society and malleable for tourist consumption. Meanwhile, it
pertinently accommodates the two contesting identities (i.e. tourist attractions and
military structures) without self-depletion, since the consumption of reintroduced military
features can bring no attrition. As reinvention proves to be an effective solution for the
conflict between developing battlefield tourism and demilitarization, reenactments at the
same time fetch tourists a time portal back to the “authentic” Cold-War island. As Urry
once remarked, “the past is endlessly constructed in and through the present” (1995, 4),
the development of battlefield simulation (and heritage tourism) in Quemoy turns the past
into commodities. With the thematic reinvention and reenactment, the Disneyization (see
Bryman 2004) of Quemoy enables the images sales to whoever pursues an authentic
battlefield. The age of reconciliation then catalyzes simulacra production for tourist
consumption. In addition to the irony thrown by the sharp contrast between symbolic
meanings of military structures, the involvement of tourism in peacemaking hereinto
complementarily enriches the irony in Quemoy.
Furthermore, understanding irony demands a context, a taken-for-granted structure
to produce the contrast with which the inner meaning of the subjects can emerge. Irony
depends on negotiations with conventional understanding, and sequentially destabilizes
the structured system of dominance (Smith 1997). Considering the Quemoy case, when
demilitarization tarnishes the military structures, their decay, incompleteness, and
disjuncture affiliate them with stories that open a window of imagination to define these
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ruins. Since the relics cannot axiomatically reveal themselves, spectators are invited to
fill in the absence with narratives that complete the meanings of these structures with the
viewers’ reflexivity: “Each spectator is forced to supply the missing pieces from his or
her own imagination and a ruin therefore appears differently to everyone” (Woodward
2001, 15). The military structures thence migrate from a place of being effective, where
effectiveness of offense and defense takes priority, to a place of being poetic, whose
meaning is open, polyvalent and fluid in the viewers’ imaginations. “The very lineaments
of the tangible past,” as Lowenthal argues, “should arouse a sense of uncertainty, the
same presentations should provoke divergent insights. Otherwise the past is too static to
be credible” (1975, 26). The military structures in Quemoy, as hinted by its geographical
narratives, march into the past, or precisely into a timeless, poetic country where “Time is
suspended, or reversed, or erased; it is hard to say which, but . . . as dusk fell it was the
end of the world” (Woodward 2001, 39).
The atemporal disengagement of ruins from the daily bustle of ordinary life explains
what exactly a reconstruction project imposed upon the historic heritages: It “fixes and
freezes a particular image, short-circuiting the imagination” (Lowenthal 1975, 27) to
create a modern simulation for tourism. Historic buildings in Quemoy suffer such a
destiny. In contrast to the military structures dispatched to the past, the locals restore old
buildings into the present. The restored buildings in the folk villages are valued for their
aesthetic and authentic visages in the state of ruins, but lose both the cherished qualities
after reprocessing. The refurbishing projects not only replace the evocative images of
these relics with anachronistic verisimilitudes, but also deny the reasons for these
buildings to be chosen for preservation. Reconstruction deprives of the aesthetic
incompleteness of the historic relics, and alienates these restored works from the
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incentives and goals for their reconstruction. Consequently, their poetics out of
imaginations vaporize when these historic buildings reveal their full splendor. In
Fernandez’s classification, such “successful failure,” analogized to Foucault’s concept of
prison, is “the irony of structural reproduction,” upon which he further remarks “[i]t is
this counter-intentionality, this contradictoriness of structural reproduction, that is so very
ripe for irony” (2001, 91).
The irony in landscape underscores the polarized changes of the military landscapes
from war apparatuses to tourist attractions, and accentuates the critical role that human
agents play in defining a place by attaching different meanings to the landscapes (often
displaced ones in Quemoy and therefore ironic). “Irony” thus properly addresses the
landscape changes in Quemoy. However, this overall representation, despite a summary
of the phenomena, provides no explanations to shed light on these ironic changes. What
shines through the ironies in the landscape then requires further discussion.
The human perception of irony is uncanny that for most of the time the delivery of
irony follows an alternative circuit of semiotic associations. In another words, irony is in
the eye of the beholders, as the meaning of words is in the ear of the listeners. The
perceived irony can rely on an over-simplified causality, an anachronistic comparison, or
even the inconsequent incongruity as long as the juxtaposition of associated
interpretations can cause a contrast great enough to unbalance the given, assumed
interpretation. Irony thereby as an instrument of destabilization attains the subversive
power from its results which introduces a sense of lightness to the discussed matters, and
consequently shakes their significance. In this light, the meanings of the landscape
changes in Quemoy should most likely reside in the very matters whose significance
diminishes after ironies appear. Since the significance of the conflicts between the R.O.C.
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and the P.R.C. suffers discredit most, irony is the mechanism of cultural demilitarization.
Commenting on the issue, an official of the Quemoy county government professes, “the
banter and the irony against war is nothing else but to profoundly embody peace 戲謔戰
爭、反諷戰爭，無非是深刻的體現和平” (Quemoy Daily 16 Feb. 2005). In this sense,
ironic trivialization of past conflicts enables the locals to usher peace into the place, and
simultaneously to shed Quemoy’s identity as a battlefield. The polarized changes in the
landscape explicitly keynote the salience of a post-military society, where the past
confrontation constructs a battle station for exclusion while the backfire in the aftermath
urges reconciliation through the construction of an emerging tourist destination.
According to Smith, “as a new society takes place, or existing society takes a new
place, it is the symbols of reference that suffer and work change” (1997, 87). The change
in the military structures and the historic buildings in Quemoy reveals what the identity
reformation—from a battlefield to a tourist and a gateway island—may bring about in the
post-conflict society. Through the interplay of touristification, demilitarization, and
reconciliation, irony in landscape emerges as the cultural mechanism of identity
reformation. I discover four types of irony in the landscape in Quemoy. “When things
seem misaligned, disproportionate, unexpected, and out of place,” spectators often
witnesses the most common irony in the daily life, namely the immediate irony
(Fernandez and Huber 2001, 1). The immediate irony, as known as intuitional irony, is
often bound to the flash experiences of random happenings and therefore intuitive,
ephemeral, and circumstantial. Although the type of irony shows in the landscape in
Quemoy, the basic requirement to trigger the irony is common sense which however does
not necessarily concern the identity reformation. For the reason, I will let alone the
specific irony from the following discussion. The symbolic irony requires the sharp
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contrast between the “inner” and “outer” meanings of the discussed matter in the form of
a pun, which is why it demands symbolic communication as its premise. The semiotic
referentiality and the semantic migration are by far socially constructed and, too,
zeitgeist-conditioned. The meanings that the natives presently attach to their material
settings can explain their specific treatments applied to the settings to possibly maximize
their social utility. When the reinvention is greatly at odds with the conventional utility,
the spatial incongruity for either practical uses poses questions of properness, and
embodies symbolic irony. The bunker bearing welcome signs on the outskirts of the
county seat speaks such irony.
From a diachronic contrast that oftentimes amplifies human futility on the certain
social movements, historical irony unravels. Anthropologists consider the type of irony
“having to do with contacts between people greatly unequal in power and wherewithal:
people in the center and on the margins of history” (Fernandez 2001, 85). Obviously
perception of the irony requires knowledge of the history. I will exemplify the irony by a
historical issue of Quemoy. Since its earlier history, the contest between the seafarers and
the land-dwellers has repetitively taken place in Quemoy, and echoes through the
repetitive reversals of the insular coordinate system. During the contest, the maritime
power, despite having its moments, has seldom gained the upper hand over the
continental regimes, to which the official histories overtly evince predilection. The
discourse normalizes the social condition of Quemoy to be affiliated to the continental
regime despite its marginalization; otherwise the temporary, “anarchic” condition of
Quemoy is, as official history often declares, destined to return “normal.” In this view, the
reiterative struggles made to switch the direction of the coordinate system of Quemoy
eventually end with meaningless futility. In the historical discourse, the activities of
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seafarers have been largely dissipated or defamed in the history, until Iquan eventually
left a formidable mark for the maritime powers. Ironically, his successor, Koxinga,
identified himself with the continental regime, leading his army and pursuing a recovery
of the lost territory of Han Chinese from the Manchurian invaders. Due to his exploits in
the battles to recover the mainland China, the modern Chinese nationalists, who
empathized with and suffered similar predicament, highly praised the historical figure,
and made him, a half Japanese in fact, a hero of the Chinese nation. However, Quemoy
people have never restrained their dislike for the nationalist role model, who in their view
brought only war and misfortune to Quemoy (see Cai 2008; Quemoy Daily 22 Jun. 2003;
Yang B. 2010, 53).
Even though the modern nationalists in a similar manner also imposed an
“eccentric” social condition on Quemoy to confront the mainland regime, the islanders
today in the pursuit of reconciliation have mixed feelings about the military rule (see
Huang 2003). They on one hand mourn their bereft days dedicated to and sacrificed for a
void cause, one that is meant to be futile against the wheel of history; while on the other
hand long for the return of the prosperous and vigorous old days based on the military
protection and patronage. With the ambivalent mindset, the Quemoy locals today when
looking back at their own past in which they strived at all cost for the anticommunist
cause helplessly perceive a tempo-spatial displacement and the mockery of fate. It is in
their Sisyphean efforts against all odds in the history and the displaced sentiments in the
pursuit of reconciliation that historical irony blossoms.
The last type of irony found in the landscape of Quemoy is the structural irony
which often appears in the “counterintentionality” and the “contradictoriness of structural
reproduction” (Fernandez 2001, 91). In fulfilling the identity reformulation of Quemoy
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from a battlefield to a tourist island, the interplay between touristification and
demilitarization discloses the necessity for reproduction of military simulacra, so as to
embark on the demilitarized battlefield tourism. The excessive reproduction of military
virtuality nullifies the local renouncement of the battlefield identity; yet insufficient
military representations cannot sustain a sense of battlefield nor tourist attraction.
Ultimately, the images of Quemoy must be always in between an authentic battlefield
replica and a typical tourist island of sun, sand and sea. This constant landscape evolution
means that the identity reformulation will never fully situate Quemoy into either identity.
Moreover, as more tourists visit Quemoy for the battlefield image, the work to repudiate
the battlefield identity will never end. Quemoy people must keep reproducing military
replicas to trigger landscape irony, to repeat cultural demilitarization, and to purge the
land full of military image. The structural impossibility of reformulating identity through
the identity reformulation is therefore tragically ironic.
4.2 Developing Battlefield Tourism and Developing Peace
During the military rule (1949-1992), the military government in Quemoy had
shown little interest in encouraging private sector economic development, nor had
capitalists felt comfortable investing the warzone. As a result the economic activities in
Quemoy were mainly the primary and service sector businesses before 1992. According
to the county censuses between 1972 and 1994, the local labor force in industry was
constantly under 15 percent. During the same period, the rate of governmental employees
fluctuated around a quarter of the work force. Inasmuch as more than six out of ten
persons in Quemoy were peasants, fishermen, or government employees during the time
of military rule (Huang et al. 2010), the economic underdevelopment was obvious. The
small number of industrial workers in Quemoy indicates a sluggish economy with a lack
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of capital investment from the private sector. This economic condition left Quemoy a
handful of choices to turn to when the combat economy eventually faded away. Tourism
was among the few choices, perhaps the best, which however was presented as an
economic solution. That said, its intricate entanglement with demilitarization and
post-conflict reconciliation came later. Even though the locals commonly agreed about
replacing the combat economy with tourism, at the beginning, battlefield tourism was not
the core of the development plan (see Yang 1996), particularly since the military facilities
were still highly sensitive and omnipresent. Besides, the forbidden, ubiquitous sights of
military structures luxuriously catered to the tourists’ appetite for the sense of battlefield
with voyeuristic pleasure at their convenience. Tourists breathed the sense of the
battlefield regardless of which type of tourism the locals were undertaking.
In developing tourism, the conservative attitude of the QDH against the open-door
policies became the major obstacle to the new Quemoy. After the abolishment of Martial
Law, the county government restored its autonomy and was no longer subordinate to the
QDH. Its new autonomous status enabled the county government to negotiate with the
QDH to loosen its grasp on civil issues. One often-mentioned example was the
installation of the streetlights. The military considered streetlights harmful to the defense
of Quemoy, since lights exposed the military installations at night and therefore during
the period of military rule the whole island was darkened after sunset. As the former
county head during 1990 to 1991, Lee once commented (Lee 2003, 29-30),
We [people in Quemoy] often made comparison between the mainland and Quemoy,
in the early days we said, “the base of Free China is the base of light, while the
mainland is the dark continent”; however nowadays [ca. 1990] the situation reversed
in the evening that “the mainland is the land with lights, and Quemoy is the dark
island.” 我們常將大陸和金門作對比，早期常說：
「自由基地是光明的基地，大
陸是黑暗的大陸」；但現在到了夜晚反而顛倒過來，「大陸是光明的大陸，金門
是黑暗的金門。」
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For local development, Lee argued with the QDH authorities to break through the
conservative policy, and install streetlights. He poignantly satirized in front of the QDH
authorities (Lee 2003, 30),
If Quemoy does not allow streetlights, this [the prohibition] means that, Quemoy
should not have daytime because after sunrise under the daylight all the military
positions in Quemoy have already been under Chinese Communists’ surveillance.
And so, the deprival of lights from Quemoy at night shares the same logic as
prohibiting one from seeing the Sun in the daytime. 如果金門不能有路燈，那就是
表示金門不能有白天，因為天一亮，太陽一照，金門所有的據點都被中共看到
了，所以晚上不能點燈和金門白天不能看到太陽是同樣的道理。
Lee’s successor, Chen (2003), still dealt with the same issue of streetlights during his
term of office from 1992 to 2000. However, with the abolishment of Martial Law, he
managed to convince the military to reluctantly agree to installing lights. While the civil
government still had to haggle with the military over various trivial civic issues, mass
tourism was a remote luxury. The attraction of tourism stood in opposition to the military
which sought to exclude unnecessary personnel from the defense area. Besides, the
tourists’ hedonic gaze upon the battlefield imbue it with lightness that “can make farce of
any represented pretension” (Smith 1997, 86). According to Smith, pretension is “a claim
to distinction, either from the phenomenal and ordering principles of the natural world, or
from other humans” (Smith 1997, 83), the authority (and uppityness) of the QDH, as well
as the characteristic military culture—such as the trained patriotism, the absolute
hierarchy, and the formalistic rigidity—were all at risk in front of the tourist’s playful
gaze. Under this circumstance, tourism was not only considered harmful to the military
dispositions but also to the reproduction of Quemoy culture of militarization. Accounting
for these disadvantages, the QDH clearly expressed its uncooperative stance on the tourist
development at first (Lee 2003), but concomitant with the initiation of the national
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disarmament plan in 1993, the military conceded and agreed to gradually loose its control
over Quemoy (Kuo 2010).
When tourism eventually gained support from military leaders, their concession
signified the initiation of demilitarization in Quemoy. Even though demilitarization was
never a choice of the Quemoy people who could only passively cope with the national
project, some of them did urge the removal of military rule and the abolishment of
Martial Law, which in fact coincided with demilitarization. The abolishment actually
ended the legal status of Quemoy as a battlefield and the necessity for large military
deployment on the island. The democratization in the short term devastated the local
economy despite the benefits in other social aspects, such as the return of the civil
autonomy, release of military properties, and freedom. After its autonomy returned,
Quemoy therefore had to stand on its own feet without support from the military, and
consequently locals placed even greater expectations on tourist business. Apparently,
demilitarization stimulates tourist development. The reduction of restricted military land
opened access for tourism or other development. These restricted areas had been under
strict control with only limited access for forty-three years, and the ecosystems had been
well preserved and with little industrial disturbance. After disarmament, the natural
environment, especially the crescent sandy beaches, offered an alternative military legacy
and tourist capital for Quemoy. In addition, the grandiosity and the sublimity of military
structures stemming from the long-term battlefield management also supplied
extraordinary spectacles for tourists. Hence, even if Quemoy did not direct itself
specifically toward battlefield tourism, demilitarization was still a necessity for general
tourist development. In this light, demilitarization, democratization—i.e. demilitarization
of the everyday life—and touristification in Quemoy went hand in hand together.
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As a fledgling industry, tourism supported only a small portion of the local
population, but economic stagnation affected all in the private sector, including peasants,
fishermen, and the retail businessmen. For them, to survive after demilitarization often
involved a change in economic activities. From 1992, due to the withdrawal of troops
from the coastal defenses, smuggling activities between the mainland and Quemoy began
to appear (Xi and Weng 2003). The P.R.C. authorities encouraged the smuggling
activities which in their definition were legal “small-amount trade 小額貿易” (Weng
2002). With trade under way, civil reconciliation ensued. In response to the skyrocketing
number of smuggling cases from twenty-seven in 1993 to 1,364 in 2001 (Xi and Weng
2003), the vigorous cross-border activities obliged the Taiwanese (R.O.C.) government to
devise a policy to decriminalize the small-amount trade. The policy designed for this
purpose was Mini-three Links, by which the direct postal, transportation, and trade links
between Quemoy and the mainland China were allowed with few restrictions. With the
policy in effect, economic interaction between Quemoy and Amoy emerged. If there is
anything Quemoy people learned through these intense cross-border activities was that
Quemoy must rely on the mainland China rather than Taiwan (Chen 2008). To reconcile
with the mainland China is therefore the foremost priority of the local development,
which is why the Quemoy county government has often taken on the position to
challenge the China policy of the Taipei administration.
The reconciliation with China was also an urgent issue for the tourist development.
From 1992, the local tourist business boomed by sales of group tours to Taiwanese, but
soon reached its climax in five years. Even in the stage of decline, the tourism business
had grown into the largest industry in Quemoy to an extent that the county head in 1998
clearly announced that “not a single developing project in Quemoy did not aim at tourist
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development 金門的建設無不是針對觀光發展” (Yang Z. 2010, 418). Besides the
country government, the KNP also contributed to the development from its inauguration
in 1996. The KNP had painstakingly diversified tourist resources to include the
traditional culture and natural landscapes, while at the same time inheriting restricted
areas from the military to develop attractions of battlefield tourism. Nevertheless, the
self-guided tourism that the KNP promoted was of little help to the withering tourist
business. The economic mainstay of Quemoy demands group tours to rejuvenate, and the
mainland tourists’ zeal for Quemoy, as shown in the cruise “watching Quemoy on the
sea,” has readily pointed out to prospective customers. For the mainland tourists, the
mysterious battlefield atmosphere of Quemoy is the major motivation for the tour in
which the military landscapes, according to questionnaire statistics, are the most
satisfactory attractions for the mainlanders (Chang 2010). Hence, to attract mainland
tourists, Quemoy has to develop battlefield tourism on the premise that the reconciliation
work with China carries on; whereby the porosity of borders with China can form and
provide an intense cross-border exchange. Making peace and making a fortune;
developing tourism and developing trade, to this point, are all tangled up together with
demilitarization to forge the economic prospects of Quemoy.
In addition to an economic drive, the development of battlefield tourism also
functions as an instrument for cultural demilitarization. Since the military landscapes are
the most competitive tourism resources with product differentiation from other tourist
islands, for the locals, making battlefield tourism the pillar of tourism merchandise
appears to be a sound judgment and a wise marketing strategy. In carrying out battlefield
tourism, the local practitioners—guides, bus drivers, interpreters—are the first to discover
that their simple means to monetary reward actually create more than what they expect.
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When they interpret the landscape change—transformation of war apparatus from places
of exclusion to places of attraction, and war memorials from shrines of patriotism to
tokens of peace—they are performing (acting out) the inscribed irony in landscape. In
contrast to the ongoing tourist consumption, their interpretations about the past conflicts
implicitly mock the meaninglessness of war outlined in the landscape change, while at
the same time they celebrate the arrival of peace.
An often-said and well-known irony concerning the famous Quemoy knives should
illustrate such an effect of tourism. The culinary knives are one of the special products in
Quemoy and are popular memorabilia for visitors. The knives are famous for their
allegedly high-quality steel forged from the propaganda shells bombarding Quemoy.
Since military rule, conscripts before their return to Taiwan would often buy Quemoy
knives as gifts or mementos. Such practice builds up the reputation of the knives among
Chinese people around the world, and group tours in Quemoy today usually include a
stop at the knife factory to let tourists watch the process. After Quemoy admited
mainland tourists, they were surprisingly zealous for the knives. In a newspaper article
reporting popularity of the knives, a mainland tourist simply stated, “this [knife] is made
from our shells. I think [it] has much historical significance” (Nownews 14 Jul. 2006). As
the mainland tourists attribute the historical significance of the knives to their source of
materials, the knife-maker, Wu Zen-Dong 吳增棟, also commented on the subject
(Chinanews 6 Dec. 2008),
sometimes, when I encounter the mainland tourists, I will make a joke and said, “by
those shells you guys gave to me for free in the past, I make them into culinary
knives now, and return back to you 遇到大陸游客，我有時會跟他們開玩笑：當年
你們送來的炮彈，現在我打成菜刀還給你們.”
The thought about mainlanders buying back their own shells at a high price amuses
Quemoy people, even though they doubtless appreciate the priceless peace. By contrast,
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knowing the diachronic exchange, mainland tourists tend to make a more serious
response. They prefer to summarize Wu’s livelihood in a poetic idiom “melting swords
into plowshares 鑄劍為犁,” which metaphorically means “ending the war and starting
the peacetime” (Chinanews 6 Dec. 2008; Want Daily 17 Mar. 2011). The culinary knives
thus become a token of peace, cast in and by the presence of the mainland tourists, since
their sightseeing in Quemoy axiomatically represents peace today (Luo 2010). For these
mainlanders in the factory, bringing the Quemoy knives home means more than a simple
gesture to remember about their trip in Quemoy but also one to figuratively undo the war
by returning shells to the mainland. The return then is where the historic significance
resides in their purchases. In the face of the interpretation of these knives, a Quemoy
veteran, while recalling the absurd engagement of shelling on alternate days, sarcastically
remarked (Quemoy Daily 29 Mar. 2012),
mainland tourists rush to buy the specialty that [our predecessors] bartered with their
flesh and blood [under shellfire]. Isn’t this another irony and joke made by history?
陸客爭著購買這血肉之軀交換來的特產，這豈非又是歷史的諷刺和玩笑。
As the mainland tourists feel obliged to buy back the “war trophies” (Quemoy Daily
15 Sept. 2005), which cost lives of the garrisons and the civilians who once fought in
Quemoy, to celebrate the newly reconciled peace that denies their cause for fighting, the
former combatant finds irony: One that subverts the binary opposition in the past
meanwhile serves cultural demilitarization today. As the antidote to the political
pedagogy inculcated during the Cold War, the irony counteracts constructs of the enemy
constructions, the political correctness, and the nationalist cult with inconsequential
lightness. The light attitude that equates the past conflicts to a joke, as the one the knife
master told, dissipates the wartime metanarratives tied to and propping up the belligerent
condition.
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Due to the symbolism of the knives and the purchases, battlefield tourism in this
particular case brings forth heavy irony. Although irony in other cases may not be as
prominent, they nonetheless can subvert other aspects of cultural militarization, such as
the historical discourse about the war justification. With the discovery of the contingent
functionality of battlefield tourism, the local society, craving peace and an economic
boost, further strengthens its resolution to follow its economic course. Correspondingly,
the county government of Quemoy employs tourist development to urge the central
administration in Taipei to act according toward the local interests which fundamentally
depend on reconciliation with China. In the circumstance, battlefield tourism not only
spotlights the contrast in landscape change to foreground irony, but also accelerates the
progress of reconciliation. The simple economic solution for Quemoy to this point has
been tinged with much political intention.
4.3 Re-editing the Military Inscriptions upon the Landscape
The development of battlefield tourism and reconciliation assist each other
reciprocally to form a new place identity other than a scene of military conflict. The
incorporation of the two social dynamics shapes the landscape in Quemoy which can
provide insights into identity reformulation. Military structures, as the material
incarnation of the past, become the features inviting place identity reformulation. In turn,
reinvention of the military structures reflects how the local people deal with the changing
identity of their homeland, and more practically reveal how they ingeniously and
simultaneously develop battlefield tourism and achieve demilitarization. In addition,
although symbolic structures, such as war memorials and slogan walls, are
non-combatant facilities, their articulation of the zeitgeist during the Cold-War era makes
them especially significant to identity reformulation. Their use as attractions of battlefield
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tourism represents refigured local understanding of the conflict in the past. As cultural
geographers often see landscapes as human inscriptions in the environment, the changes
occurring to these structures foreground an ongoing process of reediting the embedded
militant texts in the landscape through the landscape management and treatment.
The management methods of military structures in Quemoy generally fall into three
categories: abandonment, destruction, and reinvention. The first two are common
practices applied to the military structures today, while reinvention occurs less frequently.
Reinvention is exclusively applied to military structures designated for tourist facilities,
and therefore cases of reinvention can provide more information about the interrelation
between the landscape change and identity reformation. The three major treatments that
the locals in Quemoy employ to reinvent military structures are disguise, remodeling, and
rehabilitation. The three treatments are each designated for specific types of military
structures converted to tourist facilities. Rehabilitation often occurs to the structures
released from the QDH after demilitarization as prospective tourist attractions;
remodeling the wartime tourist facilities and war memorials from the Cold War era;
disguising the defenses occupying strategic positions with panoramic views. Following
the implementation of these management methods, a great proportion of the military
structures in Quemoy have disappeared, collapsed, and transformed; only a few of them
under rehabilitation can retain their original features.
The abandoned military structures are most frequently dispersed in remote areas,
such as seafronts and hillsides, on the periphery of the branch-shape defense system.
After the withdrawal of troops, the QDH cannot afford to sustain the operation of all
posts by the limited manpower. At one end of the defense hierarchy are the numerous
guard posts. Too numerous to maintain following troop reductions, they have become the
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primary structures suffering abandonment. Most beachfront posts are forgotten
monuments of this sort (Figure 4.2). The QDH closes up these posts, but keeps some of
them intact in case of war. Such management plan is termed as “sealing up during the
ordinary time; opening up during the wartime 平封戰啟.” In fact, these abandoned
military structures now are subject to decay. Since war is hardly possible in Quemoy, they
simply disintegrate and drown in the rampant subtropical vegetation. Although the locals
complain about the messy eyesores and public safety blind spots that these unused
structures may have become, abandonment only troubles the locals except as a waste of
potential battlefield tourism resources (Quemoy Daily 21 Sept. 2008).
By contrast, cases of destruction often take place when the unused military
structures impede daily civilian practices or future prospects. In these cases, destruction
may befall civil defense structures. These defense works in the civilian domain were
often compromises of convenience for former military necessity. With the military
priority fading, the locals desire to remove these obsolete and inconvenient defense works.
Thereby bunkers at the village gateways are bulldozed (Chinatimes 30 Dec. 2009);
trenches and moats surrounding the villages are filled up (Huang 2003). On some of these
tracts recovered through destruction, the village installs pagodas, trails, plants, and street
furniture to build a neighborhood park for public recreation (Figure 4.3). Otherwise, if the
structures are located on private property, owners can simply remove them to facilitate
their current land uses. The anti-parachute stakes in the fields represent this category
(Figure 4.4). To defend against paratroopers, the military erected regiments of concrete
stakes at an equal distance in open fields, and topped each of them with interlinking
barbed wire. From a distance these stakes looked like vineyards, and therefore some
international visitors when viewing the fields in Quemoy mistook them for grapes arbors
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Figure 4.2. Abandoned Military Structures. The hillside positions [A and B] are
under the sealed-up management plan indicated by the warning signs of military
reservations [highlighted by dotted lines] in front of them. In some of these
abandoned military structures [see the cannon in C], the QDH discard obsolete
weaponry and let them rust into junk in situ. [photo by the author]
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Figure 4.3. Recreation Areas Built on Leveled Military Compounds. The military
station outside the Anqian village was under construction and turned into a neighborhood park in 2008. The air-raid shelter [the bottom right] and the bunker in the grove
[the middle left] survived the renovation. [photo by the author]

A
Figure 4.4. Remnants of Anti-parachute
A
Stakes. Only a few arrays of the stakes
remain today, and are all incomplete. Many
in an array have been taken down, and the
rest lost their spikes [A]. Even the array
being closest to its original condition [B] is
missing the barbwire web atop the stakes.
B [photo by the author in 2009]
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(Dong and Huang 2007). Planting these stakes hampered farm work, and their dangerous
design has only injured the resident farmers, who willingly remove these stakes when
allowed. That is why these stakes appear only sporadically in the open fields today.
Another sort of destroyed landscape feature is what the locals consider a nuisance.
The anti-communist slogan signs are the representative of this sort (Figure 4.5). Since the
nationalist troops retreated to Quemoy, soldiers living among civilians in their villages
made slogan signs on folk houses. The anticommunist signs, such as “Eliminate the Evil
Communists,” manifest an aspect of the psychological warfare to bolster morale and to
instill determination (Zheng 2006). After the implementation of Mini-three Links, the
locals considered these signs as obstruction of reconciliation and repellent to mainland
tourists (Lihpao Daily 9 Jun. 2001):
The islanders for their livelihood [tourism] continuously ask the Ministry of Defense
to demolish these political slogans, such as ‘Repel Communism and Resist Russia,’
or ‘Kill Zhu [de] and Mao [Tse-tung],’ to avoid the awkwardness mainlanders may
feel during their visit in Quemoy. 島上居民為了求生存，紛紛要求國防部剷除這
些「反共抗俄」、「殺朱拔毛」等政治標語，以免造成大陸人士參訪的尷尬
The demolition was soon brought to the public’s attention and suffered criticism. In an
investigation report of the execution of cultural preservation in Quemoy, the investigation
committee denounced the demolition, and explained its opinion on these slogans (Taiwan
the Control Yuan 2001, 88-3):
The psychological slogans were the wartime products as the anticommunist and
anti-Russian symbols in the past. However, in an alternative view, they are exactly
what remind us of the importance of “peace” and point out the significance to avoid
other wars 反共精神標語是以前戰爭時代的產物，是反共抗俄的標誌，可是反
過來看，它正提醒我們「和平」的重要，及避免再發生戰爭的重要意義。
The reading of these symbols of conflict ironically turned them into caveats to war and
tokens of peace, so that preservation of these landscape features from demolition was
urgent and just. As to the motivation and the planner of the demolition, the report
indicated that “some governmental organs 有些機關” instructed the removal of slogans
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Figure 4.5. Slogan Signs on Folk Houses. By the remnants [A], the incomplete slogan
sign on the wall is read as “Clear Our Name; Recover Our Country 雪恥復國.” Its
incompleteness however is simply a result of weathering that the reliefs fall off from
the walls over time. In other cases [B], their anticommunist messages beckon
vandalism for reconciliation and cross-border activities. [Source: photo by the author]
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as their gestures “to express goodwill 表現友善” (Taiwan the Control Yuan 2001, 88-3),
or to avoid “bringing about a mutual uneasiness 彼此會產生尷尬” (Huang 2007, 156).
However, for mainland tourists, these anticommunist slogans are not just about hollow
threats or empty offenses from the past, but rather one of the most intriguing and
battlefield-specific spectacles in their journey in Quemoy (Chinatimes 8 Jun. 2011):
The mainland tourists show intense interest in these remnants of the battlefield
culture [slogan signs] from the time of armed confrontation across the Taiwan
Strait . . . . Some will even ask the guide in private to tour these signs, taking photos
in front of them for memory. 對岸遊客對這些兩岸軍事對峙時留下，屬於「戰地
文化」的產物特別有興趣……還私下要求導遊安排參觀，在標語前拍照留念。
Consequently, the threats and menaces in the past articulate “peace” today, and attract the
past enemy whom these signs confronted to consume the exclusive culture of the former
battlefield. The contradictory situations are exactly how the development of battlefield
tourism adds to the irony in demilitarization, while the counter-intentionality and futility
of the demolition brings forth another irony: In the end, these slogans have not eliminated
any communists whose presence in Quemoy however led to the elimination of these
slogans.
Concomitant with the withdrawal of troops from 1992, the re-empowered civil
government led “a movement of full-scale destruction of battlefield relics 塗銷戰地遺跡
的大動作” (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011). The government on one hand incited civilians to
remove the miscellaneous military features in their surroundings; on the other squeezed
to restore the antebellum landscape of Quemoy by erasing the military structures from the
civilian domains (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011):
The QDH under the pressure of the county government and the county council
destroyed bunkers, defense positions, and air-raid shelters to satisfy their policy of
“returning properties to civilians.” 軍方也在縣府、議會壓力下，陸續敲毀碉堡、
據點和防空洞，遂行所謂「還地於民」的政策
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The re-editing of the syntax of everyday landscape was described as “an overwhelming
mission of mass destruction 鋪天蓋地的毀滅行動” (Chinatimes 7 Jun. 2011). Smith
provides a possible explanation for the magnitude of destruction: “as a new society takes
place, or existing society takes a new place, it is the symbols of reference that suffer and
work change” (1997, 87). In this view, destruction of military structures announces an
undergoing process of power adjustment and transitional justice. In the attempts to
persuade his countrymen into preserving the slogan reliefs on the exterior walls of their
houses, Huang recalls some complaints he has encountered that may explain why some
Quemoy locals feel the urge to erase these slogan signs (2007, 350):
A brand new house was taken for years, free of charge; now the military has no use
of it. Why on earth cannot [I] just take off these words? Does even that [removal]
break the law? 一棟新新的屋子被毫無條件強佔了幾年，現在軍方不用了，難道
把這些字拿掉也不可以？也犯法嗎？
Why should [I] keep [the signs]? Are there subsidies for keeping? Or, compensation?
為什麼要留下來呢？留著有補助嗎？有賠償嗎？
After the abolishment of Martial Law restored the lawful status of citizens and autonomy
of the civil government, the empowered populace and administration wield their newly
attained power to “correct” the military wrongdoing, such as the property requisition.
Some locals, like the complaining property owner, aggressively destroyed the military
features due to the mindset of transitional justice that simultaneously bestowed them
rights to control their surroundings and to claim monetary returns. Destruction of military
structures matters, not for the sake of tourist development, reconciliation, or
demilitarization—all of which oftentimes were only the nominal causes to justify sheer
desire for destruction—but more as demonstrations of freedom emerging in the cleansing
of stigmas of military repression.
Although military structures in the civilian domains often faced destruction and
those in the remote areas are largely abandoned, the locals nonetheless reinvented some
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of them for non-military use. Among them, those released to private citizens and
surviving the destruction mostly integrate into the local daily life. Their civilian owners
reused them as auxiliary spaces of everyday life in various ways—barns, garages,
workshops, to name a few (Figure 4.6). Otherwise, military structures in the public
domains, now under the stewardship of the county government or the KNP, will usually
turn into tourist facilities. The transformation is completed through the three treatments.
Among them, rehabilitation is the most aggressive one that may introduce the full-scale
constructional intervention into the target structures, and is practically turns a military
facility into an attraction for the battlefield tourism. Sites selected for rehabilitation stand
out due to their potential as spectacles, and therefore are usually large in scale and unique
in style to attract the tourist gaze. Rehabilitation subsequently demands more investment
of resources than the other two treatments. By contrast, remodeling comprises only
partial constructional intervention. It however emphasizes replacing interior interpretive
materials about the past conflicts. The remodeled cases, like those of rehabilitation, are
major attractions of the battlefield tourism in Quemoy. Unlike rehabilitated structures,
remodeled ones are capable of enunciating a solid statement about the past conflicts
through their spatiality of commemoration.
The disguise treatment scarcely involves architectural mediation in the original
structures but commonly uses exterior camouflage to reinvent these structures. The
disguised structures often serve as auxiliary and infrastructural features for both the
battlefield tourism and the local public affairs, and often occupy strategic points—
intersections of arteries, a centerpiece of vistas, gateways to villages. They are ideal
positions for panoptic observation and vice versa focal points to be observed from their
surroundings. Due to their particular locations, these structures sequentially become
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Figure 4.6. Manifold Reuses of
Military Structures Released to Private
Citizens. The QDH gradually returned
lands requisitioned for military
reservations to their private owners
since they carried out the disarmament
plan. In a trip in 2006, my host, Chen,
the owner of Mingyuan 明園 B&B,
informed me of that, at the beginning,
the QDH when retuning the lands did
not take down the military structures
therein but only vacated these
buildings. Some property owners did
not know what to do with these sturdy
military buildings, and to have them
torn down cost these owners a fortune.
As they file complaints, the QDH
decides to indiscriminately remove all
structures before the land release.
Some of these military structures
bulldozed down were actually newly
built at the time, and even some local
witnesses considered the removal
wasteful of useful structures. As a
result, most military structures
integrating into the civilian daily life
today were transferred to the land
owners in the first few years after the
abolishment of Martial Law. Some
locals put them to diverse uses, for
example, a storage [A], a basement of
their house [B], a auto-repair shop [C],
and a barn [D]. [photo by the author]

appropriate carriers of outdoor advertising and public bulletin boards. The bunker at the
gateway of Jinchen Township 金城鎮—the most developed urban area in Quemoy—is a
representative of the disguised structures (Figure 4.7). At the main entrance of the town,
the bunker stands at the center of the traffic circle, literally welcoming travelers from the
east with the welcome sign on its wall. Nevertheless, the bunker was an anti-parachute
fort stationed with a handful of soldiers who in addition to the defense duties were also
responsible for the traffic control during the curfew hours. As a defense facility, the
bunker guarded the main entrance of the township from outsiders until the abolishment of
Martial Law. Before 2003, the military had withdrawn the soldiers stationed at the bunker,
and installed a flower bed circling its base that separated the structure from hand
engagement but maintained the eye contact. The structure, partially covered by the county
logos—a simplified gable of the traditional folk house—as ornaments, carried a bulletin
board with a neon dragon figure, “Quemoy County” in Chinese and English, and another
county logo atop. With these ornaments, the county government attempted to turn the
bunker into the centerpiece for the entrance into the county. Even so, the visitors could
clearly tell the origin of the structure as a bunker by its appearance. In 2008, the county
government repainted the bunker with a new coat of military camouflage, and upon the
painted surface installed seven golden characters read as “Welcome to Jinchen
Township.” The renewed appearance conveyed a mixed message, for on one hand the
military camouflage strengthened the military connotation; on the other the characters
turned the bunker into a welcoming sculpture. Although the renovation intended to
accomplish the development of battlefield tourism and reconciliation at the same time,
the resulting mixed message however rendered both meanings out of place. The
displacement then posed a question: Which one, a bunker or a welcome sign, is proper?
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In 2008, a new China
policy brought a surge
of mainland tourists to
Quemoy, and the local
added the characters to
the bunker to welcome
visitors.

From 2004, the Kinmen
Kaoliang Liquor Inc., a
county controlled
business, used the bulletin
board for advertising;
therefore the liquor bottle
atop the bunker.
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Figure 4.7. The Bunker at the Gateway of Jinchen. The serial photos show the bunker under disguise during 2003-2011. The
transition reveals a tendency to cover up the military structure more and more permanently from public view. [photo by the author]
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The locals answered the question in 2011 by another renewal of the structure in which
horticultural decorations and photographs of local landscape covered up the entire
structure. The renovation therefore concealed the original use of the structure from view.
Even with the dramatic change of appearance, the welcome sign remained prominent on
the structure. By disguise, the locals then erased the military structure from their
everyday landscape.
Through this discussion, one general principle for reediting the post-conflict
landscape seems clear: For military structures to continue their existence, they must not
hinder the ongoing pursuit of the local society. For those that do, they soon face
destruction like the slogan signs on the folk houses. For those do not, the locals disregard
them like the military structures in remote areas. Otherwise, the locals expect that some
of these structures can assist in the cause of tourist development after reinvention. Even
in these cases, reinvention is not always compatible with the continuity of military
structures. Reinvention thence appears to be an alternative way to conceal and to erase
the structures from the landscape; whereby they can silently support tourist development
without bringing up contradictories that the locals strive to avoid. The only treatment
aiming to re-present the image of military structures in operation is rehabilitation, and its
primary goal is to create attractions for battlefield tourism upon the authenticity of these
reinvented military structures.
4.4 Mashan Observation Station: Transferring Meanings of a Bunker
Not all the rehabilitated military structures recently underwent the transition from a
defense post to a sightseeing spot. Some military structures have functioned as tourist
attractions since the time of military rule: the observation stations in Quemoy serve both
functions. These stations opened a few windows for people to peep into the Red China
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behind the Bamboo Curtain. From their construction, they inherited the availability and
readiness for visual consumption. In an ordinary setting, the scenery of beaches, bunkers,
and enemy soldiers viewed through binoculars meant nothing more than what they were
in eyes of the observer. For soldiers, seeing these scenes meant performing everyday
surveillance. However, the same scenery could carry distinct meanings to visitors from
distant places for it crystallized the exotic, unusual, and mysterious image of the others’
side. The extraordinariness of the scenery, stemming from its distance from the Free
World, made the image metaphorically more significant than what they appeared to be,
and presented the imaginative geography of a communist reality. Seeing these scenes
therefore sets off a hermeneutic journey for the visitors to validate their knowledge about
the imagined realm in its authentic form.
The two ways of seeing articulated the everydayness and poetics of place. In
contrast to the routine observations that soldiers carried out everyday, the tourists’
attempt to let the communist world reveal itself pinpointed a moment of truth that
rendered the station a venue of authenticity and poetics. As the soldier’s everydayness
concealed authenticity and poetics of place with the routine surveillance, the tourist
poetics nonetheless made authenticity stand out to challenge the taken-for-granted
understanding of the communist reality. In the everyday setting, the observer was the
subject, the only actor that mattered in completing the daily errands, while in the poetic
setting the observed became the leading role with which the truth might then reveal itself.
After the development of battlefield tourism, the role of the observer and the observed
reversed; the everydayness and poetics of place concomitantly moved along. Although
the duality of the observation stations remained, the development had transferred the
meaning of the military structures away from their original utility. When tourism
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becomes the everyday practice in these stations, the authenticity what these stations
concern the most will repose on their military past rather than the scenery in the lens.
On the northeastern corner of Quemoy at the tip of the Mashan 馬山 peninsula,
Mashan observation station occupies the location with the shortest distance to the P.R.C.
The station is 1,800 meters from the P.R.C. controlled island, Jiaoyu 角嶼, on the ebb,
and the geographic proximity makes the strategic point a proper site for an observation
station and a broadcast station, let alone a certain coastal defense post. The peninsula
projecting into the waters is actually a tombolo where one of the four citadels of the Ming
Empire was built in the fourteenth century to defend the island from pirates. Upon the
same site, the nationalist troops constructed modern defense works and underground
facilities when they retreated to Quemoy in 1949. After years of military construction of
underground facilities and earthworks, the elevation of the tombolo rose to thirty-two
meters above sea level, and earthworks enabled thick vegetation cover to grow on the
barren rocky tombolo. When the construction of the observation station was completed in
the 1981, the military named the place “Mashan,” which literally meant the “horse hill”
in Chinese. Thence, Mashan became the foremost post against the Bamboo Curtain, and
the northernmost sentry post in Mashan was known as “the first post of the world 天下
第一哨.”
As a critical military post, the QDH deployed an infantry company in Mashan and
the small islet on its east, Hoyu 后嶼, to guard the water course between them and the
Mashan cove on their southeast. The observation station was only a portion of the
Mashan military complex which was mainly a coastal defense post but also
accommodated a broadcast station for psychological warfare. Normally, the observation
station was a surveillance center for the enemy activities, but during the wartime it would
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assist artillery units improve their accuracy by reporting where their projectiles landed. In
addition to the military use, the observation station was also a showcase for politicians,
journalists, and international guests. For these visitors, the military built a modern
restroom with hand dryers that the soldiers in the Mashan nicknamed “a million dollar
restroom” and believed to be “the highest class in Quemoy” in the early 1980s (Quemoy
Daily 24 Jul. 2004). The main attraction of the Mashan complex was the observatory in
which soldiers using binoculars could watch the military activities on the communist
controlled islets (Figure 4.8). When tourists visited the observatory, soldiers would
explain the scenery visible through binoculars, while demonstrating their comprehensive
knowledge of the enemy islands.
The observatory and the restroom were on opposite ends of an underground tunnel
(Figure 4.9). On the two pillars of the entrance was a couplet: “Manage the battlefield and
train for combat strength, [so that] the whole army will defeat enemies and consolidate
our territory 經營戰場培養戰力，全軍破敵永奠金甌.” The exit connected to a sunken
square flanked with wall reliefs of battling soldiers on both sides, and the building on one
side was a presentation room to introduce the complex to visitors. On the opposite to the
tunnel entrance, a sunken path carved into the earth mound, and turned perpendicularly
toward the gate of the military complex. On both sides of the path were two retaining
walls; two lines of mature banyan trees, growing on the slopes behind the walls, covered
the path from above. Seen from the gate, these trees formed a vista, and the centerpiece at
its end was a slogan wall with four characters read as “Recovering My Rivers and
Mountains 還我河山” (Figure 4.10). The entrance of the broadcast station was on one
side of the sunken path, and there was also a couplet on both sides of the entrance:
“Crumble the morale of the rebel army; amplify the heavenly voice of the great Han 弘揚
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Figure 4.8. Interior of the Observatory

Figure 4.9. Entrance of the Observation
Station.

Figure 4.10. The Vista, the Slogan Wall,
and the Sunken Path

Figure 4.11.
Station.

Entrance of the Broadcast

Figure 4.12. The Mural of Armed Soldier

Figure 4.13.

The Wall of Old Photos

[photos by the author in 2008, 2009]
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大漢天聲，瓦解匪軍士氣” (Figure 4.11). In the past the station was another tourist
attraction in the complex. From the entrance of the underground station, a tunnel led to
offices and broadcast rooms, where the broadcasters announced propaganda with their
soft voices. To broadcast the audio propaganda to the mainland seaboards, the garrison
built two towers facing the mainland on the sea cliff, and installed a total of fifty-six
loudspeakers on their façades. With these characteristic facilities and the foremost
location of the Free World, the showcasing and symbolic attributes were inherent in the
Mashan military complex.
In 2002, the QDH transferred the observation station to the KNP that reused the
place as tourist attractions. As rehabilitation aims to re-present the image of the military
structure, the KNP does not significantly alter the observation station. Today, tourists can
follow the right fork from the complex gate to the sunken path, passing by the broadcast
center to the entrance of the observation station, which is the only facility open to the
general public. The left fork leads to the coastal posts and the soldiers’ quarters in the
military reservation, and its gatekeepers’ post moves inward from the complex gate to the
middle of the left fork. Tourists can linger in the open space behind the complex gate for
photos or gathering. Also, military personnel maintain the broadcasts, but, instead of
propaganda, it plays pop music for entertainment. Most changes noticeable after
rehabilitation are cosmetic to highlight the sense of a military base: for example, adding a
coat of military camouflage paint on the green retaining walls along the sunken path; or,
decorating the tunnel entrance with a mural of a faceless, armed soldier guarding a costal
sentry post beside a binocular (Figure 4.12). The decorative treatment also appears in the
observatory. By a wall of monotone photographs of Chiang Kia-shek inspecting military
facilities in Quemoy during the wartime, the KNP endows the space with a museum
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quality, and evokes a reminiscent association with the past (Figure 4.13). To constitute
battlefield tourism, the KNP exaggerates the military motif by introducing military
accretions to the original military settings. The faceless solider guarding the tunnel
entrance offers a chance of reflexivity for tourists, especially the veterans among them, to
establish personal connections to the place through their memory and experience. With
these additions enhancing the awareness of the military settings, the rehabilitation is thus
conceived as remedies for the absence of soldiers, defenses, and conflicts, all of which in
one word are demilitarization.
In addition, rehabilitation is also means to adapt the military structures to mass
tourism. The overt demonstrations are the construction of the parking lot for tour buses
adjacent to the complex gate and the public display of the Mashan map including the
layout of the military complex. They are both amenities to create a tourist-friendly
environment. Likewise, to create such an entrance, the KNP tore down the iron gate to
allow a view into the military complex, and repaved the entrance to mold an entrance
concourse with a direction sign of the interior facilities in the pavement. Without soldiers
on guard, the exclusive military base now opens to the public, and the exposure attracts
vendors to take on soldiers’ position, preying on people coming close to their stands.
Moreover, the line of facilitation work can sometimes get subtle and discreet that one
without prior knowledge of the place cannot tell the difference, such as erasing the two
militant couplets from the entrances of the broadcast station and the observation station.
From the alteration and accretion of the structures, two purposes of the rehabilitation
emerge: first, to highlight the military sense of place and second, to facilitate mass
tourism, and if conflict occurs, the first will be sacrificed for the second as obliteration of
the two couplets. The spatial affinity to mainland tourists—that the locals consider as
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their main market of mass tourism—therefore outweighs the articulation of spatial
specificity of the military structures.
In addition to soldiers and couplets, another missing component from the landscape
in Mashan is the thick vegetation on the coast after mine removal. To perform the mine
clearance, the QDH clear-cut the vegetation in the minefields around the complex, and
exposed its exteriors and all the seafront posts originally hidden in the woods. Due to its
proximity to the mainland, Mashan happens to be the turnabout point and the finale of the
famous cruise, “Watching Quemoy on the Sea.” During the Cold-War period, soldiers
guarding the coastal sentry posts had to fire warning shots at vessels transgressing the
midline of the waters, and if the vessels disregarded the warning soldiers had to fire shots
to expel them. Otherwise, the soldiers on guard would face trials in a court-martial. After
the abolishment of Martial Law, the withdrawal of troops weakened the coastal defense
in Quemoy, and soldiers in the remaining coastal posts received instructions to hold their
fire against transgression. Instead, they are encouraged to use alarm sirens or megaphone
loudspeakers. Under the circumstances of demilitarization, the cruise boats carrying
mainland tourists to Quemoy need not worry about transgression over the marine border.
Unlike the situation in the famous story, these boats today would approach directly unto
the Mashan seafront at a distance close enough for the tourists to start a quarrel with the
soldiers in their sentry posts. Thence, the tour boats slowly cruise through the
watercourse between Mashan and Hoyu for photo shoots, and then return to Amoy from
the Mashan cove (Chang 2008). As nationalist garrisons are the major scenic attraction of
the cruise, the clear-cutting for demining coincidentally facilitated the visual consumption
for the mainland tourists. The observation station is now observed, and the observer and
the observed also exchanged their places.
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China is open to travelers from around the global to travel freely, and the scenery
viewed from Mashan does not have the significance as before, no longer does it represent
the communist world. The landscape in the binoculars displays nothing but everyday life
in China. In contrast, as the Mashan station turns into a tourist attraction, it is the focal
point of the tourist gaze whether from sea or land. Inasmuch as its attraction stems from
the connection with the past conflict, the tourist locale means more than a cluster of
former military structures, and stands a monument to the yesteryears. The historical
association of the observation station renders it an evocative stimulus to nostalgia, and
opens up the poetic dimension of the place. In the poetic setting, the garrison in Mashan
is thus the past in the present. Thereby the rehabilitation introduces the camouflage paint,
the soldier’s mural, and the wall of wartime photographs to strengthen the spatiality and
to spur personal connection with the place.
From another standpoint, sightseeing naturally becomes the everyday practice after
the touristic turn, and a part of the goal of rehabilitation is to facilitate mass tourism. To
fulfill this goal, rehabilitation embeds a new set of underlying discourses through the
spatial rearrangement that in the meantime encourages ritualized practice. For example,
participants in the group tours will normally get off their buses in the parking lot; pass by
the map of Mashan on the corner and the vendors’ booths across the street. They will
gather in the entrance concourse to hear their guides’ interpretation or to take photographs
of the stone tablet with inscriptions of Mashan. Another example is the course of the
cruise boats that usually stop briefly near the Mashan station for photographs, and then
sail into the cove before turning back to the Amoy docks. Soldiers on guard will not
mistake the approaching boats as threats, for the routine of the cruises has rendered them
taken-for-granted objects to the soldiers. Likewise, on the trip taken on the land, tour
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guides and vendors also find a fixed vantage point to embark on their regular business,
and tour guides will usually share a similar itinerary to lead their groups through the place.
Aside from the human effect, the tourist pilgrimage is a combination of improvisational
reenactments according to the spatial choreography embedded in the place through
rehabilitation: The concourse suggests lingering; the tree vista and sunken path hints
“keep walking”; and the slogan wall calls for a photo shoot. In other words, the
institutionalization originates from the spatial orders that hint to visitors to perform
certain acts in the designed environments. Since rehabilitation has inscribed the
pilgrimage ritual on the sequent spaces, the amenities of mass tourism in Mashan thus
embody the everydayness of the sightseeing spot. In the ordinary settings, the spatial
practice in response to the embedded spatial orders articulates the meaning of place, and
the everydayness of place depends on the users’ conformity to the spatial suggestions.
Either challenging or neglecting the suggestions leads to improper conducts and makes
the user out-of-place. As a result, in an everyday setting, the spatial practices create
meaning rather than the spatial orders or the spaces. In this mode of understanding, the
material settings in Mashan, namely the representation of the Cold-War past, are
insignificant, but only the present tourist activities matter.
The role exchange of the Mashan observation station from the observer (signifier) to
the observed (signified) reveals a change in its meaning: In the past, the station provided
access to the social foci—life on the communist side—but now it is, or strictly speaking
its past self is, meaningful as the social focus—the observed observation station, not just
an everyday tourist spot. The semantic transformation results from the human attachment
of historic significance to Mashan, while the attached significance in fact comes from, but
is not limited to, the past use of Mashan as an access to the social focus. If so, the identity
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change of Mashan can clarify its semantic change, as spatial practice defines identity and
identity endows places with meanings. From an everyday military station/a poetic tourist
spot to a poetic military station/an everyday tourist spot, the exchange of the
everydayness and poetics of place between the place identities present few leads. The
historical significance of the place comes from the soldiers’ everyday practice in the past,
and yields poetics of place today based on its authenticity of a Cold-War apparatus. Due
to the poetic evocation, Mashan metaphorically means more than a battle station from the
moment of demilitarization, and symbolizes the nationalist ideologies, the anticommunist
conflict, the military life, and associations with the Cold War. As a trope of the past, the
station departs from an entity for combatant use to a symbol for cultural interpretations.
As such, its meaning is constantly referential to itself as a signifier (e.g., a military relic
today) pointing to another signifier (e.g., the observation station during the Cold War) to
another (e.g. the life in the communist side in binoculars) to another. Mashan figuratively
turns into a vessel accommodating different, given meanings that however are not
concerned with its entity—Mashan as tourist amenities. The semantic transfer of Mashan
thence declares a symbolic communication with an absence of essence in its meanings
that dreadfully hinge upon one attached referent and another. Sequentially, the attached
meanings in the present, such as the one of a war memorial, become the dominant
definition of the place, and alienate other meanings of Mashan from the public. The
usurpation of meanings is exactly the purpose to perform rehabilitation in the military
relics, by which the locals may dispatch the conflicts to the past, and promote battlefield
tourism.
During the Cold-War period, Mashan as “the first post of the world” was especially
heavily garrisoned with crack troops, and the military only assigned its loyal champions
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to command the position, who could constantly meet with and therefore establish
relations with elites in the world, when they visited Mashan to watch the Red China. In
another word, whoever commanded the post would have a promising future (Quemoy
Daily 17 Apr. 2012). The arrangement constituted the specificity of Mashan that was full
of pride, feeling of superiority, and responsibility. As a veteran recalled, the experience on
sentry duty at the nearest post to China provoked a poetic, gallant feeling, “as if I alone
can shoulder all the responsibility to protect our country and all its families” (Huang
2006). Due to the geographic proximity to P.R.C. territory, Mashan was commonly
construed as a highly sensitive position under strict security control to prevent infiltration
(Quemoy Daily 24 Mar. 2004). Subsequently, the military structure like a border sign in
the landscape conveyed a crystal-clear message: “Keep Out, Red China Ahead!” For
most people, propaganda demonized communists and guns in the beachfront validate the
warning of border-crossing. However, for one looking for a way to the communist side,
the geographic statement of Mashan offered a convenient indication of the ideal departing
location. Given that, in 1979 the commander of the Mashan position swam to the P.R.C.
islet from his post. Inasmuch as the short distance was the primary factor in favor of his
trip, the “first post of the world” was simultaneously the most convenient spot for
defection.
The dual meanings of Mashan are a direct product of the borderland effect that
grants two opposite ways of viewing a place. The geographical characteristics of Quemoy
repeatedly induce social constructs appearing as a pair in the history about who the locals
are and what the place is. Therefore, no matter the Han or non-Han, a gang of maritime
powers or obedient imperial subjects, and even nationalists or communists are
dichotomous social constructions without essential meanings. What matters is practice,
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especially those concerning struggle. For livelihood, e.g. plantation or overseas trade, the
local social focus switches toward completely opposite directions a few times in history.
The struggles for living thus constitute the several occasions of what I term “reversal of
geographical coordinate system,” of which the embodiment in landscape presents
polarized contrast to the former settings. The sharp contrast after the shift manifests the
social engagement in a new paradigm revolving around another pair of dichotomous
constructs that “strive to usurp each other’s meaning” (Smith 1997, 90). In spite of the
paradigm shift, the contest between the previous pair however remains undetermined and
inconclusive, but fades away from the center-stage of the social concerns. The role that
Quemoy locals played in the anti-pirate war in the seventeenth century is still very much
controversial today. In light of this, even though the binary constructs change, the
underlying chassis causing the primary social issue and its corresponding categories is
still the borderland effect. That said, studies of Quemoy tourism also consider the
borderland effect as the key parameter of its tourist attraction (Chien 2004; Chang 2008).
As tourists from China and Taiwan contest over the meanings of the military relics, the
battlefield tourism arouses other dialectics of the identities of Quemoy and its people.
Considering the management methods of military structures as embodiments of the
landscape dialectics, it then reveals the local viewpoints on the identity issue. The
reediting of the military landscape represents not only the local reinterpretation of the
past, but also a crucial step to remold their homeland into a preferable image that
articulates who they are and where they are. The reinterpretation and reconstruction are
therefore both parts of efforts for the identity reformulation.
Mashan presents the semantic contrast of a place between the opposite viewpoints of
nationalist and communist regimes, the landscape change after demilitarization in
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Mashan, that delivers an “observed observation station,” reveals the contrast between the
two paradigms of the Cold War and the current reconciliation. The irony, generated from
the sharp contrast between meanings attached to places in Quemoy, is therefore two-fold:
one regards the borderland characteristics while the other regards the paradigm shift. As
the mechanism of cultural demilitarization, the latter irony keynotes the landscape change
after the reversal of the geographical coordinate system. When the entertaining aspect of
battlefield tourism continuously consumes the nationalist meanings of individual bunkers,
the irony in landscape also downplays the dominant discourses in the militant society (e.g.
patriotism, anticommunism, etc.). To express goodwill, the Quemoy locals have to
continuously reinvent military relics, the authentic representation of the past, to produce
simulacra for tourist consumption. By so doing, they then can continuously disarm the
past through the reiterative creation of simulation for entertainment. Until another
paradigm shift, the meaning of the Sisyphean task should constantly rest in the recurrent
process instead of the repeated, futile result. In this light, the retention of the military
structures for rehabilitation signifies the local practice to inscribe geographical
articulation of reconciliation with China. By comparison, destruction and abandonment of
military structures would be less effective in expressing their peacemaking intention. The
maneuver not only dissipates the dilemma of developing battlefield tourism and
demilitarization, but also makes them essential to each other. The three social dynamics
in Quemoy merely come as a bundle.
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CHAPTER 5 REINTERPRETING LANDSCAPES:
A JOURNEYTO HYBRIDITY
In celebrating its ninetieth anniversary in 2005, Quemoy County issued a declaration
and officially repudiated its past identity as a battlefield and the associated geographical
marginality (Quemoy Daily 1 Jan. 2005):
Our determination and will to seek peace will never change. Kinmen [Quemoy] is
the bridge of friendship over the two sides of the Strait, not a battlefield. Kinmen is
no longer an offshore island but the center with an ocean and a continent as its
hinterland. . . . Let us . . . built Kinmen into an [special] economic zone of peace . . . .
We will endeavor to push Kinmen on to the global stage.
To accomplish the goal, the county government set its cardinal development policy to rely
on “tourism as foundations of this county and [local] culture as representation of Quemoy
觀光立縣，文化金門” (Luo 2010, 472). By the policy, the county government intends “to
switch the geographic impression of ‘battlefield Quemoy’ into the one of ‘cultural
Quemoy’ 把「戰地金門」的形象扭轉為「文化金門」” (InfoTimes 20 Jun 2007). To mold
the new impression, the authorities incorporated “the traditional Southern Fukien
architecture and the military relics into the local culture 整合金門特有的閩南傳統建築
及戰役史蹟，融入地方文化.” The effort will hopefully “enrich the tourist resources;
animate the tourist industry; and promote the comprehensive development of Quemoy 豐
富觀光資源，活絡旅遊相關產業，促進金門整體發展” (Luo 2010, 472). Through the
policy, the promotion of the local culture fundamentally serves two purposes for Quemoy:
first, to buttress heritage tourism, and second, to reformulate place identities. Except for
the battlefield culture, the cultural heritage in Quemoy generally refers to the southern
Fukien culture and the Chinese emigrant culture, of which the material representations
are the traditional settlement and folk housing in the Southern Fukien style and the
Sino-occidental hybrid architecture owned by overseas Quemoyan (Figure 5.1). In a
tangible sense, to supplant the impression of the battlefield Quemoy by one of the cultural
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Figure 5.1 Traditional Folk Villages in Quemoy. Although the traditional layouts of
most villages remain, the Sino-occidental buildings and modern architectures have
blended in their skylines. [Source: Google Map, photos by the author in 2008 and 2010]
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Quemoy means to maneuver identity reformulation through obliteration of military
structures and revitalization of the antebellum landscape. Provided the two approaches
proceed smoothly, the geographic impression formed after 1949 should no longer
represent Quemoy. However, the identity reformulation brings more complications than a
declaration.
First of all, to obliterate all monumental military structures from the landscape is
unfeasible. When military structures assist tourist development, the locals exempt them
from annihilation (Quemoy Daily 12 Feb. 2012). Since military relics remain the most
characteristic landscape of Quemoy, some of them have survived the demilitarization to
serve as tourist attractions in the post-military era. In addition, these military structures
after reinvention can mostly showcase the local intention of disarmament and
reconciliation. For this reason, the post-conflict society continuously reuses these
structures for peacemaking purpose. Consequently, reinvention of the military landscape
often comprises cultural sanitization to pacify their militaristic connotation. The most
illustrative exemplars of the sort of reinvention appear in the cases where remodeling
enables reuse. War museums, memorials, and commemorative sites were once essential
propaganda that aroused patriotism and anticommunism during wartime. Due to their
capability to indoctrinate the meaning of anticommunist struggles, these places have long
been essential destinations on the battlefield pilgrimage, and over time have developed
into iconic places of Quemoy. In the age of reconciliation, most of these iconographies
however engage in a process of remodeling their interior exhibitions. Remodeled as they
are, they become ideal places to propagandize the present reinterpretation of the past
conflicts. For assistance in peacemaking, these monuments become an integral part of the
tourist Quemoy, and are more valuable to the post-conflict society under reuse than
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destruction. By reinterpreting meaning of landscape, the remodeled military structures
then become the best instruments for demilitarization.
Provided the post-war society successfully nullifies the battlefield identity, to fulfill
the identity reformulation nonetheless requires construction of the “cultural Quemoy.” In
other words, the management of military landscapes—through destruction, abandonment,
and reinvention—are merely half the work of identity reformulation, while the other half
relies on historical preservation. Their collaboration signifies two-way traffic that while
dispatching military structures to the past, the local society simultaneously brings the
historic landscape to the present. The exchange of representative images of Quemoy
generally sums up the mechanism of landscape change after demilitarization.
The construction of place image results in the ahistorical juxtaposition of multiple
cultures in the landscape that consist mainly of three themes: the Cold War battlefield, the
southern Fukien folk settlements, and the homeland of overseas Quemoyan. The
reinvented and reconstructed spaces of these cultures scattered over the island lead
tourists jumping from one time portal to another, and constitute a quixotic journey of the
surreal, poetic Quemoy. The poetic effect of heritage tourism on tourists is especially
conspicuous on group tours: As the tourists travel among historic sites, military relics,
and scenic spots by bus during the day, hotels cater to most of their needs in the evening.
Even when spontaneous excursions are possible, they have little chance to make in-depth
observations on the local ordinary life. In consequence, their busy itinerary overloaded
with Quemoy cultures inversely conceals the mundane Quemoy from them, and their
Quemoy can thus be aloof from the day-to-day reality.27 Whereas the “cultural Quemoy”
27

In the summer of 2008, I attended a five-day workshop held by Taiwan Historica and the Quemoy
County government in Quemoy. After several days of field trips and lectures, I overheard a Taiwanese
participant commenting in the tour bus: There seemed to be no 7-Eleven convenient stores in Quemoy. At
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pervades tourists’ ontological experience in their quest for the “authentic” image of the
tourist destination, the reinterpretation of Quemoy is in effect working in the landscape to
contest for the dominant place image, a Cold-Was battlefield. Consequently, the
multiculturalism, as the outcome of the contest, reveals the underlying culture of
postmodernity, which conjures the ahistorical juxtaposition of historic simulacra to serve
as the local cultural commodity for mass tourism. Based on the landscape change in the
post-conflict Quemoy, this chapter explores the construction of a homeland image for
identity reformulation and its resulting cultural hybridity that bespeaks the overlapping,
contesting, and polyvalent meanings of place.
5.1 The Other End: Preserving Historic Sites for Tourism
In comparison with Taiwan, Quemoy has a much longer history. For the reason,
some of its historic sites have long been popular sightseeing spots for Taiwanese tourists
since the Cold-War period. Until 2012, the county government has designated a total of
twenty-three historic sites and 145 historic buildings to secure the resources of the
heritage tourism. Due to the policy of tourist development, the number of designated
historic sites increased 110 percent in the last twenty years in Quemoy. In addition, since
the amendment of the Cultural Heritages Preservation Act enabled the registration of
historic buildings in 2000, the number of historic buildings in Quemoy skyrocketed and
amounts to 14 percent of the national total.28 Among these historic buildings, 71 percent
least, she did not see any. In fact, there were four in Jinchen near where we stayed, and we passed by some
of them a few times a day on the bus. As the county government strived to show participants in the
workshop as many cultural sites as our time allowed, the tight schedule however alienated us from the
everyday life. Likewise, the alienation is a common condition for group tourists who usually will only stay
in Quemoy for two evenings, as indicated by the best-selling tour package (Chang 2011).
28
Before the abolishment of Martial Law in 1992, the total of historic sites in Quemoy was twenty-one,
among which six were designated on Nov. 23 1991, and thus could also be a part of the local efforts for the
tourist development (Huang 2008). According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of Culture, R.O.C.,
the total of registered historical building is 1,031 in 2012. The number of historic buildings in Quemoy is
the second most among the twenty-two counties and cities in R.O.C., just a few less than the 163 buildings
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(103 of 145) are residences including traditional folk houses and the Sino-occidental
hybrid architectures. The intention to preserve the local vernacular culture is obvious. In
addition to the designation of historic sites and buildings, the preservation movement
further expands its horizon to protect houses that disqualify for historic designation in the
two architectural styles. The ambitious expansion of coverage protects the integrality of
traditional settlements (their layouts, skylines, etc.) when there is no strict military
regulations to constrain the rampant housing development. For preservation purposes, the
county government and the KNP both offer subsidies as financial incentives (with a
maximum of two million Taiwan dollars, ca. $67,000 USD) for private owners to restore
their old houses back to mint condition.29 Furthermore, the KNP also restores folk houses
and historic buildings for their owners if they will let the KNP use the properties for thirty
years. After restoration, the KNP subleases most of these properties to the private sector
through public competitions, by which they then fulfill the goal to rehabilitate historic
buildings. Since 1999, the KNP has acquired the utilization rights of seventy-seven
buildings, and completely restored sixty-four until 2012. Among restored buildings,
except for seven kept in the KNP as museums and on-site offices, private tenants operate
bed-and-breakfasts in forty-nine of them and retail stores in five (Kinmen National Park
n.d.). Whereas the majority of these fully-sponsored restoration projects become tourist
amenities afterwards, their use suggests that a practical cause of historic preservation in
registered in the Taipei City.
29
According to the Quemoy County Autonomous Regulation of Preservation Incentives for Traditional
Architectures 金門縣維護傳統建築風貌獎助自治條例 amended in 2006, the county government will
subsidize a maximum of 1,600,000 TWD (ca. $53,000 USD) for restoration projects in the county but
outside the national park areas. The KNP also decrees a similar regulation, the Implementation Guidelines
of Preservation Incentives for Traditional Architectures 金門國家公園維護傳統建築風貌獎勵補助實施
要點, which subsidizes a maximum of 2,000,000 TWD (ca. $67,000 USD) for the general restoration
according to the latest version amended in 2011. Up to 2009, the KNP has subsidized 237 buildings
(Kinmen National Park n.d.), and the county government has done the same for 347 buildings (Kinmen
County Government n.d.).
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Quemoy is to produce handmaids of cultural tourism. Under the influence of the
development policy of the Quemoy County that promotes incorporation of tourism with
reinvention of cultural landscape, a massive movement of historic preservation came into
being. Consequently, the total number of buildings under preservation has exceeded 850
in Quemoy in 2012. With the movement flourishing, the cultural landscape of Quemoy
thus retains a reminiscent tinge.
Through the preservation movement, the governmental agencies revive the image of
antebellum Quemoy in the present landscape. According to the cultural policies of the
county head (2001-2009), the historic preservation purports to “mold Quemoy into a
multicultural museum island so as to constitute the burgeoning cultural industries 塑造
金門成為多元的博物館島，再造新興文化產業” (Lee Zhu-Fong Election Campaign
Headquarters 2005, 23). By retaining, restoring, and reusing buildings in the traditional
Southern Fukien style and the Sino-occidental hybrid style, the preservation movement
re-presents a historical Quemoy in a golden age that in fact has never existed in its history
due to the anachronistic juxtaposition. The “museum island” policy attempts to deliver a
“hyperreality,” in which “[s]imulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or
a substance. It is the generation of models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal”
(Baudrillard 1988, 166). The products of “historic preservation” in this view are thus
contemporary creation of hyperreal verisimilitudes. Since most landscape features under
preservation belong to the local traditional culture, their general distribution in the whole
island urges the formation of a nexus of eco-museums to turn Quemoy into a site of
hyperreality. Toward this end, the chairman of the national council of cultural affairs
suggests that the construction of “cultural Quemoy” should rely on a public-participatory
process to establish a solid ground for community development. Furthermore, by
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spontaneous public participation, the construction can bring out the local distinctiveness,
and increase the local identification with the place (Chen 2004). In this view, the
construction of “a multicultural museum island” attempts to produce a representative
image of Quemoy, which communicates how the civil society in the post-conflict era
prefers its homeland to be recognized by others, and how the locals consider that their
ideal homeland should be. The preservation movement is thus an opportunity for the
locals to realize their homeland reformation. In other words, historic preservation
embodies locals’ intention to retrieve their homeland lost in militarization. Through the
localization, they demonstrate their control of place and again leave the group impress in
landscape. The place and identity reformulation motivate them to stride over the
transition towards peacetime.
Practically, historic preservation produces attractions for heritage tourism and
amenities with local specificity, such as the old-house bed-and-breakfasts. As declared by
the core development policy of Quemoy County—tourism is the county’s foundation and
culture is its representation, accordingly the heritage tourism and multiculturalism are
two sides of the same coin. Culturally, the preservation of these traditional buildings
arouses a renaissance of the immaterial cultures, by which the post-military society
revisits the local conventions and reinterprets their meanings and values that strongly
connected with the local group identities. Meanwhile, the cultural renaissance also stirs
the production of knowledge forming a discursive field that establishes the connection
between the local vernacular culture and the hegemonic culture in traditional China. The
emphases on the genesis of the island, which starts by a group of Han elites from the
Chinese cultural hearth in the northern plain, and on their role in the anti-pirate war, who
as pious Confucianists were the loyal supporters of the empire, are both historic
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discourses serving for the connection. Such historic discourses aim to consolidate the
legitimacy of the local culture to portray it as the paradigmatic type of the Han Chinese
tradition, which then transcends the insular time-space limitation, and is applicable to a
broader geographical area and an eclectic ethnic group. The knowledge of the traditional
settlements in Quemoy produced in the recent research is an example. To increase the
cultural value of the folk settlements, a catchphrase repeatedly used by preservationists to
stress their significance is a metaphor of Quemoy as “the gene pool of the Southern
Fukien culture 閩南文化的基因庫.” The metaphor comes from an architecture
historian’s research published by the county government (Jiang 2002, 15):
The traditional settlements in Quemoy embody the harmonious relation among the
“universe, earth, and humanity” in the Han people’s ideologies. In addition, their
interior layouts articulate the social relations of the traditional patriarchy . . . . It is
pertinent to say that they are the gene pool of the Southern Fukien culture and the
Southern Fukien architectures. 金門的傳統聚落是漢民族「天、地、人」和諧思
維的再現，內部的配置更反映了宗法倫理的社會關係……可說是閩南文化與閩
南建築的基因庫……。
The (re)appraisal of the material culture attaches great significance to the folk villages,
which then hold extra cultural value to inspire heritage tourism. While reconstruction of
historic simulacra as tourist spots demands further research, production of knowledge
reciprocally contribute to the discursive field. Ultimately, the cultural renaissance avails
reconciliation. Whereas the maritime powers have only been capable of overwhelming
empires in several, comparatively ephemeral time periods, Quemoy in its long history has
usually been an inseparable part of the mainland China. Due to historical geopolitics, the
cultural renaissance supplies an essential cognitive footing to justify the political cause of
reconciliation by convention; thereby rekindling the local social and cultural connection
with the mainland. After all, as the Quemoy County declared during the celebration of its
ninetieth anniversary, to remove the battlefield identity for peacemaking is the collective
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aspiration of the local people. For this purpose, the preservation movement is the local
quest for new place identities, and leads to a rite of passage to re-inscribe the landscape
impress of the post-war society. Whereas to create new often begets oblivion, the
preservation movement begets the cultural renaissance which flourishes at the cost of the
battlefield culture. In contrast to preservation applied to the traditional structures,
destruction and desertion await military relics. Although the waning of battlefield culture
signifies the achievements of demilitarization, more importantly it brings forth the
cultural hybridity in the landscape mosaic of the post-conflict society.
Maoshan Tower 矛山塔 is one of the three pagodas built with the coastal
fortifications and the walled city in the fourteenth century. In the folklore, the general
ordered to build these pagodas for fengshui considerations (Tang 2006), but recent
research propagates that it functions mainly as a navigational reference (Huang et al.
2003). Maoshan Tower stands atop a hill, currently known as Maoshan 矛山, rising from
the rocky coast on the southwest corner of Quemoy. In a lithograph landscape of Quemoy
in the 1630s from a viewpoint on the sea (Figure 5.2), the elaborate portrayal of Maoshan
Tower suggests a clear, conspicuous view of the pagoda during seaborne navigation. Due
to its prominence, Maoshan Tower over time became a local landmark, and for villagers
in Shuitou 水頭, the settlement adjacent to Maoshan, the pagoda is the iconography of
their village (Quemoy Daily 22 May 2004). In the 1930s, to report the local news to
villagers working overseas, the elementary school in Shuitou issued a periodical, the
Tower Hill Monthly 塔峰月刊, which used the image of Maoshan Tower on the cover of
all issues (Huang et al. 2003). In 1961, the troops in Quemoy dismantled the pagoda
because it provided a geographical prominent targeting reference for the communist
artillery. Afterwards, the military built a faux radar station on the hilltop site as a decoy
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Figure 5.2. Quemoy in the 1630s. The pagoda on the right is Maoshan Tower. The Fort Quemoy at the center is where
the island gets it current name. [Source: Lee 2004b]
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for the enemy shells (Quemoy Daily 13 Jul. 2005). Right after the military released the
island from its rule in 1992, the villagers in Shuitou immediately appealled to the county
government for the reconstruction of Maoshan Tower. The villages provided a photo of
the pagoda found in the old periodical as the model for reconstruction (Huang et al. 2003).
After the reconstruction of Maoshan Tower was completed in 2004 (Figure 5.3), the
county government erected a stele with inscriptions about the vicissitude of the pagoda.
The inscription specifically points out that the purpose to re-erect the pagoda is “to fulfill
the goal to construct—tourism as the county foundations; culture as Quemoy’s
representation 以實現觀光立縣文化金門之目標.” Along with the return of the cultural
landmark, the military facility on the hilltop thus ceased to represent the place, and since
passed into oblivion.
In contrast, the villagers’ urgent aspiration to restore the symbolic landscape reveals
their regret of its loss. On its destruction, a local preservationist sarcastically remarked,
“This pagoda was built for the military purpose [as a part of the coastal defenses] but was
also destroyed for the same 此塔因軍事需要而建，也因軍事因素而拆” (Huang et al.
2003, 35). Living under the military hegemony during the wartime, the oppressed
villagers reluctantly abided by the defense considerations that the military insisted upon,
which not only destroyed the pagoda but subsumed the area of Maoshan into military
reserve. As a result, the military deployment segregated the villagers from the landscape
feature central to their collective memory and identity. After the abolishment of Martial
Law returned the control of place, the villagers immediately wielded the newly gained
power to reshape the landscape. They intended to revert the surroundings to their
homeland in the memories by removing the military landscape that was not in the
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Figure 5.3. The Reconstructed Maoshan Tower and the Stele for it Dedication in
2004. [photos by the author]
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antebellum landscape. In the discussion on the cultural repercussions of militarization,
Huang confesses the mentality of iconoclasm (2011, 147):
With the resistance to and the desire to be released from [the military hegemony] . . .
the Quemoy locals [after demilitarization] often reckoned that many unreasonable
controls and restraints in the past were the most resentful objects that must be
destroyed or even completely eradicated from the landscape in no other way can
their anger vent sufficiently. 存在著欲求解脫與抗拒的心理……金門百姓，面對
許多往日不合理的管制與約束，往往視其為深惡痛絕的對象，非加以破壞甚至
連根拔起不足以洩憤
As the precondition of the historic reconstruction is the destruction of military structures,
the trade-off in this case is an advanced version of demilitarization, which in addition to
destruction reconstructs the cultural landscape central to the Shuitou villagers. Similarly,
the reconstruction of monuments originated from the mentality of transitional justice that
urges the locals to leave their cultural impress in their homeland. After Maoshan
reopened to the public and the villagers witnessed the remnants of the Maoshan Tower,
the ruins evoked memories about the pagoda in their daily life, and “stirred an intensive,
historic nostalgia 勾起一股強烈的歷史情懷” that drove them to appeal for the
reconstruction (Huang et al. 2003, 42). The appeal for reconstruction articulated their
bonding with place, and the consequent recurrence of Maoshan Tower in the landscape
demonstrated the exertion of control of place by the locals today. Thereby, the
demilitarization and historic preservation in Quemoy represented a constituent process of
homeland (re)construction.
5.2 Representations of Quemoy: Dialogue between Reinvention and Reconstruction
By reshaping landscape, the construction of new place images to replace the one of a
battlefield engages the civic society into a dialectical process of place representation. The
collaboration to cast a destination image of heritage tourism through reinvention of
military relics and historic preservation discloses the dialogues among the cultural/tourist
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Quemoy, the battlefield Quemoy, and the everyday Quemoy. The contest for the
representative image indicates a shift in the local power structure in the post-military era.
Whereas the wane of nationalism unveils the colonialist tinge of the modern military
culture, the military past is now construed as a totalitarian imposition on Quemoy,
sequentially making it the “the great tragedy of the epoch” (Huang 2004b). Following the
development of democratization, the transplanted, hegemonic military culture of the
nationalist army declined into an inferior status to other local(ized) cultures—of the Han
in North China or of the European in Southeast Asia. The rising awareness of local
cultures gradually suppressed the world of modern military culture (battlefield Quemoy),
and increasingly appreciated the vernacular cultures (the cultural Quemoy). Aside from
the fact that the alienation from the military past facilitated the pursuit of reconciliation
with China, the local people in fact have an estranged relation with the Cold-War military
landscape. As the military rigorously forbade civilian access to military reserves,
inhabitants have long excluded these military enclaves from their daily life since the
military squatted on these lands. With the return of the lands from the military to the local
lifeworld, the civil society has embarked on relocating these former military sites in the
post-military societal structure. Meanwhile, by reinterpreting their meanings, these
military structures also partake in the reformulation of place image under negotiation,
resistance, or selectively appropriation.
Through reediting the syntax of landscape, the municipal intention to create
“cultural Quemoy” for tourist consumption and self-reinvention has brought about the
dialogue among representations of place and the existing material settings of Quemoy. As
shown in the case of Maoshan Tower, its reconstruction reveals the local eagerness to
return the space to a heritage site; meanwhile conceal the former use of the place as a
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military facility. The case of Maoshan Tower demonstrates the dialogue in two ways.
First, it provides illustrations of how the “representation is created from a place and, in
turn, contributes to the reproduction of that place” (Hanna 1996, 637). The effect of
representation on “real” spaces unravels, especially when the county government actually
relied on the photo of the pagoda in old periodicals as the model for the reconstruction.
The repercussions of representations on the landscape encapsulate and reify the dialogue
between the representation and reality. With the re-erection of Maoshan Tower, its
representations, namely the periodical photos and the seventeen-century lithograph
landscape, become cultural capital of the place. Second, although nostalgia is the major
factor prompting reconstruction, concealment of military uses suggest a contest for the
dominant representation of Quemoy. However triggered by the social memories, the
reconstruction aims to constitute the tourist/cultural Quemoy, as indicated on the stela to
celebrate re-erection of the pagoda. The reconstruction reveals that the social memory is
actually less about the past, but “involves interpreting or remembering the past in ways
relevant to the present” (DeLyser 2003, 886). Through the presentist lenses, the
reproduction of place to resurrect the antebellum landscape discloses the dialectics
between the cultural Quemoy and the current landscape under demilitarization.30
Politically, the contest for the representative image of the island often results in
re-inscription of landscape, of which “the patterns of destruction [of monuments] offer
30

After its completion, authenticity of the new pagoda was called into question. Some villagers of Shuitou
overtly expressed their discontent with the “falsified reproduction.” A councilwoman from the village
displayed an old photo of the pagoda, and complained that “the current [re-erected] Maoshan Tower is too
far from the original landscape 現在的茅山塔與舊有景觀相差太多.” In her view, the discrepancy
stemmed from the county government’s disregard, and thus disrespect, for the local voices (Quemoy Daily
28 Nov. 2004). As indicated by her opinion, the authenticity of the reproduction actually hinges upon
whether the county government asked villagers’ opinions. As their involvement stands for the villagers’
control of place, the disregard stimulates the issue of authenticity. To this point, the reconstruction has
become a means for the villagers to bargain political leverage; which illustrates that the recurrence of the
past actually has more to do with the present situation.
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insight into how nations interpret highly contested political places and events” (Foote et
al. 2000, 307). Furthermore, concomitant with the destruction, “new monuments were
erected and damaged monuments restored if they celebrated the ideology of the new
government” (Foote et al. 2000, 307). Based on their observations, it is clear that the
re-inscription comprises a goal to reshape landscape toward the current social quests. The
necessity of congruence with the dominant discourse may also explain why the
re-inscription more often than not disadvantages the continuance of military structures,
but prioritizes historic preservation in Quemoy. Cultural prejudice occurs alongside the
discrimination. Lowenthal offers his insight to this process (1975, 31):
[Cultural prejudice] affects what is preserved, what is suffered to vanish, and what is
deliberately destroyed. Features recalled with pride are apt to be safeguarded against
erosion and vandalism; those that reflect shame may be ignored or expunged from
the landscape.
Reminding of the military oppression, the military facilities in Quemoy are under threat
of effacement also for their obstruction of reconciliation. The military remnants in the
peacetime have become monuments, which from time to time conjure up bitter memories
of yesteryear under military rule, about the strict control, the heavy levy, the property
requisition, and the service in the militia. Such symbolism undoubtedly accelerates their
destruction. Even so, the iconoclasm cannot bring all the military structures to extinction.
Neither can the construction of cultural Quemoy syncretically expunge military
landscapes. On the contrary, the pursuit of a new representation does not produce a
hegemonic image to replace the battlefield Quemoy, but counter-intentionally results in
an ambiguous image of the island with cultural hybridity. Hanna comments on this
seeming contradiction: “It seems that the very process of representation that is necessary
in the definition of place is the same process that replaces certain knowledge of what
place is with unavoidable ambiguity” (1996, 633). As such, the attempt to supplant
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battlefield Quemoy with cultural Quemoy dialectically produces a collage offering
cultural diversity for heritage tourism.
As the mosaic representation unfolds, both a total demilitarization of the military
landscape and a comprehensive reversion to the antebellum landscape are impractical and
unfruitful. Some military structures, like Mashan Observation Station, have turned into
battlefield tourism destinations through rehabilitation. By and large, despite their physical
retention, the place identity of these former military structures has changed, and they
subsist in a different manner from their initial purpose. The material and immaterial
changes have disarmed their martial connotation. In other cases, when both the physical
structures and their place identities remain intact, reinvention usually changes their
meanings in the post-conflict era. The semantic transformation often happens to
commemorative spaces.
During the Cold-War period, monuments, museums, or public artworks of
anticommunism functioned as instruments for political warfare to uplift the social morale.
Due to their national significance for patriotic propaganda, some of these symbolic
structures assumed unique iconographies of Quemoy. These sites became sacred places
for nationalists, bundled with the identity of Quemoy. Their images were basically what
Quemoy was known for when landscape in the frontline was highly sensitive and
confidential. These nationalist sanctuaries have since represented Quemoy. Today,
although the local people resist the battlefield identity, they keep these structures
undisturbed under demilitarization. In addition, the government continues to use these
places as battlefield attractions. Nevertheless, changes have been made to assimilate these
iconographies to the political weather of the post-conflict Quemoy. The most discernable
adaptation to the zeitgeist occurs in the remodeled interior of the memorial halls and their
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renewed interpretive materials. Through renovation, the museums now narrate old stories
afresh in two tones that, in addition to celebrations of the military victory, the governance
success, and the nationalist doctrines, the museums also comprise discourses from the
civilian viewpoint and thematic displays on local subjects.
Politics of representation often emerge concomitant with shifts in the power
structure. By referring to the evolving signifying system, the post-conflict society
reinvents meanings of its monuments for the new age, and their redefinition subsequently
follows reproduction of place. In a constructivist view, meanings of monuments in
commemoration of the past stem from “how they are conceived in retrospect, and our
conception of the past derives entirely from the condition and concerns of the present”
(Boholm 1997, 266). Thereby, “negotiation, resistance, or selective appropriation”
(Hanna 1996, 633) are dialectics between the present and the past, the cultural/tourist and
the battlefield Quemoy. The dialectical process most obviously takes shape in the
memorial halls, which convey the redefined meanings of the commemorated subjects
through their remodeled interior and their renewed interpretive materials. By the
treatment of remodeling, these nationalist scared grounds as well as iconographies of
Quemoy survive the post-conflict iconoclasm, and integrate into the new power structure.
The appropriation through reinterpretation suggests a “semantic flexibility that enabled it
[a monument] to remain a focal point of commemorative activity” (Stangl 2003, 213).
Due to the flexibility, the meaning of monuments becomes ambiguous and eclectic. Their
change from a showcase of anticommunist achievements to a kaleidoscope with
heterogeneous mnemonics of the wartime past for the locals reveals such flexibility. With
reinterpretations, meaning of these memorials expands and becomes multivocal.
Observing the spatial trait, Till (1999, 251) defines a memorial as
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both a material object and a site of negotiation; it remains “entangled” with the
ongoing creation of historical narratives, official visions, local memories and
cultural productions.
Notwithstanding the flexibility, reinterpretations do not come into being unconstrained,
nor are they completely presupposed by history. As each specific milieu strategically
produces different interpretations of monuments for its time, they share an interlocked
semantic relation between one another (Boholm 1997, 267):
[t]radition and innovation should be understood as complementary and
interdependent. . . . [traditions] modify and change through time as a result both of
their internal dynamic and in response to external demands. The present is informed
by the past and the past is reconstrued by the present.
As the interpretations call upon each other to compete for the dominant paradigm, the
invention of interpretation is purported to conceal its immediate predecessor, which in the
Quemoy case oftentimes refers to anticommunism. Nonetheless, the concealment of these
inherited iconographies does not always rely on physical operation on the landscape.
The cultural demilitarization for these iconographic structures can also proceed through
selective appropriation, so that their recognizable and constituent image for battlefield
tourism and self-identification may remain. With only partial modifications applied to
these structures, their meanings, as the remodeled interior transpire, are anachronistically
tangled up in between the present and the past. These cases of remodeling consequently
become places that Foucault terms as “heterotopias” where “all the other real sites that
can be found within the culture are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted”
(Foucault 1986, 24). The memorials, as heterotopias of time, juxtapose a constellation of
phantoms that each responsively evokes another, and all together form a Babel in the
contest for the dominant representation of the past.
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5.2.1

The Juguang Memorial: Desacralization of a Nationalist Shrine

The most renowned case of remodeling in Quemoy is the Juguang Memorial 莒光
樓. (Figure 5.4) In 1952, the QDH mobilized both troops and civilians to construct this
building to celebrate the military feats of the servicemen during the past few battles
(Chang 2003). The commander of QDH, General Hu Lian 胡璉, asked a young
solider—the first “Combat Hero” of the Chinese Nationalist forces—to write down
“Juguang Memorial” in calligraphy as the characters on the nameplate of the building.
The gesture of writing on the building façade is said to dedicate the memorial to ordinary
people as heroes (Chang 2003). The memorial is located in the southern outskirts of
Jinchen against the Mt. Fonglian; nestled on a steep slope rising from the southern rim of
the estuary of the Wujiang Creek. The straight avenue running down from its foundation
forms a vista with the Juguang Memorial at the center. Its location and designed
surroundings bring forth the building against its background as the visual focus for the
vicinity. Additionally, an observer at the building has an unobstructed and far-reaching
view and can skim over the influx, the sea, and the scattered isles dotted in between, and
fix on the mainland on a clear day. The memorial is in a Chinese revival style mimicking
bastions of the Forbidden City (Jiang 2002). The adoption of the Chinese “national style”
to the memorial attempts “to erect a spiritual symbol of the battlefield Quemoy by the
image of conventional, classic architecture 以正統的、古典的建築形象，豎立戰地金
門的精神象徵” (Chang 2003, 41). On the hillside by the estuary, the prominent structure
in the flamboyant style stands out from its monotone surroundings. By its geography and
architectural style, the Juguang Memorial is able to draw attention from afar and hence
stands as a prominant landmark. The name “Juguang,” translated as “the glory earned in
recovering the lost land,” has predetermined the symbolim of the building as “a space to
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The Juguang Memorial in the 1960s-1970s.
As a nationalist shrine, the memorial was
the locale for masses to perform rituals of
the civic religion during the military rule.
[Source: Lee 1996]

a

Figure 5.4. The Juguang Memorial in 2004.
The memorial is located on the high ground
adjacent to the estuary (a). The topography
enables visitors a panorama of landscape below,
and renders the memorial a landmark (b). The
different spatial performances in front of the
monument indicate its identity change after
demilitarization. [photo by the author]

b
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indoctrinate patriotism 愛國主義教化空間”(Jiang 2002, 153). By celebrating the
ordinary people as patriotic war heroes, the memorial conveys the notion that everyone in
the nation should look up to, and behave as the heroic role models. For this reason, the
memorial in the frontline, where the patriotism runs high and is most in need, functions as
a sacred shrine of nationalism, which over time turns into a token of all the ideologies
relevant to the civil religion.
Due to the symbolism of the Juguang Memorial, the R.O.C. government in Taipei
started a campaign baring the building’s name in 1964 to strengthen the resolution of the
general public to recover the mainland China from communists. Thence, “Juguang”
became a popular name among public organs nationwide (Yan and Chen 2007, 128-9):
Since the beginning of this campaign, all the works set to restore the regime of the
R.O.C. in the mainland [turned and] centered on this campaign. Back then, crack
forces were called Juguang Company; military heroes were called Juguang Model;
and a [television] program of political indoctrination was called Juguang Corner.
Even schools, buildings, roads, trains, and whatnot were all fashionably used
“Juguang” as their names. 自此運動後，中華民國的復國工程無不以此為主軸。
那時，績優部隊叫做莒光連隊，國軍英雄喚為莒光楷模，政治教學裡有莒光園
地，就連學校、大樓、道路、火車等等，都時興以「莒光」為名。
With the name widespread, its image followed. The most influential application of the
image was in the 1960s to a series of commemorative postage stamps with a total of
1.822 billion in circulation around the world (Huang 2003). Contingent to the political
purpose of the campaign, the omnipresence of its name and image in Taiwan sequentially
impressed an inseparable bond between Quemoy and the memorial on the public
understanding. As the direct result of the campaign, the Juguang Memorial became the
unique iconography of Quemoy, and reciprocally only in Quemoy, the nationalist
frontline, could the Juguang Memorial maximize its significance. A Quemoy local, who
has participated in construction of the memorial, related the memorial to his life, and
sentimentally remarked after the recollection (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003),
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Without the Juguang Memorial, the greatness of Quemoy, testified by the suffering
and difficulties, cannot shine through. Likewise, without Quemoy, the extraordinary
splendor of the Juguang Memorial would be dimmed with dust. 沒有莒光樓，金門
顯不出艱辛苦難中的偉大；沒有金門同樣讓莒光樓發不出耀眼驚世的光芒
Their interdependency made the memorial a nationalist sacred place and, for the Quemoy
people, an honorable symbol of their homeland.
As a shrine of the civil religion, the interior of the memorial was a commemorative
space to glorify the nationalist accomplishments both in the military and administrative
aspects in Quemoy. There are three floors in the memorial, and each consists of different
media to showcase the accomplishments: The lobby at the ground level is a convention
and presentation space. Therein, presenters in the military costume would introduce
visitors the military defense and the governmental accomplishments in Quemoy with a
detailed model of Quemoy and slide shows or documentaries on the screen at the end of
the lobby. Above the screen was a marble tablet inscribed with Chiang Kai-shek’s
calligraphy of the famous anticommunist slogan: Lest We Forget [our exile] 毋忘在莒.
The second floor was an exhibition space displaying sundry materials related to political
warfare, including elaboration of the psychological operations, the nationalist propaganda,
and the communist counterparts. On the third floor, a series of war heroes’ portrayals and
texts describing their feats were on display “to set the paradigmatic models 樹典型之榜
樣” (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003). Along with these were photos of Chiang inspecting
the military and the local establishments in this frontline. On the balcony of the floor,
views of the mainland China often evoked nostalgia for Chinese in exile. The images of
the benevolent war leader and the beloved homeland both incite the Chinese nationalists
to devote themselves to the campaign of recovering the mainland. Although portions of
the exhibition in the memorial had changed during the years, the displayed materials
constantly served the purpose of political education. The memorial for its function and
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fame, was oftentimes the first stop of the visitors’ itinerary in Quemoy. By a visit to the
memorial, visitors would acquire the general understanding of the military stronghold.
Therefore, when the county government decided to make tourism its economic mainstay,
it remodeled the memorial to “strengthen its role as the first stop greeting visitors, and [to]
enrich it into a ‘tourist service center’ 強化莒光樓作為金門迎賓第一站的角色，充實成
為「旅遊服務中心」” (Jiang 2002, 127).
When I interviewed Ms. Song, an official in the Transportation and Tourism Bureau
in Quemoy, about the renovation project of the Juguang Memorial in 2003, she repeatedly
stressed that the memorial’s external structure was undisturbed during the renovation. It
was mainly the interior displays and the outdoor landscaping had been altered. Her
emphasis on the conservativeness of the treatment applied to the building suggested the
local awareness of its symbolic significance, which may well insinuate into the local
semiotic system. According to the local rumor, both the memorial and the Maoshan
Tower were the communist batteries’ calibration references, which is why the military
destroyed the latter (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003). However, due to its symbolic value,
the memorial was untouched neither by the nationalist army nor by the pouring shells
during the ferocious bombardments and the eccentric twenty-year-long shelling (Huang
and Chen 2009).31 Against the nearly miraculous survival, it would be a sheer irony if
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Although another account indicates that “the wall of the Juguang Memorial has also been pocked with
shell holes 莒光樓牆上也曾彈痕點點” (Quemoy Daily 22 Oct. 2003), the significance of the claim that
the enemy fire has never hit the memorial resides in its resemblance to another legend. As the religious
center of the Guningtou village, the Temple of Emperor Guan 關帝廟 is a landmark located right next to
an artillery position, which was a major target of the enemy fire during the war. Villagers shared a legend
about the temple to account for how it could soundly survive the furious bombardment: “According to the
gun crew, they had seen a general in green robe, standing on the roof of the temple, wielding his blade [to
protect the building] . . . 據砲兵傳述，他們曾看到一位綠袍將軍，站在廟宇頂上，揮舞著關刀” (Lee
2009, 27). As in the locals’ belief it actually takes a god to perform the miracle to protect the building from
being hit, the claim that the same miracle happened to the shrine of the civil religion suggests its place in
the local signifying system.
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the renovation practically destroyed the memorial; however it did not, but merely gelded
the “spiritual symbol of the battlefield Quemoy” (Chang 2003, 41).
In performing demilitarization, the county government removed the former political
display that might provoke future inconvenience for the building to be the visitor center
of Quemoy. For this purpose, the display of the political warfare disappeared, and so did
the celebration of the war heroes’ feats on the third floor. Instead of presenting the
political and military achievements of the nationalist regime, interpreters today play a
twenty-minute film, titled as “Introduction to the Tourism in Quemoy 金門觀光簡介,”
four times a day in the lobby. For visitors to attain a general understanding of Quemoy,
according to Ms. Song, the display in the first floor presents a concise introduction of the
local customs, cultural characteristics, and special products. Filling the lobby in between
the movies was the melody of a ballad, titled as “Affection for Sweet Potatoes 蕃薯情,”
in which the native songwriter used the plant, being the mainstay of Quemoyan for
centuries, as a metaphor of the local people.32 His lyrics referred to the tenacious vitality
of the plant to suggest the fortitude of Quemoyan, which sustained them through flames
of war: “Even though shells penetrate my dreamland, they cut off no vines of sweet
potatoes spreading over the hillsides 夢鄉穿砲彈，滿山的蕃薯藤切不斷” (Lee 1999). In
addition, the exhibition in the second floor consists of two themes—the natural
environment of Quemoy and the cult of the city god 城隍信仰. Special emphasis is put
on its annual carnival, which is the most important religious activity in Quemoy, and the
majority of islanders spontaneously participate in the celebration. The main exhibition on
the third floor was dedicated to the modern patron saint of Quemoy, General Hu Lian,
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After its introduction to China in the sixteenth century, sweet potato soon became the major staple food
for the southeastern Chinese. See Mann’s (2011) book for details regarding the introduction.
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who received the title for his contribution to the island in his term of office. Furthermore,
a brief review of the Cold-War history and the history of the memorial were also on
display. By the modifications of exhibition, the remodeling deconsecrates the nationalist
sacred place; instead produces a pacified museum with its theme centered on Quemoy.
Although most features constituting the nationalist shrine has gone with the lost
cause of recovering the mainland China after the remodeling, the memorial retains a thing
or two to substantiate itself as a renowned anticommunist symbol. Both the photos of
Chiang taken in Quemoy and the tablet born his calligraphy are soundly in situ. Like the
Mashan Observation Station, the memorial demands a dual identity to maintain its
attractiveness as a historic landmark and its current function as a visitor center. However,
the change of place identity seemingly endures with extra convenience for reinvention to
take place. The new exhibition marches right in without complications of incompatibility.
The reinvention is similar to reusing a glass milk bottle as a flower vase: There is nothing
inappropriate about the recycling, but one can easily tell that the bottle is not made for
flowers. However, what if a dairy filled the reused milk bottle, i.e. the flower vase, with
chocolate milk, and repacked it as if it was naturally a bottle of chocolate milk? The
renovated condition then partially conceals its past from us, through a socially
constructed system, as the dairy (the institution) and the practice of recycling (the
institutional practice) in this case. A situation like that is where a reinterpretation
(chocolate milk) comes into play on request. The renovation of the August 23rd Battle
Museum is just the case of selective appropriation through reinterpretation.
5.2.2

The August 23rd Battle Museum: Cultural Appropriation for Localization

In commemoration of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis on August 23rd 1958, the
military built the museum on the thirtieth anniversary of the artillery war (Figure 5.5, 5.6).
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The dedication, as inscribed on the stele on a museum wall, is to “carry forward the
honorable war history of our nation’s military 發揚國軍光榮戰史.” Thereby, “all we
soldiers should learn from the models . . . ; commit and devote to the great cause of
recovering the mainland China under the Three People’s Principles [the nationalist
ultimate doctrines] 凡我軍人當知見賢景法……矢志以三民主義統一中國大業奉獻奮
鬥” (see He 1999, 78). For the objective, the military dedicated two walls, on both sides
of the museum gate by inscribing the names of soldiers who died in the artillery war. In
the outdoor plaza, the military displayed a fighter plane, a landing vessel, a few tanks,
and howitzers that served in the battle. When visitors entered the museum, the “Blue Sky
with a White Sun 青天白日” emblems of the Chinese nationalist regime occupied their
view. Against a marble wall, two rows of military flags with the emblem flanked a
portrait of Chiang who stood in front of the inscription, “Lest We Forget [our exile],” on a
monolith on Mt. Taiwu. Hovering over the lobby, a large nationalist emblem seemingly
bathed all entering visitors with its glory from the ceiling (Figure 5.7, 5.8). The emblem
and flags were a common design of the nationalist commemorative spaces that also
appeared in the martyr’s shrine in the valley of Mt. Taiwu, the Battle of Guningtou
Museum, and the Hujingtou War Museum 湖井頭戰史館 in Leiyu. Inside the museum,
the exhibition included “pieces of historic shots of the battle 一張張歷史性的戰爭鏡頭”
regarding supply operations, tragic incidents, and feats of the great war leader (Quemoy
Daily 24 May 2003). In addition, the display also contained (Huang 2003, 232)
various battle flags and ensigns of different corps, photos of the military
commanders in all ranks in the battle, significant documents, all types of shells
[projectiles], simulative models of the aerial, naval, and artillery battles, and so on.
[The museum] is an archive of historical materials of the battle. 各軍種軍旗、戰役
期間各級將領照片。重要文件、各型砲彈、還有海、空、砲戰場面的模擬模型
等，是記錄該戰役的史料庫。.
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Figure 5.5 and 5.6. The August 23rd Battle Museum in 2004. The renovated
museum retained its original architectural design. On the façade of its two wings,
the military inscribed names of soldiers who fought and died in the battle to
perpetuate the memory of their patriotism. [photos by the author]
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Figure 5.7 and 5.8. Exhibition of the August 23rd Battle Museum before 1992.
The lobby of the museum displayed a photo of Chiang Kai-Shek in the middle of
two rows of battle flags. [5.7 Source: Lee 1996] Behind the lobby wall, the
exhibitions conveyed three themes: (1) Chiang Kai-Shek’s involvement in the
battle, (2) his son and successor, Chiang Ching-Kuo’s involvement in the battle,
and (3) the process of the battle [5.8 Source: Jiang 2007]
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During the military rule, the museum was only open to certain personnel with the QDH’s
permission and with reservation (Quemoy Daily 2 Mar. 2004). As a military facility to
uplift morale, the museum interpreted the past from the military and national perspective.
Witnessing this, a local historian, Chang Huo-Mu 張火木, appealed to add the civilian
side of the story into the museum displays. “The national battle history and the local
civilian history should be treated with equal significance”; with a clarification, he
continues, “[the latter] is exactly where the value of carrying forward the battlefield
culture resides in” (Quemoy Daily 24 May 2003). Having said this, he implied that one
should learn the true value of war commemoration from civilians’ miseries during the war.
However, the museum neglected “the behind-the-scene distress of locals who died under
rubble of their destroyed houses 地區民眾屋毀人亡背後心酸的故事” (Quemoy Daily
24 May 2003). In 2001, the QDH transferred the museum to the KNP, which soon
updated the museum with exhibitions including civilian war memories.
After completing the renovation in 2003, the KNP opened the museum to the public
on a daily basis. The outdoor weaponry display and the memorial walls generally
remained the same, so did the structure’s architecture. The major change occurred to the
interior exhibition. First of all, the battle flags and Chiang’s portrayal in the lobby
disappeared, and in their place now is a wall with a light box showing images taken
during the artillery war: villages destroyed into debris by shellfire, piles of materiel on the
beach, and a close shot of the barrel of a M115 howitzer. Over the top of the light-box
wall is a panoramic photo of the after-bombardment ruins of the Guningtou village.
(Figure 5.9) Even with all the changes, the nationalist emblem sternly remains on the
ceiling. The new exhibitions in the museum introduce three stages of the artillery war,
including the pre-war situation, the progress of the war, and its aftermath. The displays of
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Figure 5.9. The Entrance of the August 23rd Battle Museum in 2004. The realism in the
renovation today conveys the grimness of war rather than the symbolism in the previous
settings of civic religion. [photos by the author]
268

the pre-war stage explain the international condition between the communist bloc and the
free world, as well as the domestic situation about how the two Chinas prepared
themselves to conquer each other. The militarization of Quemoy such as the construction
of infrastructure and underground facilities happened in this stage also appears in the
exhibition. The next section pertaining to the progress of war emphasizes how the
nationalist forces broke through the communist embargo by bombardments and thereby
obtained their final triumph. The interpretive boards cover the civilian contribution to the
tragic victory, for which the army conscripted local males to serve mainly as porters on
the beach unloading arriving supplies from landing vessels under shellfire.
In the exhibition titled “Life during the War,” the museum remodels the room to
mimic an earth tunnel where many islanders hid during forty-four days of the artillery
war. The whole section occupying a third of the museum is dedicated to the civilian
memories of the war. To portray the conditions, the exhibition shows the ferocity of
bombardments by a model of a destroyed village, the civilian circumstances in a
hand-dug bomb shelter, and through audio recording of psychological operations calling
for surrender (Figure 5.10). Through these media, the exhibition intends “to return the
locals and visiting veterans once serving in Quemoy back to the past time and space and
to evoke their memories of those days 讓地區民眾和曾在金門當兵的遊客回到過去時
空，喚起那一個年代的記憶” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). Furthermore, as the
crescendo of the museum, the Shocking Theater 震撼劇場 leads visitors to a
three-minute simulation of bombardments constituted by a documentary film played on
surrounding screens and a quaking floor driven by machines underneath. The bodily
experience of the flashes, thunders, and vibrations invites visitors to relive the local life
under the long-lasting air strikes. The rest of the exhibition concerns the aftermath of the
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A

Figure 5.10. Exhibition of
“Life during the War.”
Simulations of the
underground caves that
civilians dug under shellfire
as air-raid shelters keynote
the motif of this exhibition
(A). In addition to the
interpretive boards, the
museum also displays shell
fragments and a loudspeaker
used to make propaganda
calls (B). The audio records
of these propaganda calls
made from the both sides
alternately resonate in the
tunnel. Under the continuous
bombardments, the battle
completely destroyed a few
villages, and the museum
recreates the catastrophe by a
model of the post-war
Donglin village 東林 (C).

B

C

[Source: photos A and B
courtesy of Kinmen National
Park; photo C by the author]
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artillery war, including the exchange of fire on alternate days, the psychological warfare
through airborne and waterborne propaganda, and the militarization of daily life through
battlefield regulations. Also in the exhibition are displays of the exploits of specific
troops during the war, and a glance at soldiers’ life outside their camps in the local
villages. The section epitomizes the public life under military rule, and concludes the tour
with the last exhibition, “Passing through the Historic Memories,” which proclaims the
end of the anticommunist struggles by putting it to the past and the hope that “the war
never recurs and [Quemoyans’] descendents can enjoy peace forever 烽火兵戎不再，子
孫永享安平” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003).
Through these renovated exhibitions, the KNP intends to “integrally present the true
visage of the history and the fortitudinous strength of Quemoyans in their valiant
involvement in the artillery war 完整呈現歷史原貌，以及金門百姓堅韌的生命力在砲
戰中英勇的表現” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan. 2003). For multiple purposes, the remodeled
interior inevitably encompasses collective memories of the commoners and soldiers in
Quemoy. While in the past the museum exhibits lingered on the national point of view of
war history, the renewed materials today narrate the past in a hybrid fashion that
constitutes both sides of the story. However, even if the eclecticism is the way to “present
the true visage of the history,” the major concern in this case is not authenticity, but
rather incorporation of the masses’ view into the reinterpretation of the past. In fact, when
the KNP brags about its adoption of the late multimedia in the renovation project for their
mutability, it also claims (Quemoy Daily 28 July 2002),
[The adoption] would hopefully fulfill the goal to comprehensively present the war
history and moreover to enable [future] renewal of the contents [of museum] in
correspondence to the change of the Cross-Strait [China-Taiwan] relations. 以期達
到戰史完整呈現之目的，更可因應兩岸情勢轉變而更新其內容
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As long as the “true visage of the history” in the museum is set to change following the
future political weather, the current adoption of the masses’ viewpoint may well result
from democratization, due to the museum’s transformation from a military facility to a
tourist attraction for the general public. The case of remodeling manifests the dimension
of social construction in representing the past, and how the present-day dominant group
selectively appropriates the historic monument into its favor through reinterpretation.
From the first sight of their tour in the museum, visitors witness no pride, honor, or
loyalty to the country that the former setting may seek to evoke, but rather the price of
waging war that inflicts a calamity on the masses, arrested in the photos on the light
boxes. The opening statement of the museum keynotes its current definition of the
artillery war, and the viewpoint is substantiated by the simulation in “Life during the
War” and “Shocking Theater.” The last exhibition eventually puts straight the antiwar
purpose of the remodeling to steer visitors passing through the past, stuffed with
insufferable experience of war. Due to the insinuation of this message, meaning of the
commemorative space becomes complicated. On one hand, the antiwar utterance in the
virtual tour turns the current interpretation of the battle in opposition to the former one,
which was to uplift morale and provided a rationale for the museum to exist in the first
place. As a mental instrument to sustain the anticommunist struggle and the nationalist
cause to recover mainland China, the museum is currently renovated to do just the
opposite—to promote reconciliation. However, the pacifying voice of the museum is
simultaneously half-muffled by its dissidence. The reinterpretation of the past, on the
other hand, alternately coexists with memorabilia inherited from the former settings and
re-disposed to celebrate the military exploits and the national victory in the war. The
incongruent sets of displays, although each may lead to distinct and opposite conclusions
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of the artillery war, together form a heterogeneous remix, “blurred to become mutually
constitutive as a new” (DeLyser 2003, 886).
Although the commemorated past in the museum is construed from two angles, the
military and the masses’ sides of story stay consistent with each other in a general term
that however is contrary with the P.R.C.’s side of story. For the reason, the P.R.C.
administrations approve travel permits for mainlanders’ group tour to Quemoy under an
unofficial condition: Their itineraries should not include war museums (Jiang 2007, 143).
The exhibitive politics of the war museums in Quemoy and even the rhetoric therein
(such as the phrase, [Mao’s] “bandit” army, or accusations against its atrocities)
indeed conflict with the historical discourses of the P.R.C. It is then understandable
why the Chinese authorities constrain mainland tourists to visit the war museums.
The blurring, double vision of the past in the remodeled museum can neither clearly utter
the anticommunist advocacy, nor can it successfully avert the political offense to the
P.R.C. authorities. By contrast, the Juguang Memorial, as a former nationalist shrine, is
bustling with mainland tourists and did not provoke any bans from the P.R.C. authorities
after remodeling. The different spatial reception stems from the applied methods of
renovation, which also sheds light on the continuance of the place identity of the two
former commemorative spaces: The museum persists in the identity but the memorial
forsakes it. As the Juguang Memorial is turning into a visitor center, the spatial ambiguity
caught in the becoming clouds its monumentality as a nationalist sanctuary. The
reinvention therefore dilutes the dominant voice by arousing a Babel where sundry and
piecemeal information on Quemoy confuses the visitors’ perception of place identity.
Otherwise, keeping the identity of a commemorative site, as the August 23rd Battle
Museum does, despite conveying an inarticulate new message of peacemaking, is still a
sterile product, boycotted by the mainland market. In its case, the remodeling is intended
more for the domestic audience than the Others formerly inside the Bamboo Curtain.
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Regardless of their contents, the renovations applied to both the Juguang Memorial
and the August 23rd Battle Museum profoundly localized the two former shrines to
nationalism. The localization of the iconographies into the local material cultures utters
the local people’s intention to justify the historic significance of their participation in the
national history. So while the purpose of renovation is to show “the fortitudinous strength
of Quemoyan in their valiant involvement in the artillery war” (Quemoy Daily 22 Jan.
2003), localization happens. It becomes a cultural instrument which appropriates the
historical significance of the war to buttress the significance of the local history. To put it
plainly, the localization enables Quemoyans to take credit for the military and political
gains from the conflicts and the containment policy. With the nationalist shrines turned
into a museum of Quemoy and anticommunism converted to the battlefield culture of
Quemoy, the cultural appropriation manifests the dialogue between the battlefield
Quemoy and the cultural/tourist Quemoy.
When the dialogue actualizes in the landscape, the localization of the nationalist
monuments occurs with variations, for example, in the degrees of thoroughness or, as
noted, the methods of renovation. The inconsistency or messiness of localization in
practice essentializes its dialogic quality in reediting the landscape. Accounting for
localization, an local architectural historian, Jiang, recognizes its variety, and comments
that, in comparison, the Guningtou Battle Museum it is less localized for “a lack of
interpretations from the masses’ angle 缺少人民觀點的詮釋” (Quemoy Daily 18 Apr.
2006). As such, the locals’ concerns for the monuments center on their localization that
makes these commemorative spaces apt to present the collective past of Quemoyan from
their point of view. As the blurred identity of these monuments is the outcome of
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localization, the establishment of the local connections with these former national spaces
through remodeling is a form of homeland reconstruction.
Similar to the appropriated monuments, the reconstructed historic sites and buildings
are also manifestations of homeland reconstruction. Beyond the purpose of developing
tourism, the policy of “cultural Quemoy” eventually lead to a restoration of the local
material cultures, after demilitarization makes room for the reconstruction to take place.
The localized landscape articulates the inhabitants’ understanding of how Quemoy ought
to be like as the locals regain their control of place. Based on the dialogue between
battlefield reinvention and historic reconstruction, localization blurs the demarcations
between the battlefield Quemoy and the antebellum Quemoy; whereby it forms a new,
hybrid image of Quemoy. Due to its eclecticism, most mainland tourists who are attracted
to the stereotyped impression of battlefield Quemoy (Chen, Chen and Lee 2010)
nonetheless find the “warfare relics and reserves” in the disarmed island satisfactory
(Chen, Chen and Lee 2009, 277). The eclecticism meanwhile enables the locals to fulfill
their aspiration for home reconstruction with the demonstrative localism that engineers
rival cultural images against the battlefield Quemoy through historic preservation. As a
result, the new, hybrid image of Quemoy is capable of conveying the local understanding
of their homeland image, while meeting others’ expectation to the destination image of a
battlefield. The juxtaposition of multicultural landscapes provides a likely solution for the
conflict between demilitarization and tourism development; yet over time it wears off the
distinction between the two representations of Quemoy. After the twenty-year
development of tourism, the locals have appropriated the military heritage as an integral
feature of Quemoy culture by reinvention. Besides, the most attractive tourist resources in
Quemoy for Taiwanese tourists have changed from battlefield experience (Ou 2005) to
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local traditional architecture/culture (Chang 2011). The change of attractions indicates
that the identity reformulation in effect works in the landscape and Others’ recognition of
Quemoy. As such, the cultural hybridity created by the identity reformulation serves both
as a showcase of the ambiguous local identity and a false front for tourist consumption.
The fusion of cultures in the museums exemplifies the synecdoche of the landscape
localization of the whole island. The KNP and the county government by enforcing the
policy of cultural Quemoy intend to collaboratively build a museum island. The
reinvented military landscape and the reconstructed historical landscape together
constitute the major exhibitions of the eco-museum. The pre-industrial natural landscape
and ecosystem conserved in military reserves over the island is often a backdrop for the
cultural landscapes. As a result, there are three types of tourist attractions of the cultural
Quemoy, and its two pillars, the military and historical heritages, are grounded on the
natural spectacles. In contrast to the hyperreal verisimilitudes of historic reconstruction
and military reinvention, the natural attractions are the earthiest type of the three. Instead
of simulations of other time and space, the spectacles of borderland scenery,
bird-watching, and crescent beaches are all natural blessings of Quemoy. As the tourism
development demands the locals to erect a false front for visual attraction, it
simultaneously segregates the everyday reality from most tourists.
Due to the underdevelopment of Quemoy, in spite of a satisfactory tourist
destination, the locals often ironically refer to their homeland as “pretty mountains, pretty
waters, and pretty boring [places] 好山、好水、好無聊” (Quemoy Daily 19 June 2011).
The backwardness however facilitates the comprehensive preservation of pre-modern
settlements and the large-scale reinvention of military relics, both of which require a
land-use pattern of low-intensity development. That is to say, the repercussions of the
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museum island confine Quemoy to somehow stay on the path of underdevelopment to
maintain its attractiveness to tourists. By the allelopathic effect of heritage tourism, the
elite in the new power structure of the post-conflict society can maintain the tourist
industry as the mainstay of Quemoy, and pass down the genes of the cultural/tourist
Quemoy. The institutionalization of the new identity through the hybrid cultural façade
and its segregation from the backstage then continue to reproduce the pre-modern and
pre-industrial place image.
5.3 The Everyday Poetics: Reusing Ruins as Leisure Spaces
The alienation of the reformulated representation of Quemoy from its day-to-day life
has its reciprocal effects on both tourists and the locals. While the constructed image of
the museum island constrains the tourist understanding of Quemoy, to a different degree
it also distances the locals from the reinvented cultural image of their homeland. The
cultural alienation increases when the elites attempt to repackage the local cultures as a
high culture through reinvention. Gentrification of the underdeveloped island into a
museum circumstantially gentrifies culture as the elites repack the local cultures to
elevate its value and attractiveness of heritage tourism. The cultural reinventions attach
new interpretations to the taken-for-granted material settings, and translate the life
cultures to academic jargons that are unfamiliar to residents. On one hand,
preservationists and architectural historians impose their disciplinary knowledge
(typologies, iconographies, etc.) upon material settings of homes and folk villages. The
governmental apparatus on the other hand circulates the academic terms and knowledge
through publications, public lectures, and workshops to reproduce the discourse. Besides,
the county government regularly holds training programs for local interpreters and tour
guides (Quemoy Daily 3 Mar. 2004)
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to consolidate interpreters’ knowledge of the history, culture, customs of Quemoy so
that guests [especially the mainland tourists] can return full-handed from our
treasure island [with rich cultural experience]. 充實解說員的金門歷史、文化及風
土人情等知識，才能讓賓客入寶山而滿載回。
As such, the production and circulation of local knowledge achieves internal control and
external exhibition. The “boosterism” owes its success to militarization that bequeaths the
mobilizing mechanism and “strong community-rooted organizations” to propagandize the
products of cultural industries (Yang and Hsing 2001, 78). These reinterpretations
ostensibly add cultural richness to the constituent simulacra of the museum island and
therefore the destination attractiveness of Quemoy in the tourist market. However, the
cultural gentrification simultaneously displaces some locals from their homeland by the
abstruse and abstract knowledge, where there comes the necessity to educate and
discipline them about their own culture.
Due to the spontaneous segregation of tourist activities from the local everyday life,
the everyday Quemoy and the cultural/tourist representation coexist like two parallel
universes with only a few portals to communicate with each other. The gap between the
commoditized cultural representation and the local everyday landscape is not usually
noticeable until certain events nudged the two worlds to collide. The art festival, Bunker
Museum of Contemporary Art, in 2004 was one of such occasions exposing the gap
between the cultural Quemoy and the locals’ everyday Quemoy. In order “to rehabilitate
the battlefield relics and to promote the tourist development in Quemoy 為了活化這些
戰爭遺跡，為了促進金門觀光發展” (Quemoy Daily 30 Aug 2004), the county
government held the art festival, and commissioned foreign artists to create artworks in
the derelict military structures. The county commissioner Lee claimed the purpose of the
art festival was “to stress the people’s aspirations to avoid war and to pursue peace 凸顯
全民「遠離戰爭，迎向和平」的渴望.” Thereby, the artistic transformation of military
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relics through the festival would “let Quemoy become a silent monument to record the
memory of the Cold War 讓金門成為記錄冷戰記憶的一座無聲紀念碑” (Quemoy
Daily 25 Feb. 2004). The art festival successfully attracted ca. 880,000 visitors around the
world, and made the headlines of several major international media, including the New
York Times, BBC, and NHK (Quemoy Daily 1 Mar. 2005). The festival received wide
applause from art critics and the general publics; and thereby restaged Quemoy under the
global spotlight for a reason other than war. The local media considered that the latter
effect of the festival would assist Quemoy to “switch the place image from the former
one about national defense and a battlefield to the current one prone to military relics and
cultural tourism 地區從以往的國防、戰地印象，轉變為現今的戰地史蹟及文化觀光
導向” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2005). Due to the effect of the festival on boosterism, the
county head remarked that the locals should be proud of this successful event; however
the comment was made in the context to argue against critiques on his Laputan
governance of the county (Quemoy Daily 30 Nov. 2005).
From the preparatory stage, the event was under attack. The county government
commissioned no native artists to create artworks for the festival, and was criticized for
squandered money on famous foreign artists for vanity (Quemoy Daily 26 Feb. 2004).
After the festival kicked off, the discontent turned sour when “most local folks’ common
reception of the installation art in the bunker was that: ‘What the heck is this?’ 多數的鄉
親在看完碉堡藝術裝置後，普遍的反應是：「這是什麼碗糕？」” (Quemoy Daily 13
Nov. 2004). The editorial comment then discreetly suggested, “perhaps, the most crucial
factor, which determines whether an event will be well-received, resides in whether it is
‘easy to understand’ 或許，舉辦一場活動是否受歡迎，最大的要件在於是否「通俗」”
(Quemoy Daily 13 Nov. 2004). Later on, the county-owned organs offered reflections on
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the festival, and confessed that the artworks were teeming with “the abstract ideologies
and abstruse, artistic vocabularies 抽象觀念與深邃的藝術語彙裡,” and evidently did
not opt for “straightforward communication 平實的溝通” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2004).
As a result, the lofty reinterpretations with the high cultural tone were inconceivable for
common populace, and “provoked considerable repercussions among the local artists and
commoners 引發本土藝文工作者及民眾不少反彈” (Quemoy Daily 23 Apr. 2004). The
highly praised event among the international community was however vexatious for local
folks, and accounting for the aversion, a critic retrospectively commented (Lin 2004, 22),
It is nonetheless an evident fact that the [foreign] artists did not have profound
understanding of the event venues, the event theme, and most importantly the local
people’s perceptions [on the suject] 藝術家與表現場域、表現主題乃至最重要
的，與當地人感受之間的互動在多數作品中並不深刻，則仍是顯而易見的事實
In this view, the indifference to the place specificity and the disregard of the locals as one
audience of these artworks should be responsible for the discontent. By revealing the
cause, the critic indirectly substantiated the gap between ordinary and cultural/tourist
landscapes that the local elite created for cultural consumption and landscape pretension.
Through reinterpretation of cultural landscapes, the local elites orchestrated an
historic reconstruction to produce a multicultural, tourist landscape that is situated in and
interrelating with the ordinary landscape. Their creations contributed to the diversity of
tourism resources as well as the cultural hybridity, and in some cases, the tourist
development also produced recreational spots for the locals. As fringe benefits of the
cultural gentrification, these reinvented landscapes, such as the Maoshan Tower, are
polysemic for the contemporary generation. They are at the same time recreational spaces,
military relics, and heritage sites. Their multicultural and multilayer material settings
reflexively annunciate multiple voices to their user groups, and lead visitors to multiple
locales contingent on their spatial perceptions. These places are therefore sightseeing
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destinations for tourists and leisure locations for the locals. The duality is the spatial
characteristics that smooth out possible cultural gaps between the locals and tourists.
These places as landscape palimpsests thus become a collage—historic venues in the eyes
of heritage tourists, military sites in the eyes of military enthusiasts, and scenic spots in
the eyes of the inhabitants—so their images should at least partially satisfy each social
group with distinct recreational purposes. These places are analogous to theater scenes,
against which the play can either be imaginary in the spectators’ mind, traveling through
time, or be as real as the natural scenery in the innocent eyes.
The Triangular Fort is located at the end of a projecting sandbar on the northwest
coast of Quemoy, guarding the mouth of an inlet to Xiamen Bay (Figure 5.11). Until 1949,
the mainland merchants had customarily sailed in junks into the inlet to trade with people
in the Guningtou village for centuries (Lee 2009). The waters adjacent to the fort were the
venue of a decisive naval battle, by which the allied force of the Netherlanders and the
Qing Empire defeated the maritime power of Koxinga in 1663. The Qing Empire then
scorched Quemoy, evicting all islanders, and turned it into a deserted island for twenty
years. The local historian in Quemoy often terms the incident the “Guimao Tragedy 癸卯
之變” when the empire hastily and forcefully expelled inhabitants from their homeland
(Xu 2010).
The place, as a reminder of the awkward position of Quemoy in between the
maritime and the land powers, again turned into a highly fortified spot during the military
struggle between P.R.C. and R.O.C. In 1967 the QDH embanked the inlet for defense
considerations, and turned it into a lagoon called Lake Cih 慈湖. In the intertidal zone
outside the sea wall, the military implanted layers of anti-landing spikes made of
segments of tipped railway rails rising obliquely from the seabed (Figure 5.12). On the
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Figure 5.11. The Triangular Fort in 2008. The surroundings of the fort were still
under demining, which cleared most vegetation on the sand bar. The decommissioned
tanks in front of the fort dejectedly stood aside the artwork created for the Bunker
Museum of Contemporary Art. [photo by the author]

Figure 5.12. The Anti-landing Spikes outside the Cih Causeway. In the demilitarized
today, the anti-landing spikes in the intertidal zone become ideal substrates for wild
oysters to attach to. The skyline of the Xiamen city on the horizon is visible from the
area on a clear day. The unobstructed view makes the area a favorite scenic spot.
[photo by the author in 2008]
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two ends of Cih Causeway 慈堤, the military subsequently deployed garrisons to prevent
enemy from breaching through the point inland behind. In the deployment, the position
on the north end is the Triangular Fort, surrounded by layers of defenses and minefields
that still restrict human activities. An interpretive board erected outside the fort explains
the rational for the nationalist deployment of garrisons at the location. According to its
text, the fort occupies a strategic position that could monitor “the movements on the
opposite [mainland] coast; [could coordinate] naval defenses on Kinmen‘s western coast”;
and blockade the channel between Quemoy and Leiyu. The geographical characteristics
promote the place repeatedly chosen as the venue of military activities. Due to the
unobstructed visibility in the area that availed monitoring enemy activities in the past, the
KNP constructed a rest area next to the bridgehead of the causeway in 1997. The area
mainly consists of an overlook platform for visual enjoyment of the natural scenery.
Mounted on the rail of the platform, a few interpretive boards illustrate the visible distant
landscape, the nearby observable bird species, and the surrounding military relics. By
their content, these interpretive media suggestively direct the tourist gazes upon the ocean
view of the historic naval battlefield, the wetland and intertidal ecosystem, the modern
military fortifications, and the skyline of Amoy city, P.R.C. The convergent constellation
of the natural and cultural spectacles at the location thereby makes the place a popular
spot for all social groups, who by popular votes accredit the “sunset on the Cih Causeway
慈堤落日” as one of the “new ten scenic spots of Quemoy 金門新十景” in 2007 (United
Daily News 11 Dec. 2007).
The material settings however did not originally obtain the eclectic attractiveness but
evolved with recreational and tourist activities through the years. The rest area with a
warning sign of minefields in the surroundings was initially a sightseeing spot for the
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locals and self-guided tourists. By the ebb and flow, the local fishermen and women in
dribs and drabs would also appear in the beach to forage seafood or to check on their
fixed fishing nets during the day. Due to a lack of nightlife, the night scene of the
glittering and blinking Amoy city with winds and waves in the ear popularized the place
as a rendezvous after dark especially for youngsters and couples requiring privacy.
However, the sense of place gradually deviated from the local and bucolic tinge, and
turned brighter and richer along with sequences of events held in the place. The first
public gathering was for a firework festival synchronized with its counterpart in the
Amoy city in 2002. The event again took advantage of the cross-border visibility, which
allowed viewers to perceive the collaboration between the two firework shows taking
place across the waters. By the synchronic display, the county government attempted to
convey a notion of reconciliation to “substitute shellfire for the fireworks 以煙火取代砲
火” (Quemoy Daily 27 Feb 2002). The geographical characteristics enabling the past
mutual surveillance became an advantage to commence a new type of engagement of
peacemaking. Also, the ritual of cultural demilitarization visibly occurred again in this
event. As shown in the case of the Mashan Observation Station, introduction of military
simulacra to the heritage site of battlefield tourism spotlights the absence of necessary
constituents of a battlefield—for example, soldiers and conflicts. Awareness of their
absence from their verisimilar substitutes thereby polarizes the landscape change after
demilitarization. When the catchphrase of the event juxtaposed fireworks and shellfire, it
immediately pointed out the absence and the substitute employed in the ritual. Due to the
similarity between the two types of explosives—their blasts, flares, and the acrid smell of
gunsmoke—the pleasure brought by fireworks alleviated or even subverted the dangerous
association of shellfire. For the declarative quality of the event, the county government
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ritualized the fireworks to repeatedly demonstrate the goodwill of peacemaking and
demilitarize the past by the contrast between two explosives in the performance.
The theatricality of the area intensified after the QDH released the fort to the KNP,
which soon offered it as a venue of installation art for the Bunker Museum of
Contemporary Art in 2004. With two artists incorporating their works with the fort,
tourists continuously made pilgrimages to the reinvented military structure that the
military abandoned during the exhibition, and turned the fort thenceforward into a tourist
attraction. After the art festival concluded, the fort identified as a reused military relic
continued to attract self-guided tourists until the intensified bird-watching activities in the
area induced a remodeling of its interior as a bird observation station in 2006. The
well-conserved beachfront environment and the lagoon in the vicinity of the fort were
ideal habitat for birds and water fowls. Lake Cih annually attracted approximately 8,000
great cormorants in the winter. The magnitude of the migratory birds constituted a natural
wonder, which not only provided a recreational opportunity for the local populace but
also foreign bird-watchers and naturalists. Through the ecotourism attractions, these
visitors reinvigorated the stagnant tourist business in Quemoy’s harsh and gusty winter,
when northern birds migrate to this subtropic southern island.33 Grasping the opportunity,
the KNP and the county government collaboratively have held an annual event called the
Great Cormorant Season since 2003, and with years of the celebration they successfully
insinuated the “local natural speciality” in the military structure. Like the Juguang Tower,
the fort also underwent a change in place identity after reinvention (e.g.
33

The locals pose two reasons to claim the exclusivity of the natural phenomena in Quemoy: First, the
location of Quemoy in the middle of the curvy coastline of Southeast China made the island an essential
midway stop for most migratory birds en route (Quemoy Daily 16 Oct. 2003). Second, the underdeveloped
environment of former military reserves accidentally resulted in a well-conserved ecosystem (Quemoy
Daily 23 Jul. 2004) that attracted migratory birds form other industrialized, disturbed environments, like the
urbanized Amoy city (Quemoy Daily 26 Nov. 2006).
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Figure 5.13. The Remodeled Interior of
the Triangular Fort. The fort consists of
three gun emplacements at the three
corners, which enable bird-watching
through their embrasures today. [Source:
photo by the author in 2011; map adopted
from the on-site interpretive board]

Figure 5.14. The Tank Display on the Sandy Ground. After the KNP completed
demining the area in 2010, these tank introduced to the area reinforced the military
image of the place. [photo by the author in 2011]
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glass milk bottle/vase). The localization of the military structure contingently localized
the natural spectacle by establishing its exclusivity in the region. The KNP remodeled the
interior of the fort with interpretive boards introducing observable bird species in
different habitats in the area. In the online newspaper introduced the Triangular Fort, the
KNP staff explained the new use of the fort as a bird observation station (Figure 5.13;
Kinmen National Park 2009):
The past gun embrasures designed with defense consideration [to hide the shooter]
become the best viewing window for bird watchers today. As flames of war in the
pervading gun smoke had gone, shutters replace triggers. The past rule of
engagement [on the wall of embrasures], “hold the fire in three situations: Do not
shoot if the target is not in range; not in sight; or not aimed,” become the guidelines
of photographing birds today. 昔日防禦的軍事射口，今日成了鳥友最佳觀鳥窗，
沒有煙硝瀰漫的戰火，快門取代了扳機，射口旁昔日射擊守則的「三不打」
：
「打
不到不打、看不到不打、瞄不到不打」，今日成了賞鳥攝影守則
As the military structures often incorporated with their surroundings for protection and
camouflage, their interior design also abided by the principles of defense and secrecy.
Taking advantage of the spatial traits, translation of the fort into a wildlife observatory
was functionally justified, since the design of fortifications indeed provided the secrecy
necessary for a bird observatory. The conversion by spatial traits was not unfamiliar in
the cases of reinvention in Quemoy, just as the exhibits of the battle museum had
ironically turned the facility of anticommunist propaganda into a mouthpiece of pacifists
after reinvention. The common spatial trait could thus justify the cultural appropriation.
The reinterpretation of the rule of engagement as guidelines for photographing birds also
demonstrated the appropriation. Despite divulging a mockery toward the rigid military
culture, it seamlessly transferred the meaning of the fort into the post-conflict age.
After a few stages of demining, the tract of land between the platform and the fort
became available for development, which promoted the union of the two spaces. The
sandy ground covered with clusters of evening primrose provided space for recreational
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activities, like kite-flying, which energized the area limited only to sightseeing before. To
integrate the two leisure spaces, the KNP built a boardwalk along the driveway for their
connection, and an array of concrete pedestals for tanks displayed on the sandy ground
along the coastline. The emplacements of the six decommissioned M41 tanks, lined up
with their guns pointing to the Amoy city, formed a visual continuum extending out from
the Triangle Fort (Figure 5.14). Also, the line of tanks corresponded to layers of the
anti-landing spikes at the beach on the other side of the overlook platform. Their
corresponding deployment highlighted the image of battlefield in the area, and further
forged the piecemeal landscape features into a whole and eclectic spot for recreation. In
addition to the spatial integration, the re-introduction of military features, as also shown
in the rehabilitation of the Mashan Observation Station, showcased the conflicts in the
past, and resulted in a sharp contrast to the prosperous city skyline of Amoy at a distance.
The tilted gun barrels of the tanks, quixotically pointing at the wheel of history that
ground over the naval battle and the artillery war, and thus exemplified the diachronic
irony belonging specifically to the borderland island.
As the eclectic backdrop evolving with and animated by recreational activities, the
landscape of the Triangular Fort departed from its pragmatic everydayness of a facility
for war. However, the change articulated its poetic dimension as a trope in the landscape.
The symbolization of the site, such as the venue of a historic naval battle, was an attempt
to fit the place into the newly formed signifying system of the cultural Quemoy. By
popularizing the historic knowledge, the evocated geographical imagination, on one hand,
increased the cultural value of the heritage site; on the other, diluted the place image that
up to the point was connected exclusively to the military. Likewise, the contemporary art
festival was another investment of cultural capital into the site for the evocation of artistic
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imagination, and to disengage attention from military use of the fort. By attributing the
ecological richness to the legacy of militarization, the portrayal of Quemoy as a unique
bird habitat in the region localized the natural phenomena, and justified the reinvention of
the structure as a bird observation station. The reuse then added another layer of disguise
over the fort. Consequently, the more eclectic and polysemic the place had become after
carnivals and reinvention, the further perception astrayed from the fort’s original raison
d'etre.
The people’s alienation from the conventional understanding of the fort indicates the
achievements in its identity reformulation that induces the cultural heterogeneity to free
the place from the monopoly of everydayness. As touring often involves otherness,
recreation too involves activities other than mundane undertakings. The extraordinariness
of leisure activities necessitates an out-of-place understanding of the material settings to
spur people’s poetic performance in places for recreation. In this light, the development
of poetic, leisure space from an everyday space is an attempt on an “enacted utopia.” For
such creation, Foucault coins a term “heterotopia” (Foucault 1986, 24). He uses a mirror
and the reflection in the mirror to account for the relations between the unreal utopia (the
reflection in the mirror), the real Foucault in front of the mirror, and the reflexive
Foucault inside the mirror. Although the utopia in the mirror, a virtual, counter space to
the reality, does not exist, the mirror however does. As the reflexive Foucault appears in
the mirrored virtual world where the real Foucault is absent, the real Foucault however is
in the reality on a counter position to his reflection. By simultaneity, juxtaposition, and
displacement produced by the mirror, Foucault intends to demonstrate the mirror, which
eclectically subsumes all worlds, as the “enacted utopia” (Foucault 1986, 24):
it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at
once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely
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unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is
over there.
As the world in the mirror is unreal, imaginary, and poetic, the reality is trivial, mundane,
and everyday. The contrast, according to Foucault, however stems from individual
perception, namely intra-subjectivity. For this reason, I prefer this other heterotopia, the
backdrop scene of plays instead of the mirror, to analogize the landscape in the Triangular
Fort and epitomize “heterotopias.” As Mitchell indicated, “[s]pace is the unchanging
backdrop against which the life is played out” (2000, 215). By the backdrop conception, I
aim to emphasize the collective theatricality that anthropocentrically (re)enacts the unreal
utopia through human orchestrated performance. Although a scenographer can alternately
and repeatedly use the same backdrop to situate different scenarios in a play, the reading
of landscape is each time distinct for situations among different players. Their unique
understandings can render the landscape as a working space for foraging for seafood, a
scenic spot for sightseeing, or the both/and also. Due to the semiotic nuances, the
everydayness and the poetics of place can be interchangeable, juxtaposing, contesting, or
at least agreeing to disagree in place. The leisure spot around the Triangular Fort is
therefore where the cultural/tourist Quemoy meets the everyday Quemoy, while their
jumbled attunement delivers the everyday poetics of the heterotopia shared by locals and
tourists.
Foucault has used variant real spaces to exemplify his concept of “heterotopia.” He
considers that museums, “a place of all times that is itself outside of time,” and
fairgrounds, “marvelous empty sites . . . teem once or twice a year” with extraordinary
yet temporal crowds are both heterotopias of time (Foucault 1986, 26). The tourists,
trapped in a snippet of time in each tourist spot, experience the representation of historic
stages of Quemoy one by one, as a stroll through exhibition rooms in a museum.
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Otherwise, they may have a quick taste of extraordinary happenings converging at the
eclectic sites for a short duration, like scenes of dusk at the Triangular Fort. Since the
tourist/cultural Quemoy are poetically outside of time, yet contingent to the temporality
of the trip, the tourist experience of Quemoy coincides with Foucault’s examples of
heterotopias. In his understanding, the modern destinations of heritage tourism are in fact
the combination of the two heterotopias concerning time. Accordingly, the intention to
create a museum island for heritage tourism in Quemoy unsurprisingly results in the
unique social product of “the epoch of space” (Foucault 1986, 22). His emphasis on space
is to reveal the characteristic phenomena of our epoch: the juxtaposition that transcends
space and time. By the concept of heterotopias, he illustrates the phenomena (Foucault
1986, 25):
The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces,
several sites that are in themselves incompatible. Thus it is that the theater brings
onto the rectangle of the stage, one after the other, a whole series of places that are
foreign to one another . . . .
Unlike the temporal juxtaposition (i.e. simultaneity), the spatial juxtaposition stands
out by multilocality, which, as Rodman (2003, 211) points out, “is a way of experiencing
those [heterotopias] and other places.” Whereas place is socially constructed, actors can
not only act out the embedded social relations, but also inscribe social relations on places.
Multilocality thus can be construed as the juxtaposition of different social relations to a
single place, which is thus polysemic for different actors. For this reason, the Triangular
Fort can have overtly different meanings to military enthusiasts, preservationists,
bird-watchers, fishers, and tourists. They may put on a different play deemed proper in
situ to create a world for themselves to be. The intersubjective realities among members
in the different social groups constitute heterotopias with multilocality and therefore
multiculturality, which then indicates the essentiality of human performance to place
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formation. As heterotopias are the human effort to enact utopia, the local people in
Quemoy in retrieving their homeland from militarization created a chaotic babel in which
they dwell. In light of heterotopias, the cultural mechanism driven by irony and simulacra
signifies a dialogical process of localization that through negotiation and selective
appropriation turns heterogeneous heritage into cultural capital exclusively of Quemoy.
To cope with the marginalization after demilitarization, the society of the border island
dispatches the military reality to the past, while bringing an imaginary past to the present
through landscape planning. To structure a heterotopia as home is therefore realization of
social strategy for the reversal of the coordinate system today. Even though the babel of
landscape reinterpretation makes each voice illegible, the hybrid potpourri of homeland
endures, but it endures as a boat, “a floating piece of space, a place without a place, . . .
from port to port, from tack to tack” (Foucault 1986, 27) in “a continuous process of
becoming” (Vološinov 1986, 81).
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: AMBIGUITY AS RESISTANCE STRATEGY
This study investigated the change in landscape spurred by a change in the power
structure of post-conflict societies. Following geopolitical shifts, places shaped by
conflicts often undergo identity reformulation to celebrate the departure of the past social
orders and the arrival of the new ones. Reshaping the landscape is thus partial fulfillment
and embodiment of the identity reformulation. In this study, I investigated how the
identity reformulation changed the post-conflict landscape and what the cultural
mechanism of the change signifies. I selected Quemoy, a Cold-War frontier that has been
engaging in a transformation since 1992 as my study site and revealed the significance of
the transformation, which by irony subverts the past dominant discourses, and fosters
cultural hybridity as the social strategy to thrive in the post-conflict time.
In shedding its identity as a battlefield, Quemoy transformed itself into a heritage
tourism site. The identity reformulation proceeded with the interplay of three major
dynamics of the post-conflict society: demilitarization, reconciliation, and touristification.
Their collaboration works in the landscape, which reciprocally articulates the formulating
identity. In a holistic view, the landscape change represents a reversal of the coordinate
system of Quemoy that its front and rear, left and right, inside and outside all switch
directions. With the upside down and inside out, the former front of Quemoy dissipates to
form the communal living sphere between Quemoy and Amoy, and the formerly
well-protected and well-hidden inside now opens wide to attract tourists. With the decline
of the combat economy, the left and right flip sides with the local economic center
returning to the west, the side near Amoy. The switch of the geographical coordinate
system thus bespeaks the reterritorialization and the resturcturing of social relations.
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In a case-by-case perspective, the landscape change in Quemoy signifies the local
effort of homeland reconstruction. Undertaking the change, the post-war society engages
itself into an iconoclastic movement which destroys and abandons the majority of
military structures in Quemoy. Otherwise, military relics that accommodate tourist
development receive variant treatments for reinvention. “Disguise” as the most common
and economic treatment covers up military structures to conceal their origins. Through
this process, bunkers at traffic intersections formerly guarding against foreign entry now
bear welcome signs inviting visitors to enter. The reinvention of military structures as
tourist infrastructures thus shows historic irony in the landscape change. “Rehabilitation”
recasts the military facilities into attractions of heritage tourism. Before opening these
facilities to the public, the military deprives them of essential constituents, e.g. soldiers
and weaponry. To counteract demilitarization, rehabilitation often selectively reintroduces
military features back to the spots of battlefield tourism, and thereby reconstitutes their
image in the Cold-War era for authenticity. The contradiction of the treatment that fulfills
demilitarization through reintroduction of military simulation discloses structural irony.
Last, “remodeling” is a treatment to paraphrase the meanings of monumental buildings so
as to localize heritage sites serving as tourist attractions. Through reinterpretation, the
localization selectively appropriates these sites, which become “topo-tropes” in the
landscape, each with multiple meanings. In some cases, such as the August 23rd Battle
Museum, the reinterpreted meaning directly contradicts the raison d'être of the museum.
The juxtaposition of contradictory meanings thus reveals symbolic irony. By the lightness
transpiring from the contrasts between these contesting meanings, the three types of irony
subvert the significance of the past conflicts. Irony in landscape therefore serves as the
initial mechanism of the landscape change in Quemoy.
294

The irony in landscape signifies the arrival of multiculturalism in lieu of the
nationalist metanarrative from the past. The identity reformulation turns Quemoy into a
heritage site and a museum island. For this purpose, the locals obliterated the majority of
military facilities from the landscape, and re-presented the antebellum landscape for
tourist development. The exchange of place image brings about the renaissance of
traditional cultures and localization of landscape. The reshaping of landscape signifies
locals’ recovery of control of place and their efforts toward homeland reconstruction. The
resulting cultural hybridity forms a heterotopia with contesting representations and an
ambiguous identity of the post-conflict society. As a result, the identity reformulation
counter-intentionally frees Quemoy from a single place identity, and reasserts that the
postmodern place is fluid, hybrid, and dialectical.
Whereas the post-conflict society, by irony, culturally demilitarizes its landscape, the
constitution of heterotopias with cultural hybridity actualizes its resistance to the
dominant paradigm of the either/or dichotomy. The change has incurred and is incurring
reversals of the coordinate system of Quemoy for reterritorialization. In geographers’
accounts, heterotopias manifest a “geohistory of otherness” (Peet 1998, 225) “at work in
the interstices of these geographies of control, a history of resistance that itself emerges in
and against the dominant order as a set of ‘counter-sites’” (Mitchell 2000, 215).
Seconding their clarification of heterotopias, the transnationalist “anti-essentializing
concepts of subjectivity that emphasize plurality, mobility, hybridity, margins, and
in-between spaces” also celebrate the multi-cultural formations “that continually
challenge the marginalizing impulses of dominant cultures” (McEwan 2004, 506). The
construction of heterotopias in this sense signifies the resistance of the border island
community to reterritorialization with ambivalence. More importantly, it indicates “an
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emancipatory praxis” in search of “political solutions to the many forms of inequality and
oppression, especially those associated with problems stemming from global
restructuring” (Peet 1998, 225). As declared in the celebration of the ninetieth
anniversary of Quemoy County, the county government aims to make Quemoy “no
longer an offshore island but the center with an ocean and a continent as its hinterland”
(Quemoy Daily 1 Jan. 2005). The boosterism based on cultural hybridity is then a strategy
to avoid marginalization in the post-conflict era and the course of reterritorialization
across the insular history. In this light, the cultural mechanism of landscape change,
which by irony subverts the nationalist hegemony and by hybridity avoids
reterritorialization, both aims to unshackle the border island community from binary
oppositions. As such, the regulated improvisation for emancipation clandestinely operates
under the disguise of hustle and bustle in tourist attractions.
6.1 The Cultural Becoming of a Border Island
Through a review of the geographical biography of Quemoy, I explored the
geographical personality of the island that may contribute to understanding of the current
changes in landscape. I discovered a repeated theme in the insular history that I term as a
“reversal of the geographical coordinate system.” In brief, the small border island has
repetitively faced dramatic change in relations with the land and maritime powers. A
switch of geopolitical relations reverses the directions of social concerns of the marginal
community toward the sea or the mainland. The inbetweenness of the border island
articulates the marginality and the gateway characteristics of Quemoy. Due to its
islandness, the limited environmental capacity of Quemoy promises the involvement of
its people in the seaborne economic activities for their livelihood and overseas emigration
to fend off overpopulation. Through foreign contacts in merchandise and personnel
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exchange, the insular community developed a cultural diversity and hybridity in its
position at a traffic intersection. As a land power, the traditional Chinese regimes deemed
seafaring alternative, unorthodox, or even disturbing, and their responses to it were prone
to imposing constraints. The imperial attitude toward the local way of life aroused
conflicts of interests between Empire and the local people. In this context, the reiterative
reversals represented the fervid articulation of either side’s position on the issue of
maritime activities. By examining historical records of the region, I presented evidence to
problematize the current discourses of the early history of Quemoy, arguing that the local
persistence in the problematic discourses of history present a social strategy to maximize
Quemoyans’ cultural capital relevant to their identities. Bogged in the either/or dichotomy,
the islanders through history have built up their familiarity with the manipulation of
identity politics. Their campaigns have been centered on their ethnicity as Han
Chinese/sea nomads, their social status as obedient imperial subjects/rebellious sea rovers,
and their current nationality of Chinese/Taiwanese. The conflicts spurred by the binary
oppositions of the identities continuously leaves impresses on the landscape of Quemoy,
while the both/and also juxtaposition bequeaths necessary ambiguity for the marginal
society to thrive. Through the Sisyphean process of coordinate reversals, the alternation
of conflict and ambiguity thus constitute the geographical personality of the marginal
society on the border. With the identification of the characteristics, I then demonstrate
how the repetitive process of landscape impress contributes to the place formation.
The latest reversal of the coordinate system happened in 1949 when the nationalist
Chinese retreated to and successfully defended Quemoy. The nationalist construction of
defenses in Quemoy inverted the insular front against communist troops on the brink of
the mainland. Through the theory of the geographical coordinate system, I examined the
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social change after the reversal, and drew conclusions on its manifestation in three
elements of Quemoy. First, by surveys of Quemoy’s landscape, I found that as a result of
the four-decade militarization, the characteristics of a military landscape emitting from
the insular defense system were rigid, hierarchical, and utilitarian. By the imposition of
the defensive system on the landscape, the military carefully charted the spatial
composition and demarcation. The geographical configuration with a clear center and
periphery, front and back, inside and outside constituted an anticommunist stronghold
prepared for a total war. Through the subsequent landscape manifestation, I then
demonstrated how humans shape landscape to facilitate what they jointly engage in, and
reciprocally how the landscape articulates the social intersubjectivity. Second, the
creation of biopower through social control institutionalizes the military disciplines in
everyday practice of the island residents whose bodies hence become the containers and
the enactors of military culture. The biopolitical production unfolds in the militarization
of everyday life in Quemoy where people lived abiding by military rule, and forced
militia duty. The pattern of ordinary life disciplines individuals of the marginal society,
and instills the nationalist metanarratives and anticommunism into the people. Last, the
belligerent condition produced local knowledge specifically of Quemoy as battlefield.
The knowledge provides understanding for unique situations in the battlefield, and
provides necessary “common sense” to sustain the life under shellfire. Reproduction of
the knowledge thus signifies the insinuation of military culture into the local semantic
system. In particular, I explored two occasions that produce alternative meanings of
shelling as desirables associating with joy and sweetness, and by the idiographic
understanding demonstrate how social adaptation to the war condition contributes to the
local knowledge. With discussions on the three social aspects, I theorized the social
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changes of Quemoy arising after the reversal of the geographical coordinate system, and
reveal the systematic configuration and capillaries of militarization.
6.2 The Cultural Mechanism of Landscape Change in Quemoy
As demilitarization and reconciliation are revoking the most recent reversal today,
the coordinate system of Quemoy is reorienting. Due to the development of battlefield
tourism, the former anticommunist stronghold is undergoing a drastic change from a
disposition of expulsion to invitation. The juxtaposition of contradictory meanings of
military structures produces pervasive irony in the landscape. Through observations of
landscape change in Quemoy during the last decade (2003-2012), I examined the ironies
in a landscape emerging from different management methods of military relics, and
concluded three major types of irony: symbolic irony, historical irony, and structural irony.
Their commonality resides in the power, once the lightness of irony transpires, to displace
the historical significance of the nationalist metanarrative. By (re)production of irony in
the landscape, the civil society subverts the former dominant paradigm of the military,
and engages in cultural demilitarization. Coinciding with the production of irony, which
erases the military legacy in Quemoy, a reformulation of identity mushrooms in the
demilitarized landscape. The movement of historical preservation produces historical
simulacra for the development of heritage tourism, which engulfs and localizes the
military heritage to constitute a representation of Quemoy. The landscape change for the
identity reformulation thereby concludes with the production of the tourist destination
that announces the new identity of Quemoy to its visitors. Coming to the conclusion, I
unravel the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy that is a continual
dialectic between production of irony and heterotopias.
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The movement of historical preservation creates a hyperreality, which
simultaneously showcases the reformulated identity as a heritage site to a nonnative
population. Although the image of a heritage site represents the desirable homeland of the
local people, from my observations, the constructed destination image however alienates
tourists from the local everyday reality. I discovered that the final product of identity
reformulation is paradoxically a hyperreality of a romanticized Quemoy in an imaginary
Golden Age. As such, I borrow the lens of Foucault’s heterotopias to look into the
meaning of the cultural mechanism responsible for the reformulation. Foucault
analogized heterotopias to a mirror, reflecting a desirable utopia. If Quemoyans’ nostalgic
homeland, the collective imagined geography, is the utopia in the mirror, the
reconstructed historic sites and the reinvented military structures are the mirror in the real
world reflecting the image. Moreover, the mirror, as an enacted utopia in the world of
ordinariness, captures in itself its surroundings that overlay the hyperreality. Their
juxtaposition blurs the imagined and the everyday reality, and delivers an ambiguous,
dialectical, and paradoxical place of the post-conflict battlefield. The polysemous
multilocality of the post-conflict landscape thus reveals the embedded cultural hybridity
constituted by fragments of a military base, a heritage site, and a border island. In light of
the heterotopias, I substantiated that the cultural mechanism, driven by irony and
simulacra, in fact constitute a dialogue of localization. Through negotiation and selective
appropriation, the process transfers heterogeneous heritage into cultural capital
exclusively of Quemoy. Facing the reorientation of the coordinate system, the border
community dispatches the military reality to the past, while bringing an imaginary past to
the present through landscape planning. Structuring a heterotopia as home is thus
realization of social strategy against marginalization after demilitarization. As the
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multicultural potpourri articulate the border island’s inbetweenness through history, its
ambiguous identity emancipates the insular community from the oppressive, hegemonic
either/or dichotomy. Significance of Quemoy’s identity reformation primarily resides in
the negotiating process rather than its intended purpose to construct a dominant identity.
6.3 The Border Island Identity in Constant Negotiation
In this study, I review the development history of Quemoy in a general fashion of
sequent occupance, discovering the geographical personality of the border island, which
due to its key location at the mouth of Xiamen Bay, instead of the isolation often found as
characteristics of small islands, stands out for its marginality. On the margin of land and
the sea, Quemoy with the inbetweenness is a front of both Chinese regimes and maritime
powers, of which their interplay directs the reversals of the coordinate system of Quemoy
to their directions. I discover that social adaptation to an opposite geopolitical situations
produces irony in the landscape, which in an immediate view nullifies the previous
reversal while in a diachronic view reveals human futility in a Sisyphean process of
territorialization in a border island. My findings of the repetitive reversal of the
coordinate system of Quemoy therefore provide an angle of historical geography to probe
into the issue of place formation of a border island.
By an investigation on the reinvented heritage sites, I reveal that the production of
irony and heterotopias constitute the cultural mechanism of landscape change in Quemoy.
My identification of the mechanism suffices a real case of irony working in landscape. In
the discipline of cultural geography, the subject has insofar largely remained at the
discussions on theories (e.g. Smith 1996; Smith 1997), or conceived places (e.g.
Brigstocke 2011; Craine and Aitken 2004; Ridanpää 2007). While few studies (e.g. Gray
1996; Perera 2002; Smith 2002) explore irony in real places, they are often content with
301

the discovery of irony in landscape. By the case of Quemoy, I advance to demonstrate
how the post-conflict society orchestrates irony in the landscape to subvert the past
dominant discourses, and thereby substantiates the practical use of irony which suggests
an unfamiliar realm long awaiting cultural geographers’ further expeditions.
With the discovery of the cultural mechanism of the landscape change in Quemoy, I
reveal the underlying strategy of social change, by which the post-conflict society resists,
and therefore frees itself from, dominant orders. Although essentialists today may argue
that the cultural hybridity articulates the inconclusive geopolitical relations that retain the
identity reformulation in a status of becoming, my discovery substantiates that the
“ongoingness” is the end product of identity reformulation, for fluidity, hybridity, and
ambivalence of heterotopias provide opportunities for the border island community to
transcend the geographies of control. The awareness of irony and ambiguity in landscape
can thus lead to deterritorialization which obliterates the border island from the charted,
cyclic course of history to become “a place without a place” (Foucault 1986, 27). From
the experiment of the underlying strategy emerges the structure of regulated
improvisation that induces the expressive cultural practice of people long on the margin
of history, as sea nomads, pirates, exiles, repeating the Sisyphean task to challenge
territorialization. Like Sisyphus (Richardson 2003, 339),
[a]s he descends, he plans the route for the return up the mountain. He is man who
knows his work. Each push back to the top comes from that knowledge. Each step
arrives with it own purpose. And gods begin to have their doubts. Could it be that
their punishment has been vanquished?
In this ascent, people in Quemoy benefitted by their previous footprints and conceived a
new strategy to carry their world through the current predicaments, and in their every step
of vanquishment comes the answer to the peril of reducing being to the hegemonic
totality.
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APPENDIX THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FUKUOTUN CULTURE
The discovery of Fukuotun culture has an anthropological significance to the
hypothetical models of Austroniesian dispersal and the location of their homeland.
Identification of Austronesian has amazed anthropologists with the wide distribution of
Austronesian over Oceania, island Southeast Asia, and the coastal region of the mainland
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, they are also puzzled with, and therefore eager to
locate, the origin of Austronesians. A hypothesis proposing the region from the southeast
coast of China to the west coast of Taiwan as the homeland of Austronesians has received
general acceptance among a group of anthropologists (Rolett, Jiao, and Lin 2002; Tsang
2001): Shulter and Marck first proposed Taiwan as the homeland of Proto-Austronesian
culture in 1975. Peter Bellwood however suggested that the homeland of Austronesians
should be on the southeast coast of China. The people first moved to Taiwan in ca.
4000-3500 BCE, and over time gradually dispersed elsewhere. Robert Blust from a
linguistic stand of view agreed that Taiwan was the homeland of the Proto-Austronesian
language, or at least very close to it. Barbara Thiel by a comparison of the archaeological
materials between those of Taiwan and Luzon of Philippines again concluded Taiwan as
the homeland. Darrel Tyron, after examining all precedent hypotheses, inferred the
homeland as Southern China, wherefrom the people moved to Taiwan during 4000-3000
BCE. Although all these scholars tend to agree that the origin is located in the region
from Taiwan to the southeast coast of China, their studies reach this conclusion with
variant reasons and oftentimes chart different dispersing route or routes from one another.
Nevertheless, even coming to disagreement on the exact location, those who consider
Taiwan as the origin of Proto-Austronesian would also agree on the fact that
Pre-Austronesian originate from the Southeast coast of China (Bellwood 2006, 65). After
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all, the development of the proto-language could take place in either locations, but the
Neolithic people in Taiwan should originally come from the mainland. The discovery of
Fu-kuo-tun culture in 1969 thus provides a solid archeological evidence for the
connection. Chang (1987), based on a comparative study on the artifact assemblages,
claimes that Fu-kuo-tun culture has a close relationship with Tapenken 大坌坑
culture—the earliest Neolithic culture in Taiwan (4000-2200 BCE). The geographical
distribution of this archaeological culture includes the west coastal region of Taiwan and
Pescadores (Penghu) archipelago. Chang (1987) hypothesizes Tapenkeng culture as the
materialization of Austronesian culture between 5000-2000 years ago; with the argument,
he then alleges (10-11):
If Fu-kuo-tun culture on the other side of the Taiwan Strait can be proved to be a part
of Ta-pen-keng culture, I would then infer that the homeland of Austronesian can be
pushed back [from Taiwan] to the southeast coast of China, largely concentrated on
the coastal region ranging from the estuary of the Min River southward to the one of
the Han River 韓江 on the east coast of Fukien and Canton.
According to the latest research on Fu-kuo-tun culture, Kuo, Liu, and Dai (2005) updates
the chronology of Fu-kuo-tun culture to 6000-3800 BCE; whereby makes it coeval of
Hemudu 河姆渡 culture in Zhejiang—the other earliest archaeological culture in the
southeast coast of China (6000-4000 BCE). With this chronological status and close
connection with Ta-pen-keng culture, Kuo, Liu, and Dai then asserts Fu-kuo-tun culture
an ancestor type of the former. (Figure 2.3) The discovery of Fu-ku-tun culture therefore
associates Austronesian with Quemoy, and renders Quemoy a possible start point of their
dispersal. Acknowledging this, this study then coincidentally substantiates a migration
route from Quemoy to Taiwan six-thousand years ago since the outset of Ta-peng-keng
culture in Taiwan. And, in turn, the migration route then makes Quemoy a prehistoric
gateway of the region of China.
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